



AN INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL

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## UYGHUR TRIBUNAL

Expert report by Christian Tyler

Date: 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2021

### **Background, expertise, credentials.**

#### Curriculum Vitae:

1963-66: Cambridge University: MA Moral Sciences (Philosophy)

1967-70: Yorkshire Evening Post, Leeds:

1970-2000: staff journalist Financial Times of London: Labour Editor, World Trade Editor, Leader Writer, Chief Feature Writer and columnist.

2000-present: self-employed author and freelance writer.

#### Credentials:

First visited China 1983 as Trade Editor of the FT. In 1984 I wrote first editorial survey in a Western newspaper of a Chinese province (Shandong). In 1988 contributed to FT national survey on China, visiting Inner Mongolia, Ningxia (Chinese Muslim area) and Qinghai; attended joint interview with CCP leaders in Zhongnanhai compound. Later accompanied Lord Young's trade mission to China.

1995: toured southern Xinjiang: by jeep from Dunhuang to Miran, Charklik, Cherchen, Niya, Keriya, to desert oasis Tongguzbasti. Camel train to Mazartagh on Khotan River. Jeep to Aksu, Kucha, Korla, Urumchi.

2002: Six-week research trip for book. Toured northern Xinjiang by road halting at Gulja (Yining **ch**) – Shihezi – Urumchi – Turfan – Kocho (Astana) - Kashgar, Maralbashi. Stayed with Uighur families and kept a journal recording conversations, and opinions of them and their friends, and incidents involving insults and harassment by Han.

#### Publications

*Wild West China: the taming of Xinjiang*, John Murray 200, Rutgers University Press 2004. (Four copies sent this year to Sabi and Associates). Main articles in *Financial Times*: 'The red flag in China's wild west', 6/7<sup>th</sup> Jan, 1996; 'Enter the dragon', 27/28<sup>th</sup> July, 2002; *The Times*, 21<sup>st</sup> August, 2003; *Cornucopia* magazine, 'The Turks of China' Feb 2004 .

My research included interviews with many Uighurs and their families in Xinjiang, with Uighur exiles or their representative group leaders in London, Brussels, Istanbul, Ankara, and Almaty. These are too numerous to mention, and many had to remain anonymous for their own safety. I hosted former WUC president Rebiya Kadeer on a visit to the House of Lords.

My written sources included: histories, memoirs, academic studies, interviews with and reports by Amnesty International UK, Human Rights Watch (Hong Kong), East Turkestan Information Centre UK, and leaked copies of Chinese Communist Party internal documents.

On publication of the book I gave talks to: The Royal Society for Asian Affairs, the Royal Geographical Society, the London School of Economics, the Great Britain-China Council, and student societies at Cambridge, Oxford and Leeds universities.

I have twice given evidence at UK hearings on behalf of Uighur refugees seeking asylum in Britain. Both appeals were successful.

**Purpose of my submission:**

1. To show that the present programme of mass internment and surveillance of the Turki peoples of Xinjiang is only an extreme version of a policy of assimilation adopted for most of the last 70 years under the CCP.
2. To correct the more egregious claims about the history of the region which are made by Chinese government officials to justify its present programme.
3. To establish that Uighurs are a distinct culture, people, or race in contrast to the CCP claim that they have always been Chinese
4. To show that its claims to be fighting terrorism, separatism, religious fanaticism and ‘backward thinking’ are pretexts for a much profounder programme of annexation of land, elimination of Turki culture, and forcible assimilation.
5. To argue that protests, demonstrations and acts of violence against Han Chinese should be seen as retaliation for ill-treatment, injustice, and destruction.

Although I have kept track of events in Xinjiang up to the present, I want to focus on the historical background and its connection to present policy.

My report is in four parts:

History of the occupation of Eastern Turkestan/Xinjiang.  
Ethnic policy before and during Communist Party rule.  
Repression: the regime’s public justification and undeclared motives.  
Repression as the cause, not consequence of ethnic violence.

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## HISTORY OF OCCUPATION

Officials of the PRC have been claiming that Xinjiang has been part of China since the time of the Han dynasty (202 B.C. – 201 C.E.) and that the Uighurs are not descended from the original Turks but were caught up in a ‘pan-Turki conspiracy’.

The government’s claim that the Uighurs are ‘Chinese’ is undermined by the fact that the Communist leadership has persistently treated the native Turki population as second-class citizens. A Chinese province in name, Xinjiang continues to look like a colony in practice.

Xinjiang became a province of China in the late 19th century, towards the end of the Qing dynasty. It had been re-conquered after a Muslim revolt and a short period of independence under the Uzbek warlord Yakub Beg.

Before that it was a colony, annexed and garrisoned by Manchu soldiers after a campaign by the first Qing dynasty emperor and eventual conquest in the 1750s. Manchu rule

was delegated to native leaders. Manchu garrisons remained separate from the Turki populace, increasingly ineffectual as time went by.

Before the CCP won its civil war with the Nationalists, China had effectively lost control of Eastern Turkestan to warlords – Chinese or Hui (Chinese Muslim).

Earlier occupations by the Chinese resembled the old-fashioned colonialism practised by Europeans in Africa, South America and India, where natives were not removed but put to work for the colonists. Recent Chinese occupation of Xinjiang is more like 'settler colonialism' of white America's encroachment on native American ('Red Indian') lands in the U.S, or the British colonisation of Australia where the native people were displaced, enslaved, or deliberately killed.

### Summary of occupation of East Turkestan/Xinjiang

- 2000-900 BC: Indo-Europeans and Caucasians settle the Tarim basin, speaking a European language, 'Tocharian'. Modern Chinese analysis of well-preserved corpses buried in the Taklamakan Desert shows no Sino-Mongolian genetic elements.
- Occupation by Turki/Mongol tribes.
- 94 C.E. Han Chinese army captures Kashgar. Garrisons and military settlements established.
- 200 AD, Han abandon Tarim.
- 7th cent C.E: three-way struggle for dominance between Uyghur and Tibetan empires and Chinese Tang dynasty. Tang take control AD 650, but hold for less than 100 years.
- 680: Turks and Arabs mobilise against Tang occupiers. Chinese defeated at battle of Talas.
- 744: Uyghur confederation forms: trade and aid for Tang. By end of century China has lost control of East Turkestan, not to regain it for a thousand years.
- 900-c.1200: Rule by assorted local tribes. Islam arrives from across the Pamirs to replace Buddhism.
- 1218: Mongols under Genghiz Khan take Eastern Turkestan, following invasions of Manchuria and capture of Beijing. Uighurs supply script and run the civil service.
- 1271: Chagatai, son of Genghiz, rules from Almalik, near Gulja (Yining).
- 1368-1660: Chinese Ming dynasty replaces Mongol Yuan. Ming China has no control over Qinghai, Tibet, E.Turkestan (now Xinjiang), or any lands north of the Great Wall. Xinjiang ruled by succession of Mongol khans who convert to Islam, followed by Muslim *khojas*.
- 1644: Manchu (Qing) dynasty replaces Chinese Ming dynasty. Kangxi Emperor invades North-West.
- 1759: Qianlong Emperor completes conquest of Tarim. Millions slaughtered. Region (known as *Huijiang*, 'Muslim-land') is annexed and

renamed 'Xinjiang' ('New Territories'). Rule through Muslim *begs*. No Chinese settlement allowed at first.

- Early 19th century: garrisons isolated and weakened. Khojas from central Asia bid to retake East Turkestan. Many local rebellions.
- 1862: Revolt of the Hui or 'Dongans' (Muslim Chinese) of Gansu and Shaanxi provinces, more militant than the oasis-dwelling Turkis of Xinjiang but now supported by the latter.
- 1864-77: Yakub Beg from Uzbekistan sets up independent state of Kashgaria. Seeks alliance with Queen Victoria of Britain.
- 1877: E. Turkestan reconquered by China under General Zuo Zongtang.
- 1884. Xinjiang becomes province of China. First attempt at forcible assimilation (sinicization) of Turki inhabitants.
- 1911. Qing dynasty falls following Taiping rebellion of 1850-64, and foreign domination of China's trade. Republic. Beijing loses control. Chinese governors run Xinjiang as personal fiefdoms. Soviet influence grows.
- 1931 Dongan (Chinese Muslim) revolt starts in Gansu province. Spreads across Xinjiang.
- 1933-35: Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (TIRET) set up by emirs in Khotan and rules most of southern Xinjiang. Defeated by Dongan army under youthful warlord Ma Zhongying.
- 1944: Ili rebellion led by Kazakhs, but including Uighurs and others, leads to creation of Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) with Russian support. HQ is at Gulja (Yining). Attempt by Nationalist army to regain control is heavily defeated.
- 1945: peace treaty gives ETR self-rule in return for agreeing not to secede: freedom of religion, publication, assembly and speech, and right to elect officials. Supported by Chinese Communist Party, now fighting a civil war with Nationalists.
- 1949 Communist troops reach Xinjiang. Rule from Beijing restored.

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## ETHNIC POLICY

### A note on the 'Uyghur' identity

'Uighur' or 'Uyghur', the name of the sedentary oasis dwellers bordering the Taklamakan desert in Xinjiang, was conferred on them only in the 1930s.

Before that, they identified themselves by their location, as 'Kashgarlik', 'Khotanlik', etc.

The name was borrowed from the Turki tribal confederation of Uyghurs who had an empire in the north-west in the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> centuries C.E. These Uyghurs were driven south to the Tarim basin in the later 10<sup>th</sup> century AD, with a new capital at their southern base of Turfan.

It is important to note that the new categorisation gave Uighurs a sense of nationhood they formerly lacked.

The name, endorsed by the CCP, was based on Lenin's classification of the Turks of Soviet Central Asia according to their lifestyle: Kazakhs – nomadic mounted herders; Kyrgyz and Tajik – mountain shepherds; Uzbeks – city dwellers.

Definitions:

'Turki' includes the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Tajiks of Xinjiang. 'Turkic' for their very similar languages, from which modern Turkish is also derived. The Mongols, although historically related, have a different language and script. Physically the Uighurs are distinctly different from the 'Han' Chinese. They look like their central Asian cousins and neighbours. But some have features of a more Mongolian cast.

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But who are the Han, and where are the borders of 'China'?

'Han' is a generic designation for different peoples of 'mainland' China who share a common script but not a common language. All were 'minority nationalities' at some point in their history. The name is taken from the group of small states bordering the Yellow River who were united under the Han dynasty of 206 B.C.- 221 C.E.

Modern China is the result of the assimilation of many peoples over many centuries, including those 'barbarian' invaders from the north who set up ruling dynasties. But in Xinjiang (and even more so in Tibet) the Chinese presence has been weak and intermittent, and assimilation has been very slow. Its present borders include large areas conquered by Manchu (Qing) emperors between 1650-1759 minus territories including Mongolia (formerly ceded to the USSR) and Taiwan. The people of Chinese Inner Mongolia are suffering the same cultural restrictions, especially suppression of their language.

Before the total re-shaping of society by the Communists after 1949, only one serious attempt had been made to convert the Turki Muslims of Xinjiang into Han Chinese.

This was in 1885, a year after Xinjiang had become a province of China. The impetus came from General Zuo Zongtang who in 1877 had reconquered the region by defeating the independent regime of 'Kashgaria' set up by Yakub Beg.

Chinese colonists arrived in large numbers. Turki were offered tax and exemptions from forced labour (*corvée*) to encourage them to learn Chinese. They were ordered to marry Chinese and worship in Chinese temples. Locals were required to kneel in front of Han officials, who were given a free hand in arresting, punishing and executing those who resisted. But resistance was fierce, and children had to be locked in the schools, sometimes pinned down with leg-irons. Many succeeded in dodging the system.

The programme collapsed when the dynasty was overwhelmed by a series of disasters, the revolt by Chinese Muslims, war with Japan, and the Boxer Rebellion.

The present attempt to eradicate the Uighur identity, while even more severe, shares many features of Zuo's plan: forced re-education, forced inter-racial marriage, religious interference, arbitrary justice, and the mass immigration of Han Chinese in what Uighur activists have for years been calling 'demographic genocide'.

The CCP's policy towards the native people of Xinjiang has been from the start ambiguous, ambivalent and erratic.

It is ambiguous, because though the Turkis were given nominal power in the new governmental structure after 1949, the real power has always been confined to the Party, dominated by Han Chinese. Different areas of Xinjiang were assigned to the various 'minority nationalities'; the Uighurs had no allocated domain but the province as a whole was named for them – the 'Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region'.

Unlike the USSR, where the Soviet republics of central Asia were given the right to leave the Union (as they did after 1990), the XUAR has no such right.

Turkis are given administrative posts right to the top of the provincial hierarchy, but at every level are shadowed by a Han (as formerly in mainland China) who has the real power. This has caused great friction and mistrust within the native community.

The ambiguity of the CCP's jurisdiction is felt all over China, but most severely in areas like Xinjiang where, in matters of religion and justice, for example, the written constitution is rarely honoured in practice and the courts are subservient to the Party.

It is ambivalent because the Communist state has made a great show of celebrating the unity and enthusiastic support for its regime from the 55 'minority nationalities'. Tourist brochures for domestic and foreign visitors to Xinjiang portray the Uighurs as colourful and carefree, famous (as indeed they are) for their music, acrobatic skill and tightrope walking. At the same time they are denigrated as backward, unpatriotic and dangerous. And this is the picture presented to the rest of China, and which is now being offered to the world.

Ethnic policy has been erratic because Party policy, especially under Mao, has been erratic – not to say disastrous. It has swung from brutality and coercion to tolerance, and back again. Periods of relaxation have, however, been few and short.

Before he took power 1949, Mao promised the Turkis independence. Once in command, that promise was rescinded. (The written record of Mao's promise was removed from his collected works). Xinjiang has suffered disproportionately from successive Communist 'reforms', especially during the 'Great Leap Forward' of 1958-61 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76. Concessions granted under the birth-control policy were flouted by local official. Rights granted under the Constitution, for religious belief for example, have been ignored in practice. The judicial and penal systems have been biased against Turkis, and they have been subjected to torture, the last people in China to be so.

A general programme of expropriation, and collectivisation during Mao's rule was followed by general easing. After Mao's death and the chaos of the Cultural

Revolution (when the minorities of Xinjiang were singled out for harsh treatment and denounced as traitors and spies) Party secretary Hua Yaobang ordered a period of liberalisation.

But security and repression were soon tightening again, and Turki grievances grew, provoking riots at Baren and Gulja (Yining) [*see below*]. The Party looked nervously at the threat posed by an Islamic revival in central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At home, demands for greater democracy by students across China, snuffed out by the massacre at Tiananmen Square.

Apart from intermittent easings, repression of the Turki peoples has been the norm. Not only China's dynastic rulers (both native Han and 'barbarian' (Mongol, Manchu) but even the CCP under Mao Zedong and his successors have acknowledged the Turki-speakers as a different 'nationality' while still citizens of China. The theory was that under Communism the concepts of 'race' or 'nationality' would gradually be subsumed into the issue of class. The terms 'Han', 'Uighur', 'Tibetan' and 'Mongol' would eventually disappear.

In Xi's regime that process has been accelerated for Tibet, Xinjiang and – it seems – also for inner Mongolia. The doctrine now is that all who live within the borders of China must become Han Chinese – a doctrine once denounced by Party theorists as 'Great Han Chauvinism'.

### **Summary of ethnic policies in Xinjiang**

1949: after 'Liberation', large numbers of volunteers were sent from inner China to help the Turkis, and were generally welcomed. (They and their descendants have not welcomed the mass of new immigrants sent in to dilute the Turki population)

Early 1950s: selective execution and dispossession of prominent Turki families. Landowners with political influence were shot. Other landowners had houses and land confiscated. Co-operative farms set up.

1956: Mao's 'Hundred Flowers' free speech decree. Uighurs speak out, complaining of the Han presence and lack of autonomy. Purge follows. Publicity campaign against 'pan-Turkism' follows.

1957: Zhou Enlai, in a speech to Party leaders at Qingdao, says Uighurs and other minorities had to be shown respect and treated as equals with the Han. Written up for the Party journal *Hongqi* but suppressed until Deng Xiaoping's economic liberalisation in 1979.

1958: Great Leap Forward: giant communes (collective farms) set up to help merge Xinjiang's ethnic populations. Many Kazakhs prefer to starve, and kill their herds rather than surrender them.

1959: Nationwide famine. Mao introduces 're-education through labour' camps (*liaojiao*) to supplement 'labour reform' camps. (*laogai*). In sparsely populated, China's historic gulag, Xinjiang prisoners starve but the people fare better. Starving refugees pour in from Gansu.

1961: Mao forced to back down. Ethnic controls relaxed.

1962.: Big exodus of Kazkhs, Uighurs (and some Han) to USSR, widening a Sino-Soviet split. Kremlin accused of incitement.

1965: Cultural Revolution begins: Minorities suffer especially harsh treatment. Mosques closed, *mullahs* tortured. Rival groups of Red Guards fight it out and army is called in. The sight of starving naked children in Xinjiang causes Wei Jingsheng, whose family is close to Mao and who has travelled to Xinjiang as a Red Guard, to become China's most prominent dissident.

1978-81: Liberalisation in the west after Mao's death. Land given back to farmers and houses returned to prominent families. Hu Yaobang, Party Secretary, calls for Uighur autonomy and removal of Han 'cadres' (officials). Turki origins recognized for the first time since the Manchu conquest.

1990s: Post-Mao easing for Turkis ended with Tiananmen Square massacre and rise of political Islam in central Asia following collapse of the USSR. [*see 'Repression, the impact' below*].

2001: Sept 11 terrorist attack on US and American declaration of 'war on terrorism' is the signal for big increase in security forces in Xinjiang.

2014? Xi appoints Chen Quanguo, former Party Secretary in Tibet, to take over in Xinjiang. Tibet was a testbed for the action in Xinjiang.

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### REPRESSION: JUSTIFICATION and MOTIVATION

Before 9/11, ethnic protest was seen as motivated by either religious extremism or 'splittism', the desire for independence. Today, the CCP declares it is fighting 'three evils': separatism, religious extremism and terrorism.

#### **'Terrorism'**

After 9/11 most acts of violence were been attributed by Chinese officials to Islamist militancy. The Party redoubled its propaganda inside China against the Muslims, warning that the Uighurs were dangerous, that it was not safe to visit Xinjiang. Many believed that there was a war going on. Their stance was reinforced when in 2002 the US government approved the listing of an obscure group, the East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organisation. ETIM was removed from the list by the US State Department in November, 2020 after no credible evidence was found for its existence.

ETIM has re-emerged with reports that terrorists are active in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban with whom China is seeking, through its ally Pakistan, to do a deal. The ETIM groups are reported to be operating in the small contiguous border area known as the Wakhan Corridor.

In general, evidence of Islamist terrorism is difficult to find in China. The family car-bomb suicide in Tiananmen Square in 2013 and the Kunming atrocity the following year [*see next* section] were possibly instances.

But most so-called ‘terrorist’ acts are more properly seen as protests or revenge for, attacks on religious institutions, sexual offences against Turki women, and gross examples of injustice. Outside observers have attributed many of the incidents to disputes over land and property or access to water. Today the description ‘terrorism’ has been extended to include almost any sign of religious interest or disagreement with the authorities.

Militant separatists are rare; most Turkis accept their status as part of China even if they feel unfairly treated and ‘second-class citizens’. Islamist fanatics are rarer still. In the past Islamic zealots outside Xinjiang, notably in Saudi Arabia, have been keen to finance religious schools and publications in western China. It is not clear if there were also religious extremists from neighbouring countries stirring up trouble among unemployed young Uighurs and Kazakhs.

### **Religious extremism:**

Theistic belief is a threat to the Party’s role as the supreme authority. Buddhism has long been accepted in China as has Taoism. After a fractious start, Christianity has also taken root and had grown rapidly in recent decades. But a campaign has begun to suppress the so-called ‘underground’ church and limit the reach of approved clergy. Islam, which arrived in Eastern Turkestan around the late 10<sup>th</sup> century, has always been regarded as foreign. The constitution permits the practice of religion but not proselytism. In the case of the Turkis, almost any sign of religious enthusiasm is punishable, as noted above.

The Party has also punished severely adherents of the spiritual movement known as Falung Gong, to which even CCP members belonged.

### **‘Splittism’ (separatism):**

Even after the post 9/11 crackdown popular demand for independence from China was not very evident. People were more concerned to achieve equality of status with the Han. It was much more popular with refugees I met in Europe and Turkey. The policy of the World Uighur Congress and its predecessors veered from demands for full independence, to local autonomy, to partial devolution of powers.

Like previous regimes, Beijing today fears that uprisings in Xinjiang will encourage rebellion in other parts of China. It cannot forget the student demonstrations of 1989 which were held all over the country.

It is the same fear that lies behind its abrogation of the agreement with Britain over Hong Kong, where massive street protests were seen as a threat to civil order which could spread to the mainland. The threat to invade or ‘take back’ Taiwan also illustrates the CCP’s fear of secession and its determination to secure ‘unity’ - by force if necessary.

### **Political and economic justifications:**

Many Turkis see the regime as a foreign occupation plundering Xinjiang’s wealth of natural resources for the benefit of inner China. The Chinese see the Turkis

as potential saboteurs of a grand modern development programme designed for the benefit of everyone.

Xi Jinping's goal of 'super-power' status for China has meant a projection of power in south Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

His absolute rule, enforced by his Party appointee in Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo, cannot tolerate any weak link in his vision of China's rise to world dominance through economic and military might. Its 'Belt and Road Initiative', launched in 2013, opened China's road and rail links to Europe via Xinjiang. It became imperative to quell local disturbances.

Earlier efforts to gain control over neighbours and close down escape routes for Uighur dissidents included the Shanghai agreement of 1996. This was designed to 'liquidate the Uighur resistance movement'. It was a border and economic treaty with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan creating an 80-mile-deep cordon patrolled by joint military units. Signatories agreed to shut down Uighur publications and arrest critics of China. Deals have since been struck with other countries where Uighurs have sought refuge, especially Turkey.

### **Deeper motivations**

Historic racism or 'Greater Han Chauvinism': from earliest times the Chinese have been highly ethnocentric. Even under foreign dynasties (Mongol, Manchu) they have maintained a sense of superiority over other peoples. Xi Jinping's regime is reverting to the theme that Turkis are naturally backward, superstitious, violent and unpatriotic. [*see section on ethnic policy.*] They now have a sense of 'manifest destiny' like the Americans under Thomas Jefferson, and the European colonial powers in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Chinese officials frequently quote these as examples of western hypocrisy.

The Xi regime is adopting an extreme form of the various 'Strike Hard' campaigns instigated by Mao. But its aim is higher: to see the Uighurs and other Turkis disappear as a cultural and racial entities – an ideal espoused by 'pure communism' that non-Han would merge with Han and that eventually all nations would disappear. The regime's sinister goal is more pragmatic than idealistic.

Insecurity of the CCP. Commentators suggest that in spite of – and also because of – China great economic progress since the opening by Deng Xiaoping, the Party is afraid of losing its monopoly power. It has come to believe that its aims cannot be achieved without total control and surveillance of all Chinese citizens at home and abroad – whether they are students at foreign universities or entrepreneurs seeking to list private companies on the New York Stock Exchange or investors buying Chinese stocks. Even before Xi came to power, Uighurs abroad who criticised China were routinely shadowed by police-appointed 'friends'.

Human rights. The hallmark of Chinese dynasties is authoritarianism, administered by a large bureaucracy under a long chain of command up to the emperor. The Communists are no exception. Historians trace this back to Confucianism, social harmony achieved through patriarchy, respect for authority and worship of ancestors. Although condemned under Mao as anti-socialist and out of date, Confucianism has now been reinstated as part of a rewritten and glorified history of China.

China has no conception of human rights as in the West, even though it signed the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.] China subscribes to ‘Asian values’ (the phrase popularised by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew [ch], which means, in simple terms, that the individual is always subordinate to the collective. Human rights are largely derived from Christian theology.

Beijing is fond of reminding Western critics of their own countries’ history of colonialism and assimilation. But for 70 years, since the end of the Second World War, Western governments have been busy settling the debts of the past – granting independence to countries they had previously annexed, devolving authority to regional authorities, and paying reparation to ethnic minorities previous governments had abused. In the same period the CCP has taken exactly the opposite line with its imperial legacy of Xinjiang

A weak judiciary: The judicial system is primitive. Chinese courts are still largely subordinate to Party *diktat*, especially where political dissidents are concerned. ‘Thought crime’ is taken more seriously than criminal behaviour. Wrong thinking has to be changed, by whatever means available and however long the process takes: hence the brainwashing of so-called ‘Rightists’ during the Cultural Revolution, and the brainwashing of supposed dissidents in Xinjiang today. These techniques were borrowed from the USSR.

The penal system is also crude, especially in Xinjiang where torture has been most prevalent. The CCP keeps alive the dynastic practice of punishing whole families for the crimes of one member – hence the arrest of relatives in China of refugees who testify against the regime.

Xinjiang is historically the place of exile, from later dynastic times up to the present; there is a large network of labour camps, some of which have been converted to agricultural communes.

No fear of retaliation? Why is China defying the world about its treatment of the Uighurs? Perhaps because it is more afraid of losing power at home than losing friends abroad. Perhaps the CCP calculates that its economic power is too strong for human rights objections to damage it. Leaders of Muslim countries have been notably quiet about the mass internment of Muslims in Xinjiang. Western democracies have condemned it, but been hesitant to act because of their dependency on trade and investment . .

Note: Xi’s personal involvement with X. His father Xi Zhongxun, a early member of the CCP close to Mao worked in the far west. Mao congratulated him on his tactful handling of minority people. Xi appears to have decided on a ‘final solution’ to the Uighur problem, using Chen Quanguo [ch sp] who shut down Tibetan protests to do the same in Xinjiang.

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## REPRESSION AND REACTION

I see state repression of the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang not just as a reaction to public demonstrations and violence but as their cause.

The CCP treats protests as entirely politically or religiously-motivated. It will not admit that they are usually the consequence of its own erratic, inconsistent and often violent treatment of the indigenous people.

The Turkis have been excluded from playing any part in the development of the province; they feel they are second-class citizens in China and strangers in their own land.

In general Uighurs in the north accept Chinese rule more readily than those in the south; the middle-aged and older are more reconciled than the young, and the educated are more adapted than the uneducated.

Farmers in the oasis villages ringing the south and western edges of the desert, where the Han presence was not felt until recently, are generally hostile to the regime. New roads and building and destruction of religious sites have changed that.

Young unemployed Uighurs and Kazakhs are more likely to resort to violence than their elders. But young and old alike are bitter about the mass immigration of Han labourers by Chinese construction companies. The loss of jobs is evident at dusk, when the streets of the old Turki towns are filled with unemployed men and boys selling hot food on stalls.

Educated Turkis, too, have seen Han newcomers given preference in white-collar jobs. But they have mostly been politically passive. Many have accepted that they or their children will have to learn Chinese in order to prosper. Even then, they have difficulty getting employed. English is also popular, especially with those hoping to emigrate.

Uighurs have not been prevented from making money. I have seen grand mansions built by Uighur entrepreneurs. One of them, Rebiya Kadeer, whose retail, property and trading business made her a multi-millionaire, earned a place on the People's Political Consultative Conference. Then she was jailed for criticising the regime for its punishment of the Gulja demonstrators in 1997 (*see below*), then released into exile after international protests.

'Re-education' of the Uighurs was introduced long before the internment camps: lawyers, teachers, newspaper editors and others were sent away for indoctrination and to write self-confessions (as during the Cultural Revolution). These days, we know, famous Uighur intellectuals and artists are being interned or jailed, apparently as a warning to others.

The hectic rate of urban development is typified by the provincial capital Urumchi (Urumqi), situated in the Tianshan range that separates the Dzungarian steppe and Tarim desert. The clash of old and new is most visible in Kashgar, the ancient Turki capital. But the people of Turfan are historically more tolerant of the Han.

*Note:* Urumchi is not a Uighur city, but a Manchu foundation. Many Uighurs have moved up there in search of work, and live mainly in the south of the city.

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Security had been greatly increased during my second visit after 9/11, but the deliberate erasure of Uighur culture had already been resumed in the 1990s. This was due to the outburst of student demonstrations all over China culminating at Tiananmen Square and the replacement of moderate leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang by hardliners. By the time of my first visit in 1995 the new pressure on Uighurs was already evident.

### A climate of fear [

To a visitor in 2002, the most striking feature was the climate of fear in Xinjiang. In the presence of foreigners especially, people were reluctant to talk about political matters. One retired academic did speak out, and when rebuked by his wife declared he was too old to worry about the consequences. There was general mistrust of native-born officials. A former secret policeman a Uighur, said he had given up his job because he no longer felt it right to act against his own people.

There was fear even at private gatherings: a young man at a birthday party was reported to the police by another of the host's friends. Uighurs would betray rivals in competition for jobs, and neighbours would denounce one another to win merit. The atmosphere was like that described during the Stalin Terror in the USSR.

I witnessed many incidents of younger Han immigrants humiliating respected Uighur elders.

### **Summary of Turki grievances 1990-2012**

Cultural: progressive removal of Turki language from education. Restrictions on religious publications, censorship of Uighur literature and history. Book burning. Compulsory indoctrination sessions for civic leaders.  
Uighur place names Sinicized: ancient sites from Turkic or Tibetan times claimed for Han and dated according to Chinese dynasties.

#### Economic:

Expropriation of village farmland, properties and water sources.  
Export of Xinjiang's natural resources to inner China.  
Mass immigration of Han, loss of job opportunities, unemployment.

#### Religious:

Destruction of mosques, shrines and graveyards. Curtailment of worship and domestic rituals. Protests met with extreme force.

#### Police and judiciary:

Disproportionate use of armed police against protesters: summary shooting, mass arrests and 'exemplary' public executions.

A discriminatory police force: refusal to arrest Han Chinese.  
The routine use of torture against arrested Turkis.

#### Family

Aggressive and discriminatory programmes of birth control, forced sterilisation and abortion for Turki women.

Abusive sexual behaviour towards Turki women. (This has been an incendiary feature in the history of the region.).

Health: Medical deformities and cancers attributed to former nuclear test sites in Lop desert, eastern Xinjiang

### **A catalogue of recent protests:**

As stated earlier, it is difficult for outsiders to get to the truth about incidents of Turki violence against the Han. Violence is routinely explained by officials and state-controlled media as the work of dissidents or terrorists.

Before the present clampdown, public demonstrations were mainly prompted by state interference with religion – the closure of mosques, or religious youth clubs [*meshrep*]. Others were in response to violence against Uighur women and the aggressive birth control programme: local officials were accused of ignoring the rule allowing native families to have more children, enforcing their own quotas instead.

1990: **Baren** riot: Decades of resistance began with large riot, in the Kyrgyz area south-west of Kashgar, following closure of a mosque, but blamed by state security on foreign infiltrators. Public prayer meeting outside council offices broken up by police shooting on ground and from the air. Mass arrests. Official sources say mass protest called for *jihad* and expulsion of Han from Xinjiang. Cameras were set up in mosques in whole province.

1992: Bus bomb in **Urumchi**, injuring 26.

1993: Ministry building in **Kashgar** bombed. Anti-nuclear demo by 1,000 at **Lop Nor** test site.

1997: **Gulja** (Yining) protest march, following disputed closure of a *meshrep* (religious youth club) at end of Ramadan. 300-500 arrested, city closed down for two weeks for house searches. Up to 5,000 arrested. Many executions, 1,600 people missing, and thousands more fled to Kazakhstan. Followed by 3 bomb attacks in Urumchi and a bus bomb in Beijing, killing two, wounding eight.

1998: Military bases attacked and weapons stolen.

1999 Changji, near **Urumchi**, police motorcade blown off road; ‘armed nationalists’ blamed.

2000: **Urumchi**: a lorry full of explosives blows up: 60 killed and more than 300 wounded. Not known if accident or planned. Explosives are – or were – readily obtainable in Xinjiang; explosions, always attributed to terrorists, also occur in disputes between farmers.

2009: **Urumchi**. Many hundreds of young people were killed and thousands arrested following a peaceful student march protesting at the murder of 18 Uighurs working as forced labourers far away in Guangdong province. Two had been accused of rape. The Urumchi march was broken up by police with tear gas, followed by shooting, in which an estimated (at the time) 400-1,000 Uighurs were killed. Many were pursued and arrested that night. Uighur rioters attacked buses and cars, and took revenge on Han shopkeepers in the Uighur quarter of town. Images of bloodied faces of two Han women were widely circulated worldwide. The deaths of innocent Uighur protesters were not. This account from a Uighur source in Europe was confirmed for

me by a young Uighur woman refugee who had taken part in the march. I testified at her court appeal for asylum in the UK.

2013: **Beijing**: Family of three from Xinjiang commit suicide with car bomb in Tiananmen Square, killing two pedestrians and injuring 38.

2014: **Kunming**. 31 passengers stabbed to death by Uighur assailants at the railway station in the south-western Chinese city.

Ends.

1 **11<sup>th</sup> September 2021 (00:12:08 – 1:21:43)**

2 **Christian Tyler**

3

4 CHRISTIAN TYLER – Am I audible? Thank you. I first went to China 1983 through the  
5 Financial Times. Spent a number of visits so I got to know something about the place  
6 and the economic open that was going on. I went to the Northwest- sorry I went to the  
7 North, but I never went as far west as Xinjiang. In 1995 I went on a trip, an expedition  
8 for just amusement. To cross the desert with camels. Down to the \*Locke\* desert- from  
9 \*Jinhung\* through the desert along the south road which was at the time still primitive  
10 compared to what I hear it is now. There was a trip across the desert out to \*Masatag\*  
11 north to the river to Aksu, return by jeep to the north side to Urumqi so quite a lot of  
12 perspective. On that occasion I noticed the obvious bullying of the locals by the  
13 incoming Han Chinese. The more I saw the more I wanted to record it because I didn't  
14 know if anyone had done so yet. Some academics, and studies on the region which I  
15 discovered later. And the second visit I went in 2002 just after 9/11. And massive  
16 increase in security of course. Borders closed and so on. This time I went with my wife  
17 and a friend from Kazakhstan toured across the north to Urumqi and down to \*Irfan\*  
18 back to Kashgar and stay in the desert which is further north. Staying all the time with  
19 Uyghur families for which was not difficult to get permission as long as one did not  
20 stay longer than 3-4 days. So, I had a lot of time with Uyghur people and talking to as  
21 many people about the situation as much as they would speak to me about the  
22 situation. I kept a note of all the conversations. The people I talked to were not aware  
23 that I had of what I was doing. By that point I had left the financial times, by then I had  
24 been there for 13/30 years and thought it was time to move on. The people I was

25 talking to saw me as a tourist, which is what the I told the authorities I was. I didn't  
26 want them to know because they wouldn't have spoken at all if they'd known what I  
27 was up to. There was some deception involved I suppose obviously I was very careful  
28 not to mention any names.

29 The book I wrote as counsel said, was a book on history that started in very ancient  
30 times- John took it on. Nobody heard of Uyghurs- I thought nobody knew about the  
31 Uyghurs except for me. Obviously, there were some sources, and I got everything I  
32 could find. I went to Turkey to do some research and met Uyghurs of the Diaspora  
33 leaders.

34 I'm not an academic, and I wrote a book that I wanted to be read by travellers to the  
35 region so they would have idea of what was going on and what the history of the place  
36 was.

37 The purpose of my testimony as counsel says to show that the present program is just  
38 an extreme version of a policy of assimilation for 70 years of the Communist Party  
39 rule; to correct the egregious claims made about the history of the region which are  
40 made by Chinese officials to justify the present program. To establish that the Uyghurs  
41 are distinct culture or race in contrast to the Communist Party claim that they've always  
42 been Chinese. To show that the Party's claim to be fighting terrorism, religious  
43 fanaticism and backward thinking are a pretext for a far more program of annexation  
44 and elimination of culture and forcible elimination. And to argue that protests and acts  
45 of violence of Han Chinese should be seen as retaliation for ill treatment and injustice  
46 and destruction- local assets and properties. And as counsel says, there are 4 sections  
47 to my testimony (1) a history of my occupation of East Turkestan and others (2) the  
48 ethnic policy of the Communist Party rule (3) the regimes justification and for the

49 repression and its undeclared motives since communist rule. (4) and the suppression  
50 should be seen as much the cause of ethnic violence and not the consequence of  
51 ethnic violence.

52 *COUNSEL – Thank you Mr. Tyler. I just have three questions for you before I hand*  
53 *you off to the panel. My first question is that you've noted that the Shanghai of 1996*  
54 *cut off routes of neighbouring countries for Uyghur dissonance. Would that explain*  
55 *why in your view that Uyghur refugee flows are very minimal in neighbouring countries*

56 CT – Uyghur refugee flows?

57 *COUNSEL – Uyghur refugee flows minimal. I mean flow of people into neighbouring*  
58 *countries. What would explain that?*

59 CT – Explain what? Sorry I didn't hear the question.

60 *COUNSEL – So, my question is that there are obviously Uyghurs fleeing alleged*  
61 *persecution in Xinjiang: what would explain the fact that there are very minimal flows*  
62 *into neighbouring countries?*

63 CT – Now?

64 *COUNSEL – Yes.*

65 CT – Investment in other countries. So Chinese investment and trade and so on is  
66 conditional upon them cracking down on existing communities of refugees who fled  
67 various demonstrations or riots that occurred in Xinjiang. Yes, and to make sure no  
68 more are allowed in so the borders are effectively closed to those people, realistically.  
69 If they try and get across.

70 *COUNSEL – My second question is that you identified the goal of Xi Jinping’s*  
71 *government as to see the Uyghurs and others to disappear as cultural and racial*  
72 *entities. My question is does that necessarily entail does crimes against Uyghurs.*

73 CT – No it doesn’t– when the English colonized Wales. I don’t think they had to  
74 commit– well I don’t know, my history is not very good– needed to commit crimes for  
75 the Welsh to eventually accept what they were getting from Britain and by retaining  
76 their own identity, customs and language.

77 *COUNSEL – It does, might you have a view on why alleged crimes are occurring, if*  
78 *the goal is assimilation?*

79 CT – Crimes against the Uyghurs?

80 *COUNSEL – Yes*

81 CT - Well it’s a good question. They are seen– the Uyghurs– are seen as a constant  
82 threat because of their religion. The way in which the Han Chinese have taken over in  
83 running the place and taking charge of the assets and resources of the place brought  
84 a lot of resentment. Therefore, there have been. Protests and complaints and local  
85 level and sometimes larger numbers and that has been an opportunity to teach them  
86 a lesson. The crimes that are—going on- I don’t understand that at all except of course  
87 the aim now is to remove Uyghurs and others– completely. And so any sign of dissent  
88 or contrary practice from any of the ethnic Muslim minorities is going to be punishable.  
89 Is punishable and is being punished

90 *COUNSEL – Finally, my last question. You indicated that the northern part of Xinjiang*  
91 *is more assimilated than southern part of Xinjiang. Would that be described by a*  
92 *successful policy in the North, prior to being implemented in the south?*

93 CT – I think so, yes. Because the opportunities for work were all in the [\*Mancu\*  
94 00:25:42] conquered area. And Urumqi is the provincial town, so it's gone away from  
95 Kashgar which is the old Turkey capital. The opportunities are there, the education is  
96 there, the facilities are there. A lot of people migrated up and the well/better educated  
97 Uyghurs work there. Relationship between Han and Uyghur or should we say the well-  
98 educated ones can be reasonably good. Its further down and further south where the  
99 problems main arise. But that's not to say that Urumqi, as we know, very large protests  
100 and demonstrations.

101 *COUNSEL – Final question arising from that. If there was a successful assimilation*  
102 *policy in the north and alleged crimes in the North have reduced or not as prominent*  
103 *in the North as in the South– would that suggest that something similar might happen*  
104 *to the south?*

105 CT – I don't know, I don't have the answer to that– I think that is a difficult question  
106 because successful assimilation policy can mean two different things, it can mean: It  
107 could be that people are willing to accept the incoming culture. Like the Saxons and  
108 the Normans and adapt the language of the incoming culture. But also, also successful  
109 assimilation in Beijing's eyes could be a complete elimination of dissent and  
110 disagreement or cultural religious different, it rather begs the question what you mean  
111 by successful? As I have said before, there have been violent but also peaceful  
112 assimilations in history. One could draw up a list of both

113 *PANEL – Mr Tyler, you write in your submission there is a distinction to be made earlier*  
114 *occupation by the Chinese in the region– and this is without the desire to conflate the*  
115 *differences we just heard between the north and the south but there are distinctions*  
116 *between the earlier part of the region to recent developments. I wonder if you could*

117 *draw on your knowledge of the history of the region to explain to the tribunal: what*  
118 *those differences are and then secondly explain why you characterize present day as*  
119 *one of settler colonialism. And what the features of that formal occupation are?*

120 CT – Well, the central difference until the 1959 the area had been largely left to itself.  
121 It wasn't conquered– the Han dynasty was briefly there, the \*Tang\* dynasty had fought  
122 for power with the Uyghurs and the Tibetans in the 7<sup>th</sup> century competed but then  
123 retired quite quickly. So the real occupation started in the 1730s and consummated in  
124 1770- the \*Manchu\* policy, being themselves barbarians to teach barbarians as  
125 though they were distinct people and allowed the Uyghurs– the Turkic were allowed  
126 to be left alone–the garrisons were set up – which still persist, they were set up but  
127 the communities were kept apart. No Han Chinese were allowed to settle until 1830  
128 then traders and people came there– mostly traders, there were quite a lot of Han but  
129 there was no attempt to bring the Turkeys into the Han. Until the brief 7-year rule of a  
130 warlord called Yacub Bey from Uzbekistan took over in 1870/1860s when the whole  
131 of East Turkistan became briefly independent. There was a great Chinese conquest  
132 went in preparing– spent years preparing, he captured the shortly after there was an  
133 attempt Sinicize Uyghurs and many of the things being done now wholesale attempted  
134 piecemeal so special school, special education. Having to bow down, having to- all  
135 elements of the present. It lasted a few years. It did fail. And then most of the locals  
136 just dodged it. So that was failure– so after that period. The government had no– the  
137 dynasty was declining elsewhere, and they lost their group. The place fell into the  
138 hands of warlords and became a private fiefdom so it wasn't until when the nationalists  
139 they didn't have nominal control of the place and indeed it was two independent  
140 republic set up during that time. So, it wasn't until 1949 that a program, the systematic  
141 program of assimilation but it was extremely it was mild, it was idealistic there is a lot

142 of enthusiasm of bring culture and civilization to the west. The locals were pleased to  
143 get the help and assurances of the Han Chinese and there— its worth saying that the  
144 Han Chinese who have been since 1949 are almost as upset with the present regime  
145 as the Uyghurs are, when I say Uyghurs, I also include the Kazaks. So, um yeah

146 *PANEL – To my second question if you would elaborate on what the features are of*  
147 *the present day, described as multiple people, as settler colonial. What is the*  
148 *distinction?*

149 CT – When you say ‘today’ do you mean since we’ve learned about the camps?

150 *PANEL – I mean, scholars have identified, haven’t they, a change 2014-2016.*

151 CT – I would say it’s an intensification not a sea change. I would say intensification.  
152 There were camps— not camps but compulsory indoctrination sessions when I was  
153 there. Teachers and editors, all sort of professionals were being marched off to write  
154 essays about— to learn about Chinese history and write about it and praise for the  
155 authorities. The language was already under attack, it was progressive in education—  
156 the history books were burned— I’m talking about this century. In the beginning of the  
157 century and people were given— a few lines with the Quran and burned. The language  
158 was under attack. The literature was under attack, the thoughts of people were already  
159 under attack

160 *PANEL – What arises from that then is: whether what is underway here is an attempt*  
161 *to adjust the populations or an attempt to eradicate Uyghur tribunal. I wonder whether*  
162 *you could reflect on that for the Tribunal*

163 CT – I can’t say which it is— I can only say what it looks like, and it looks like eradication  
164 of identity combined with an overwhelming— attempt to achieve overwhelming Han  
165 domination. The fact that the birth rate— in the June hearings, the figures of the

166 Uyghurs plummeted to practically zero in some areas so clearly there is a third element  
167 which is the physical elimination if you like, it seems to be a wish to remove them  
168 without actually killing— stop them from being born.

169 *PANEL – What then are the economic drivers of what is happening in the region?*

170 CT – Region is very strategically placed. It is on the border between the Asian and  
171 European markets, we have to go through Xinjiang to get there so road connections  
172 are important. The belt road initiative, which I now read is flailing a bit that depends on  
173 the peaceful transfer of goods and people in that region. Any trouble in that region is  
174 bad for the economic aims of China. They are already- when I was there last- they  
175 were apparent in central Asia begin to worry about the number of Chinese people  
176 physical presence. There were afraid of being taken over. But anyway, that's the  
177 situation is an important part of the economic program. there is of course a genuine  
178 wish to develop the west not only because there is lot of space there for the population  
179 but because there is oil and cotton and all kinds of assets there. There is water. They  
180 were keen to develop the west, for the west to but also to bring it up to level with inner  
181 China especially eastern China which developed first

182 *PANEL – Thank you, you're very helpful in your submission. Could current campaigns*  
183 *the strike har campaign and last time, and present-day policies and per the present*  
184 *day in very much historical context. I wonder if you could explain to the tribunal why it*  
185 *is you characterize the current regime's goals as more pragmatic than idealistic. I'm*  
186 *interested in that distinction and im not fully sure why you describe it that way*

187 CT – Could you tell me where that is?

188 *PANEL – it's in your elaboration of deeper motivations of the regime so partly Han*  
189 *chauvinism, the insecurity of the CCP. Page 10 of your report*

190 CT – Thank you. AH yes, what I'm trying to say there is that the economic motives  
191 have become whether it has to do with equalizing incomes, or public protests as well  
192 as developing assets. The idealistic aim, which I will talk about, without religions. But  
193 it is now more so about hard economics

194 *PANEL – Thank you. On page 13 of your submission, you describe a growing culture*  
195 *of fear the tribunal has heard a fair amount about the growth of fear, erosion of social*  
196 *solidarity and erosion of trust. I wonder if you could say a bit about that from your*  
197 *perspective and also perhaps link it to your earlier observations. Economic*  
198 *development and the north and the south and specifically the proletarianization of*  
199 *labour*

200 CT – well it was my impression that the people– as you say, the better educated people  
201 especially the east, which is closer to mainland, which I call mainland. Much more  
202 used to the Han, more give and take and the understanding of the south. The fear I  
203 spoke about and the fear expressed to me expressed to me about those people that  
204 applied to people of all ranks. Even people of university, which studied Chinese and  
205 were fluent. were afraid of losing jobs– I can't remember but someone had said "it was  
206 just a matter of holding on to your job- you do anything to keep your job because you  
207 knew there was somebody Han Chinese who could get it if they wanted." So although  
208 the relations between the two were different in the cities, especially amongst the  
209 educated people, the insecurity of the Uyghurs was very great and fear of talking and  
210 making comments that could get back to the authorities and also it's worth saying in  
211 that second visit, I think, we came across only one Han Chinese who spoke Uyghur,  
212 and he was working with a forester- but he had learned Uyghur which was remarkable.  
213 He was travelling with the jeep. He was the only one I saw, who could speak to  
214 Uyghurs on a daily basis and that was– that gave you an idea of how severe it was,

215 the separation. There were bank in Gulja were being told to learn English. Oh sorry-  
216 were being told to learn Uyghur, encouraging– so that was a sign but the number of  
217 people that do it is actually small.

218 *PANEL – Thank you so in closing then, it's said by some that there is an effort to*  
219 *eliminate Uyghur identity, to your knowledge has the PRC expressly acknowledged*  
220 *that – on the contrary has the PRC ever said or given an indication that it was just to*  
221 *maintain Uyghur identity.*

222 CT - Yes- I'm not aware, it certainly has said in the past that it wants to maintain the  
223 culture profile/identity of minorities of period. IN those periods– especially at the start,  
224 there was definitely a policy of resisting greater Han chauvinis m which meant that you  
225 acknowledged this minorities and you tried to be proud of them, gave them benefits of  
226 one more child. It was part of an idealistic campaign of– the same as the Soviet Union.  
227 but at the same time they were going to be forced into the socialist mould, they couldn't  
228 do anything that could socially fall into that. I've called the policy ambivalent because  
229 it varied so much over time from Idealistic– acceptance and/or even pride singing  
230 dancing. As long as they stuck to singing and dancing– I mean if you'd been to those  
231 shows in China you know what I mean they are full display. Behind- they are not being  
232 treated right.

233 *PANEL – Thank you very much, that was very informative. Earlier you implied the BRI*  
234 *working, I was just wondering if you could perhaps expand on that. You said it was*  
235 *perhaps...*

236 CT - The belt road initiative?

237 *PANEL – Yes.*

238 CT – The wider economic penetration all over the world, they've got debts  
239 accumulating, and the money is not coming back. So, the program is being wind down  
240 to support the trade, its spending on. The program is winding down.

241 *PANEL – Could I just follow that on. China seems to be spending a lot of money both*  
242 *a lot inside and abroad. Where is it getting from?*

243 CT – I'm not an economic expert– I'm out of touch with that side but of course they  
244 have massive surplus with trade with the US. they have an enormous 'shadow  
245 banking'. There are serious worries about one big big company which seems to be  
246 running out of money- I don't remember which one, I don't have my notes with me. So  
247 there is always a financial program its just a question of how long they could go on,  
248 postponing it with a positive trade balance. I'm not qualified to give you a proper  
249 answer on that, I think.

250 *PANEL – I'd like to ask you a question about the Uyghurs and how they are presented*  
251 *to the rest of the Chinese population. You refer on your page 6 that they are*  
252 *denigrated, not patriotic and dangerous and page 10 the current regime is reverting*  
253 *back to superstitious, violent and not patriotic. Do you have particular sources which*  
254 *indicate the material is being fed to Chinese people?*

255 CT – I can't identify for you the sources for those counter comments. I've heard about  
256 them in different contexts, from many different people and I'm afraid I can't tell you  
257 how it's been brought together in one place. Scholars have studied, Frank Dikötter,  
258 the Danish scholar who was written a lot about China's innovation policies. I think you  
259 would find a lot there for example, but I know from VOXPOP from complaints on how  
260 Uyghurs are presented, when they go to Mainland china.

261 *PANEL – So if I could just clarify these are ideas that you’ve picked up from minority*  
262 *peoples, presented to you from Han Chinese.*

263 CT – I’ve had Han Chinese say something to me about Tibet, for example, which would  
264 make your hair curl. Tibetans– poor Tibetans were very backwards, and they have  
265 reputation for being ‘savages’ for Han Chinese. They are very strong on identify and  
266 characterizing other races. That’s been a long tradition that they’ve been ruled by  
267 barbarians- the Mongols, the mancus, I can’t remember the other ones. They have  
268 been kind of sucked into the Chinese bureaucracy being so strong and efficient.  
269 they’ve absorbed Sinicized these people over the centuries. So, they’ve always come  
270 out looking Chinese. It’s a curious theme. Although they’ve been- a long, long time  
271 they’ve been ruled by barbarians over the border.

272 *PANEL – Thank you for your testimony. On page 9 at the top you write about sexual*  
273 *offences against Turkey women as a trigger for protest. First of all can I clarify with*  
274 *you is that Han sexual offences against women*

275 CT – Yes

276 *PANEL – So this is about up until 2002. So you’ve o probably heard what is happening*  
277 *in Xinjiang lately recently/lately. We at the tribunal about the fact that more men are*  
278 *detained than women in detention centres. In one report up 91% so this means that*  
279 *there are a lot of Turkic women without their men folk, brothers, or sexual offenses or*  
280 *perhaps forced marriage. Can you speculate as to whether the conditions can rise to*  
281 *sexual offences could you also the overall consequences the one child policy in China*  
282 *which has led to preferences of boys over girls, as in India, perhaps 100 men to every*  
283 *90 women so there is a massive need for women. so could you speculate that there*

284 *are more people coming to the region, more women that are on their own and what*  
285 *that could lead to.*

286 CT – It is plain from reading the history of the place that a lot of incidents from the past  
287 have started with Han Chinese assault on a Turkey women. I've read many cases in  
288 modern times as well, and the people of the families are being sorted– the assaulted  
289 women are being jailed rather than the assailant– I've read a lot about that. What you  
290 say about the future is difficult for me to answer. Clearly there is a lot of forced marriage  
291 going on, we've heard about that in earlier hearings. That's not new either by the way.  
292 Forced marriages occurred General (name inaudible) in the 1870s. There are a lot of  
293 girls being forced to marry Han Chinese– bribed or forced according to the evidence  
294 we heard the families are threatened if they don't consent to the weddings. They will  
295 suffer. There are/ or were a lot of migrant workers- I don't know about the situation  
296 now but there were a lot of migrant works who come in to do work and hang around  
297 and so they are a constant sort of threat. They are a threat because Han are a threat  
298 and Uyghurs are extremely defensive of their women folk and don't hesitate to attack  
299 them if they are forward. I can see what you mean by a large number of the men locked  
300 out that they women are particularly vulnerable. And we've heard evidence- families  
301 are assigned Han friends/men to ensure ... I can't really say what will happen. The  
302 whole campaign, birth control campaign is very demoralizing– and for families,  
303 shaming for the men. I can't see anything but trouble.

304 *PANEL – With respect to the Han friends are there more men than women? Male*  
305 *friends?*

306 CT – From what I read- because of course this system didn't exist when I was there.  
307 The men were introduced into these families

308 *PANEL – What sort of threats are issued? What happens if a woman says ‘no, I don’t*  
309 *want to marry you’? Threats of detention, family being taken away?*

310 CT – I think your family would be in trouble

311 *PANEL – Trouble meaning?*

312 CT – well they would be taken away

313 *PANEL – Trouble like detention?*

314 CT – I don’t know precisely but there is also a period where a lot of Uyghur were being  
315 exported into China to learn or become factory workers to learn whatever, im talking  
316 about 5 to 6 years ago there was a fear that a lot of them were forced into prostitution  
317 in inner china

318 *PANEL – You and others including Professor Roberts that there have been acts of*  
319 *violence perpetrated by Uyghurs, authorities have characterized this as particularly*  
320 *differently from 20 years ago that this is a war on terror. You and others have described*  
321 *it differently. And I wondered what gave that difference legitimacy?*

322 CT – Can you refer me to what I said?

323 *PANEL – You described it as a reaction to...*

324 CT – Yes, that point. This a quite difficult question to deal with. Quite clearly there  
325 have been some violent and savage attacks by Uyghurs. Let me just first say that it is  
326 difficult to find out what happened, the official reports of the two riots in 1990 are high  
327 politicized. Two completely different versions, the one you hear locally and one that  
328 appears officially by the Party documents. So, the actual event, is always unclear. Why  
329 do I say that there are retaliatory? Let me just take the word terrorism. What we mean  
330 by terrorism? We know what we mean. It’s an act of violence, against innocent

331 people/persons to instil fear. We make the motive of extreme authority or frightening  
332 people into something else. They know what they are doing. For the moment what we  
333 understand as terrorism is Jihad and people being influenced by mullahs and going  
334 out and killing somebody. The Palestinians were described as terrorism until they got  
335 their status, or guerrillas/freedom fighters. Terrorism was used by George Bush Jr to  
336 launch his war against terror. To launch his specific threat- Al Qaeda, ISIS type of  
337 terrorism- religious fanaticism. And innocent victims and the Chinese picked up really  
338 quickly. And what we've heard repeatedly they use it now to describe anything that  
339 they don't like, which they disprove of- different versions of these incidents. I don't  
340 know enough about each incident to tell you that this is definitely retaliatory for some  
341 act of aggression, the destruction of a mosque or the rape a woman or some other  
342 miscarriage of justice.

343 The big Urumqi demonstration of 2009—if I've got that right— started out as a peaceful  
344 demonstration in Urumqi to show solidarity with Uyghurs. 18 Uyghurs were killed two  
345 of them were accused of raping a Han woman— I don't know if that happened who  
346 know? It was a big march, a big protest. What we saw, the public saw, Han Chinese.  
347 Two Han Chinese women with bloody faces that was the famous picture. I discovered  
348 — well other people not just me— I did give evidence at an asylum appeal in Bedford of  
349 a young woman who had been on that march who was seeking asylum here. And her  
350 account of what happened was extremely enlightening— complete with maps and what  
351 happened in different stages and it turned out at all as the Chinese official Chinese  
352 viewed- it started out as a peaceful march, they'd gone down a street they shouldn't  
353 have and the soldiers started shooting in the air and then shooting demonstrators.  
354 There was genuine pandemonium. The police chased after them. Police shot in the  
355 streets into the evening. Meanwhile, a lot of the Uyghurs south of Urumqi with shops

356 and started ransacking the Han shopkeepers. These two women were damaged– I  
357 don't know if it was a car that had been blown up.

358 So, I just give that example because it's very hard to know the truth of all these  
359 incidents but there is no doubt at all that the very violent attacks on Chinese military  
360 and civilians bombs the [\*Kumway\* 1:09:36] railway attack, didn't know every much  
361 about. Didn't include knifing railway station that looks to me like terrorism. Because it's  
362 against innocent people, used to illustrate their hate for Han Chinese, what I'm trying  
363 to argue here.

364 There comes a point that the only way you can get back at the "enemy" / the invader  
365 is to attack him or take revenge for an injustice you suffered or somebody that your  
366 family had been imprisoned or raped or whatever it may be. Some of these attacks  
367 were to steal weapons and steal explosives. But like I've said elsewhere it's very easy  
368 to get weapons in Xinjiang. We could find examples in other countries where that as  
369 happened as well.

370 The only way you can characterize it, if you were to put all these instances together-  
371 let me just mention one more, let me just check the date, it's in here somewhere. The  
372 three people who were in Tiananmen square, I think it was this man, his wife and his  
373 mother-in-law. I forget. ask yourself what kind of terrorist attack is that? Why would  
374 you take your mother-in-law with you? Why take your wife? So, there is something  
375 about that. There is something to know, I would love to know the story behind that.  
376 what were the people doing in Tiananmen square? They injured 20 people, but it was  
377 peculiar form of terrorism. I wanted to say, if you add all these instances together  
378 different version of them, produced by different parties, you can't help feeling that at

379 the bottom, here is a retaliatory motive. It is a getting back at a perceived injustice- a  
380 physical attack...

381 *PANEL – Thank you for everything you’ve told us. Unless Professor Linch and Kumar*  
382 *have found it appropriate to ask somewhere that there is no historic– genetic*  
383 *connection... Apparently, those with great medical experience say... Is there no*  
384 *genetic connection, so far as you know?*

385 CT – As far as I know, the Uyghurs have a Turkic lineage, they came from the north...  
386 a lot of them married Indians... They’ve got Indo-European.

387 *PANEL – I’ll stop you right there because it seems like we’re on the right track there.*  
388 *And I’ll give my colleagues the chance to ask questions. This willingness and*  
389 *enthusiasm to have Han men marry Uyghur women... does that then demonstrate that*  
390 *there is no particular desire with genetic purity, to have the Sinicization of the Uyghurs?*

391 CT – I don’t think it’s about generic purity

392 *PANEL – Thank you. I don’t know if you attended yesterday’s hearings, but I asked*  
393 *Mr Idris a question, I think you cover in a different way. Where you cover in the*  
394 *agreement, the Shanghai agreement of 1996 and the Border zone. He gave us a lot*  
395 *of evidence about, and I asked him about that the belt road initiative. We agreed to*  
396 *use the word persecution as a general term not a technical term just for the purposes*  
397 *of the question and I asked him, was the persecution because they are Uyghurs or is*  
398 *the persecution because they are in the way of belt road initiative? I think his answer*  
399 *was ambiguous, but I’d like your comment- is the persecution, use the term in the*  
400 *general way if you don’t mind because they’re Uyghurs or because they’re in the way*  
401 *of the Belt Road initiative?*

402 CT – I'll try to be [*inaudible*] I want to say that it's because they are in the way because  
403 they are trouble and trouble because they're Uyghurs

404 *PANEL – You write in your paper that the conceptualization of rights being different in*  
405 *China versus the West. I wonder if you could say a bit more about that, whether you*  
406 *think senior people in the CCP believe their policies and their acts are consistent with*  
407 *their conception of human rights or whether they are actually breaching their own*  
408 *conception*

409 CT - I can't tell you what human rights means to them about the policy, but I can tell  
410 you, they don't have the same idea of human rights it's the collective rights- the  
411 people's rights that matter. The people are defined as anybody that the party likes  
412 them to do. People have got to be protected individuals that misbehave. Anybody  
413 outlines things differently- they don't have human rights, they don't get a lawyer, a trial  
414 and all the things we insist on. they are, I think used to Uyghurs, is that it's a cancer.  
415 they are a religious cancer. Yes. I don't think human rights as we understand it, a  
416 western invention, is seen as universal.

417 *PANEL – What was said earlier was that it was a fight between good and evil. Any act*  
418 *that would protect the party or state...*

419 CT – I don't know how people line up with political parties but there have been people  
420 in the past who have spoken as though minorities are just colourful subdivision of  
421 Chinese people, but they are people who have rights of their own. They would see  
422 them as deserving more than just exterminate value have the status.

423 *PANEL – One another question: you've written a book– as counsel mentioned, you*  
424 *have a different version of history as you mentioned. I just wonder what the reaction*  
425 *to your book has been in China. Has anyone sought or tried to disprove it?*

426 CT – I've never had anyone approach me about the book but whenever I gave a lecture  
427 on it there was always someone who was clearly from the Chinese embassy. But he  
428 wouldn't talk to me. I'd ask for his help with a slide projector occasionally and he looked  
429 a bit disconcerted. I've had some Chinese students say they can't believe what I'm  
430 trying to prove, and they just don't believe it, I believe them when they say it. They  
431 don't know anything about Xinjiang.

432 *PANEL – Mr Tyler thank you very much for your evidence.*