



AN INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL

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James Millward

Testimony to the Uyghur Tribunal, 12 September 2021

I. Professional background, expertise and credentials

A. Biographical information

I am a full professor of history, employed by Georgetown University since 1996, where I teach Chinese, Central Asian and world history to undergraduates and graduate students. I studied East Asian language and civilization as an undergraduate at Harvard, East Asian Studies at SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London) for my MA degree, and history for the Ph.D. at Stanford University. While doing research for my doctoral dissertation about 18th and 19th century Qing imperial administration of the Xinjiang region, I spent 1990 in Beijing and in Xinjiang gathering archival and published materials and interviewing many scholars. Besides speaking Mandarin and reading modern and classical Chinese, I read and speak Japanese and have a limited degree of research ability in Uyghur (sufficient to consult and cite Uyghur-language articles in my published work) as well as in Manchu and Mongolian.

I travelled quite extensively through the Uyghur Region during trips in the 1990s, at which time I enjoyed a basic ability in conversational Uyghur. I have not been to the Uyghur region since 2004, however, because in the early 2000s the PRC authorities put me on a gray-list which restricts my travel to China. I have subsequently only been granted occasional visas to visit the PRC to attend official conferences in eastern China, following my assurances that I will not travel to Xinjiang or have contact with Uyghur people while in China on those trips.

B. Publications

I have published the following academic books and articles and public-facing essays relevant to the place now known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region:

Books relevant to Xinjiang:

Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New York: Columbia University Press; London: C. Hurst Co., 2007; second revised edition 2021.

The Silk Road: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2013. Chinese edition by Yilin publishing 译林出版社, Nanjing, China, 2017. Ma Rui, trans. Preface by Rong Xinjiang.

Millward, James, Shinmen Yasushi and Sugawara Jun, eds. *Studies on Xinjiang Historical Sources in the 17th-20th Centuries*. Tokyo: Toyobunko, 2010.

Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity and Empire in Qing Xinjiang, 1759-1864. Stanford University Press, 1998. (PRC Chinese translation in National Qing History Editorial Project Foreign Language Translation series, volume 9, 2006; Complex characters Chinese edition: 米华健, “嘉峪關外: 1759–

1864 年新疆的經濟、民族和清帝國." Jia Jianfei 賈建飛, trans. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press 中文大学出版社, 2017.

Academic articles relevant to Xinjiang:

Millward, James and Dahlia Peterson. "China's system of oppression in Xinjiang: How it developed and how to curb it." The Brookings Institution, Global China series, September 2020.

The Qing and Twentieth-Century Chinese Diversity Regimes," in Andrew Phillips and Christian Reus-smit eds. *Culture and Order in World Politics* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019 (ch. 4, pp. 71-92). (This book won the 2021 International Studies Association Prize for the Best Edited Book in International Theory and was runner up for the ISA Best Edited Book in History and IR.)

Mi Huajian 米华健 (James Millward) [“丝绸之路”研究与清帝国边疆](#) (Silk Road Research and the Qing Imperial Frontier). *Pengpai xinwen* 23 February 2018.

"Towards a Xinjiang Environmental History: Evidence from Space, the Ground and in Between." In *New Historical Sources on Xinjiang*. James Millward and Yasushi Shinmen, eds. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2010.

Guest editor: "Special Issue: The Uyghurs in China—Questioning the Past and Understanding the Present. *Central Asian Survey* 28:4 (Dec. 2009).

"Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi violence mark a turning point?" In *Central Asian Survey* 28:4 (Dec. 2009): 347-360.

"Positioning Xinjiang in Eurasian and Chinese History: Differing Visions of the "Silk Road." In Michael Clarke and Colin Mackerras, eds. *China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Future Prospects into the 21st Century*. London: Routledge, 2009.

"Eastern Central Asia (Xinjiang): 1300-1800." *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: the Chinggisid Age*. Edited by Nicola Di Cosmo, Allen Frank and Peter Golden. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Millward, James and Laura Newby. "The Qing and Islam on the Western Frontier." In Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen Siu and Donald Sutton, eds. *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity and Frontier in Early Modern China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

"Uyghur Art Music and Chinese Silk Roadism." *The Silk Road* (online and print journal of the Silk Road Foundation) 3:1 (June 2005): 9-15.

"The Advent of Modern Education on the Sino-Central Asian Frontier: *Xinxue* vs. *usul-i jadid*." In Bradley J. Parker and Lars Rodseth, eds., *Untaming the Frontier in Archaeology, Anthropology and History*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005.

Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment. Policy Studies # 6. Washington: East-West Center, 2004.

"Contextualizing the Qing: the Return of the Torghuts and the End of History in Central Eurasia." In Lynn Struve, ed., *The Qing Formation and World Time*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

"Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the late 19th Century" (with Peter Perdue). In Frederick Starr, ed. *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Frontier*. M. E. Sharpe, 2004.

- "Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978" (with Nabijan Tursun). In Frederick Starr, ed. *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Frontier*. M. E. Sharpe, 2004.
- "Historical Perspectives on Contemporary Xinjiang." *Inner Asia* 2 (2000): 121-135.
- "Coming onto the Map: "Western Regions" Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of Chinese Empire in Xinjiang." *Late Imperial China* 20, no.2 (Dec 1999): 61-98.
- "New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier." In Gail Hershatter, Emily Honig, Jonathan N. Lipman and Randall Stross, eds. *Remapping China*. Stanford University Press, 1996.
- "1759-1860 nian Xinjiang baiyin shengmingxian" 1759-1860 年新疆白銀生命線 [Xinjiang's silver lifeline between 1759 and 1860], in Ma Dazheng et. al, eds., *Xiyu kaocha yu yanjiu* 西域考察與研究 [Exploration and research on the "Western Regions"]. Urumchi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1994.
- "A Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court: The Meanings of the Fragrant Concubine." *Journal of Asian Studies* 53:2 (May 1994): 427-458.
- "The Qing Trade with the Kazakhs in Yili and Tarbagatai, 1759-1852." *Central and Inner Asian Studies* Vol VII (1992).

Pieces for Public-facing media:

- ["Mike Pompeo accused China of committing 'genocide,' an international crime. Biden's team agrees."](#) Conversation with Jessica Chen Weiss and Oumar Ba in *The Washington Post's The Monkey Cage*. 23 January 2021.
- ["The Uighurs' suffering deserves targeted solutions, not anti-Chinese posturing."](#) *The Guardian*. 27 July 2020.
- ["Between the lines of the Xinjiang Papers."](#) *The New York Times*. 20 November 2019.
- ["What Xi Jinping hasn't Learned from China's Emperors."](#) *The New York Times*. 1 October 2019.
- ["We need a better middle road on China. Here's how we can find it."](#) *The Washington Post*. 6 August 2019.
- ["Re-educating China's Muslims."](#) *The New York Review of Books*, February 7, 2019. Republished outside paywall on [Chinofile](#).
- ["Is China a colonial power?"](#) *The New York Times* 4 May 2018.
- ["What it's like to live in a surveillance state."](#) *The New York Times* 18 February 2018.
- ["China's fruitless repression of the Uighurs."](#) *The New York Times* p. A27, 29 September 2014.
- ["China's two problems with the Uyghurs."](#) *Los Angeles Review of Books*, 28 May 2014.
- "Being Banned from China, and What Can be Learned from It." *The China Beat* (<http://www.thechinabeat.org/?p=3746>) 24 August 2011. [Now republished on Medium](#).
- ["The Urumchi Unrest Revisited."](#) *The China Beat*, 29 July 2009.
- ["China's Story: Putting the PR into the PRC"](#) OpenDemocracy (online), 18 April 2008.

"Statement to the Congressional Executive Committee on China" regarding the Chinese sense of insecurity in Xinjiang and the history of foreign involvement in the region, 16 Nov. 2005.
<http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/111605/Millward.php>

II. Testimony

My written testimony consists of two parts. Part A is a summary of key points, the text that I will deliver as oral testimony. Part B consists of a chapter from the revised edition of my book, *Eurasian Crossroads: a History of Xinjiang*, which I completed in the summer of 2020 and which was published in Britain early in 2021, and due out in the US in November 2021. The chapter is entitled "Colonialism, Assimilationism, and Ethnocide (2000s-2020s)." I offer this as a reference to the Tribunal, given that there are few other general surveys of this critical period available in English.

A. Text of oral testimony: PRC ethnicity policies from 1949, and the recent turn to assimilationism

1. The inauguration of PRC settler colonialism in Xinjiang

Traditional and nationalistic historical narratives often erroneously discuss "China" as a continuous political entity thousands of years old. PRC state propaganda stresses the military colonies established in the 2nd century BCE by the Han empire in parts of what is now Xinjiang. But these claims are no more relevant to contemporary PRC policies than Roman outposts in Britain would be to modern Italian-UK relations, or Ottoman imperial administration in Egypt is to Turkish-Egyptian relations today. Despite millennial cultural continuities and historical memories in China not unlike those in Europe or Islamic lands, the story of PRC policies in Xinjiang, and PRC policies towards the Uyghurs, logically begins with the PRC, and the military occupation of, first, southern, and then northern parts of Xinjiang, by the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Before the CCP took control of Xinjiang in 1949, the previous government of the region, in power since 1945, had been an uneasy coalition of the Guomindang (KMT), or Chinese Nationalist Party, and the Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) or Eastern Turkestan People's Republic (ETPR), which had formed with Soviet support to resist the imposition of Guomindang rule in 1944. The ETR with Soviet military aid had nearly defeated the GMD militarily in Xinjiang by late 1944, but in the final months of World War II the United States urged the Guomindang, and the Soviet Union urged the Eastern Turkestan leaders, to reach a ceasefire. Thus the GMD and the ETR formed a coalition government in Xinjiang, with a Guomindang official as governor, and the Uyghur leader of the ETR as vice-governor.¹

When the CCP took over Xinjiang, it replaced the former ETR leaders with its own hand-picked Uyghur, Kazakh and other native officials. It accepted the GMD surrender in southern Xinjiang and settled 80,000 demobilized Guomindang troops in the region, where they formed the Xinjiang Production Construction Military Corps (XPCMC, sometimes abbreviated XPCC), or Bingtuan (Military Corps). There had been settler colonies under the Qing in northern Xinjiang, and the GMD harbored similar aspirations, but the modern colonial settlement of the Xinjiang region with Han Chinese begins with the

¹ James Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, revised 2nd edition (London: Hurst, Co., 2021), chapter 5.

demobilized GMD troops and formation of the Bingtuan. The XPCMC is now deeply involved in running Xinjiang prisons, internment camps as well as in the region's agriculture, including the cotton and tomato industry.

2. Ethnic policies designed to cover the appearance and ameliorate the experience of colonial rule

Like the Soviet Union after 1917, the PRC from 1949 was a socialist state ruling over a former empire—the Qing empire. For a regime like the PRC, a dedicated opponent of imperialism and nominal proponent of socialist internationalism, this legacy of imperial diversity posed both a practical and an image problem. The PRC thus implemented a modified version of Soviet nationalities policies, and in China officially recognized 56 ethnic groups, 55 "minority nationalities" and the Han. The designation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, three other "Autonomous Regions," each nominally self-governed under a titular ethnic group, along with many so-called "autonomous" prefectures and counties, comprises the territorial element of that original PRC approach to ethnicity. We may call this PRC's diversity management system.

This original diversity management system made ethnic identity a building block of state administration. Administratively, financially and rhetorically it supported language, education and cultural expression of each officially recognized group; in theory, and at times in practice, in following this system the Party publically denounced "Great Han Chauvinism," protected non-Han groups from discrimination and cultural erasure by the Han majority, and assured that each official ethnic group was represented within the authoritarian government and party. While very different from the diversity management systems of liberal democracies, this first generation PRC diversity system, when honestly implemented, proved popular among non-Han people. One might even say that in the 1950s, non-Han people in China were, as regards racial discrimination and violence, better off than Blacks and other persons of color in Jim Crow America. The Cultural Revolution of the 1960s-1970s was a horrific exception that took Han-supremacist form in Xinjiang and Tibet. But Uyghurs and other non-Han groups in the PRC look back to the 1980s, in which the Party attempted to make amends for the cruel chaos of the Cultural Revolution, as a golden age of PRC diversity policies.

3. The PRC's assimilationist turn and racialization of Zhonghua identity

With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, PRC scholars and Party ideologues debated whether Soviet nationalities policies themselves had contributed to the disintegration of the USSR. Some called for a second generation Chinese ethnicity policy that would promote "melding" and "fusion" of ethnic groups, and reduce state and party support for the 55 non-Han identities and their nominally autonomous territories.²

When Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, he embarked on a radical revision of the PRC diversity system. He transferred the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and the State Administration for Religious Affairs, formerly under the State Council, to reside instead under the United Front Work Department of the

² Mark Elliott, "The Case of the Missing Indigene: Debate Over a 'Second-Generation' Ethnic Policy," *The China Journal* 73 (January 2015): 186–213.

Communist Party. In other words, he moved the bureaucracies dealing with ethnicity and religion out of the government, and under more direct Party control.³ Xi announced in 2014 that problems in Xinjiang would require attention not just to "material" measures (that is, economic development) but also to "psychological issues" (*jingshen wenti* 精神问题; "*jingshen*" is also translated as "spiritual").⁴ He launched a campaign to "sinicize" (*Zhongguo hua* 中国化) religion in China by destroying domes and minarets and removing crosses, moons and stars from architecture; hanging the national flag and Party slogans in houses of worship; and erasing Arabic script and even the word "*halal*" from the windows of restaurants. Since 2017, this so-called Sinicization program has completely razed 30% of the mosques and shrines in the Uyghur region, and removed major architectural elements (domes, minarets) from another 27% of religious structures.⁵

Moreover, General Secretary Xi has promoted the ideal of a unitary, homogeneous Chinese identity, labeled "*Zhonghua*," as an ideological centerpiece closely related to his "China Dream." As one current Chinese political catchphrase puts it, "Take firmly the forging of a *Zhonghua* collective consciousness, as the main [political] line" (铸牢中华民族共同体意识为主线).⁶ The *Zhonghua* concept is meant as a super-ethnicity, a national category above and encompassing all the other ethnic ones, but defined more culturally than simple passport citizenship. The word *Zhonghua* itself is composed of two Chinese characters that each individually mean "Chinese," and the officially promoted characteristics of *Zhonghua* identity are indistinguishable from Han characteristics and customs. The muscular state promotion of *Zhonghua* identity is in effect, then, a top-down effort to Han-ize, or Sinicize, the non-Han ethnic groups in China.

Another prominent slogan, appearing at least since 2018, makes *Zhonghua* a racial concept, and even argues that Uyghur and other Xinjiang non-Han groups are, in fact, *racially* part of the *Zhonghua* identity. The official press read-out of the Third Central Xinjiang Work Forum (Sept. 26-26, 2020) quotes Xi Jinping saying, "Every ethnic group [*minzu* 民族] of Xinjiang is a **family-member linked to *Zhonghua* bloodlines**" 新疆各民族是中华民族血脉相连的家庭成员 (emphasis added).⁷ Such official invocation of blood-ties has been accompanied by official promulgations falsely claiming that the Uyghur language

³ James Leibold tracked these developments as they happened, with great prescience.

<https://jamestown.org/program/hu-the-uniter-hu-lianhe-and-the-radical-turn-in-chinas-xinjiang-policy/>

⁴ <https://jamestown.org/program/a-family-divided-the-ccps-central-ethnic-work-conference/>

⁵ Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, "Cultural Erasure & Re-writing: How China is Using State Cultural Protection to Erase Islamic and Indigenous Cultures from Xinjiang." Paper delivered at the conference "The Xinjiang Crisis: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, Justice," 1 Sept. 2021. The authors compared satellite photos from before 2017 with recent photos and consulted registers of religious places and cultural monuments to conduct their survey.

⁶ http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-09/26/c_1126544371.htm. And see <https://jimmillward.medium.com/notes-on-xi-jinpings-speech-to-the-3rd-xinjiang-central-work-forum-25-26-september-2020-768b43242b8f>

⁷ http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-09/26/c_1126544371.htm. And <https://jimmillward.medium.com/notes-on-xi-jinpings-speech-to-the-3rd-xinjiang-central-work-forum-25-26-september-2020-768b43242b8f>

is linguistically Chinese, not Turkic; and that Uyghurs are not historically descended from Central Asian Turkic peoples, but rather from so-called *Zhonghua* people.⁸

This is an assimilationist narrative arguing in effect that Uyghurs are primordially Chinese, whether they know it or not. Because the characteristics of the *Zhonghua* category are for all practical intents and purposes indistinguishable from those of the Han category, it is also Han-supremacist. It is not the kind of chauvinism that *excludes* diverse ethnic groups from membership in a national community or expels them across national borders—a fact that has confused some who associate ethnic cleansing and genocide with burning villages and massed refugees driven across national borders. Rather, the current PRC assimilationism seeks to forcibly submerge Xinjiang non-Han peoples into an invented identity, mandating that distinctive ethnic features be scrubbed away through false historical narratives, cultural and language erasure, rhetoric about shared bloodlines, and coerced re-education—while at the same time implementing birth suppression measures for non-Hans and incentivizing Han in-migration to re-engineer demographic ratios in Xinjiang. The goal of the cultural assimilation and of the demographic policies is to assure that the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—never Autonomous, also ceases to be Uyghur.

Today's PRC assimilationism is diametrically opposed to the diversity system espoused and practiced during first six and a half decades of the PRC. The phrase "forging collective *Zhonghua* consciousness" reminds me of a metaphor we now reject in the United States: the melting pot. The CCP, however, has substituted a blast furnace for the melting pot, and directed it at the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang and, increasingly, at other non-Han and at speakers of languages other than Mandarin as well. The industrial-strength metaphor of the blast furnace, embraced and publically trumpeted by the CCP itself, aptly sums up the physical coercion and cultural violence of the concrete policies inflicted upon Xinjiang indigenous peoples since 2017.

B. "Colonialism, Assimilationism, and Ethnocide (2000s-2020s)"

[The second part of my written testimony follows in a scan of chapter 8 from *Eurasian Crossroads*.]

⁸ In 2018 the Mayor of Urumchi declared that "The Uyghur people are members of the Chinese family, not descendants of the Turks." <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1117158.shtml>

1 **12 September 2021 (7:52:46 – 8:39:25)**

2 **James Millward**

3

4 JAMES MILLWARD – I was planning to read the oral testimony I had written. Some
5 things may be of particular interest to the Tribunal. I don't have a PowerPoint
6 presentation, I understand you are short for time. Maybe since you have the written
7 version, maybe I'll skip to the very last part of that talking about Zhonghuaism. This
8 Zhonghua identity and how it is related to assimilationism and racialization of
9 Zhonghua identity. The PRC's assimilationist turn and racialisation of Zhonghua
10 identity. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, PRC scholars and Party ideologues
11 debated whether Soviet nationalities policies themselves had contributed to the
12 disintegration of the USSR. Some called for a second-generation Chinese ethnicity
13 policy that would promote "melding" and "fusion" of ethnic groups, and reduce state
14 and party support for the 55 non-Han identities and their nominally autonomous
15 territories and eliminate territorial set asides. Which were nominally territorial set
16 asides in the first place. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, he embarked on a
17 radical revision of the PRC diversity system. He moved to the bureaucracies stealing
18 ethnicity and religion out of the government and under party control. Xi announced in
19 2014 that problems in Xinjiang would require attention, not just to material measures
20 that is to economical development. But also to psychological and spiritual issues.

21 He launched a campaign to Sinicize religion in China by destroying domes and
22 minarets and by removing crosses, moons and stars from architecture. These
23 Sinicization methods included hanging the national flag, party slogans in houses in
24 worship and even erasing the word halal from windows of restaurants. Since 2017 this

25 so called Sinicization programme has completely erased some thirty percent of
26 mosques and shrines in the Uyghur region and removed major architecture elements
27 such as dome and minarets from another 25% of religious structures. Moreover
28 General Secretary Xi has promoted the ideal of a unitary homogeneous Chinese
29 identity, labelled Zhonghua as an ideological centerpiece closely related to his China
30 dream. As one current Chinese political text phrase puts it, “take firmly the foraging
31 of Zhonghua collective consciousness as the main political line. The Zhonghua
32 concept is meant to be some kind of super ethnicity. A national category above and
33 encompassing all of the other ethnic categories. This super ethnicity is much more
34 cultural in character than say passport citizenship would be. The word Zhonghua itself
35 is composed of two Chinese characters that each individually mean ‘China’ or
36 ‘Chinese’. The officially promoted characteristic of Zhonghua identity are virtually
37 indistinguishable from the customs of Han. This muscular state promotion of
38 Zhonghua identity is in effect then, a top-down effort then, to Hans’ eyes or Sinicize
39 the non-Han ethnic groups in China.

40 Another prominent slogan at least appearing since 2018, makes Zhonghua a racial
41 concept and suggests that Uyghur and other Xinjiang non-Han groups are in fact
42 biologically part of the Zhonghua lineage. The official press read out from a recent
43 Xinjiang work forum in 2020 quotes Xi Jinping saying, “every ethnic group of Xinjiang
44 is a family member linked to Zhonghua bloodlines. This official invocation of blood ties
45 has been accompanied by spurious articles falsely claiming that the Uyghur language
46 is linguistically Chinese and not Turkic. And that Uyghurs are not historically
47 descended from Central Asia Turkic peoples, rather from so called Zhonghua people.
48 This is an assimilationist narrative arguing in effect, Uyghurs are primordially Chinese
49 whether they know it or not. Because the characteristics of the Zhonghua category are

50 for all practical purposes indistinguishable from those in the Han category,
51 Zhonghuaism is a kind of Han supremacism. It is not the kind of chauvinism that
52 excludes diverse ethnic groups from membership in the international community or
53 expels them across national borders. Rather the current PRC assimilationism seeks
54 to forcibly merge Xinjiang and non-Han peoples into a invented identity mandating that
55 distinctive ethnic features be scrubbed away through false historical narratives,
56 cultural and language erasure, rhetoric about shared bloodlines or coerced re-
57 education.

58 Whilst at the same time re-engineering Han and non-Han demographic rations in
59 Xinjiang. Today's PRC assimilationism is diametrically opposed to the diversity
60 system espoused and practiced during the first six and a half decades of the PRC.
61 The phrase forging collective Zhonghua consciousness reminds me of a metaphor we
62 now reject in the United States that of the melting pot. The Chinese Communist Party,
63 however, has substituted a blast furnace for the melting pot and directed it at the
64 indigenous peoples of Xinjiang and increasingly at other non-Han and its speakers of
65 languages other than Mandarin.

66 Its industrial strength metaphor of the blast furnace embraced and publicly trumpeted
67 by the CCP itself aptly characterises the physical coercion and cultural violence of the
68 concrete policies inflicted upon Xinjiang indigenous peoples since 2017. That is the
69 end of my oral testimony.

70 *COUNSEL – My first question is how might you reconcile the narrative emanating from*
71 *the CCP that the Uyghurs are primordially Chinese and ought to be assimilated to that*
72 *original state with policies that seek to physically or biologically change the Uyghur*
73 *population.*

74 JM – That is a good question. I guess I would say that rhetoric and ideology is tending
75 in the direction I have described. Namely trying to explain away or cover up the
76 differences. At the same time I think the overall goal is to make the inconvenience,
77 inconvenient difference of Uyghurs and Kazakhs and non Chinese people to make
78 that inconvenience go away right? To make Xinjiang look much less like (inaudible)
79 East Turkistan, and more like a Chinese place, to get rid of this inconvenient colonial
80 appearance. So both rhetorically and ideologically and then also in terms of
81 demographic engineering. Both of those are tending towards that same goal.

82 *COUNSEL – You have extensively documented systemic ethnic discrimination of*
83 *Uyghurs going back decades. There is an implicit suggestion in your book that a*
84 *combination of assimilation and repression, together with huge investment appears to*
85 *be making up for previous failed assimilation attempts. Could this mean that once*
86 *assimilation, or as you call it Mandarinisation, is achieved coercive and repressive*
87 *measures might stop?*

88 JM - That is asking me to predict the future and I'm not ready to do that. I don't think I
89 can. There is a question about what achieving this would mean, would even, as our
90 last witness was discussing, even the loss of ability to speak Uyghur would mean the
91 people themselves are no longer Uyghur. That does not mean the State stops treating
92 them with suspicion. Even if they do learn Mandarin. The idea that this is some sort of
93 solution and that it will.. If it reaches whatever conclusion or whatever ultimate goal
94 the architects of these policies hope for, I don't think all will be peaceful and smooth
95 running in future. That's me and that is my own prediction. I'm not a fortune teller.

96 *COUNSEL – You alluded to it, what in your view would it mean to be assimilated to an*
97 *acceptable level?*

98 JM - I do believe this kind of assimilation is not acceptable as a policy at all. I wouldn't
99 say there is an acceptable level of that. I may be misunderstanding the question.

100 *COUNSEL - I meant in the sense that the PRC consider an acceptable level of*
101 *assimilation of the Uyghur people.*

102 JM - Certainly if we take the measures that have been taken and look at the measures
103 that have been taken, various aspects of cultural erasure; destruction of culture and
104 architecture and severe pressure on languages. Some of the incentives and pressure
105 for mixed marriage. The goal is to have what are perceived as uncomfortable aspects
106 of ethnicity and culture to no longer be salient.

107 I didn't single out religion but obviously religion is a central part of that, the main target
108 but not only target of PRC policies has been against Islamic beliefs. Simply for them
109 not to be salient. For the optics of Xinjiang as I said before to no longer display such
110 difference.

111 *COUNSEL – You characterised what is happening to the Uyghurs as not just cultural*
112 *but demographic genocide. At page 400 of your book you explain the basis of that*
113 *assessment. Can you explain why the demographic decline of the Uyghur population*
114 *is not incidental to a general assimilation policy but it is something which is intended*
115 *or intentional?*

116 JM – I am sure you have heard from other witnesses the details and you have had a
117 chance to read yourselves, the studies of birth suppression policies that we have seen
118 going on in the Uyghur region. I have been convinced myself on close reading of those
119 studies and even looking at the underlying documents. I am convinced myself,
120 particularly by the wording, not so much...Well in addition to the qualitative data, that
121 particularly Adrian Zenz has put forward; but I found most compelling and most

122 frightening some of the qualitative data. In other words the wording he has discovered
123 in many government documents, talking about population optimisation and the human
124 problem. Even documents talking about demographic proportion is the greatest
125 danger to Xinjiang and to security. These statements being made in 2018/2019, very
126 very recently. After all of the camps and other measures are supposed to be
127 addressing the so-called terrorism threat. After they were well in place and after in fact
128 public/ state media had proclaimed that the terrorism threat was over. At the same
129 time there are internal or less public comments and statements from Xinjiang officials
130 saying that the human problem is a problem of demographic proportion still exists. So
131 the evidence I have for wording it that way in my chapter is the same information and
132 same studies the Tribunal has seen. I find it convincing.

133 *COUNSEL – My final question before I hand you over to the PANEL. The literature*
134 *and report we have received, and you cited Dr. Zenz yourself; seem to suggest policy*
135 *discrepancies in policies and promulgated and implemented in northern and southern*
136 *Xinjiang? How might you account for this discrepancy?*

137 JM – Are these policies specifically with regards to the camps are referring or more
138 generally?

139 *COUNSEL – A mix of alleged measures to intend to restrict births as well as the*
140 *imposition of camps.*

141 JM – I think it depends on particular policies perhaps. As the Tribunal knows, there
142 are significant geographical and demographic differences between North and the
143 South of Xinjiang. There are southern parts, particularly Hotan and Kashgar, that area
144 are still majority Uyghur and the densest population of Uyghurs are in those areas. I
145 think that, specifically the policies you are alluding to, the difference is explained by

146 that existing difference of the spread of population; who is living where and what
147 groups are concentrated where.

148 *PANEL – Thank you for your excellent report. At the beginning of your oral*
149 *presentation, you say the logical place to start in the understanding of CCP policy*
150 *towards the Uyghurs is with the occupation of that area in 1949. Other witnesses we*
151 *heard from tried seemed to stress the importance of the prior history and I wonder*
152 *whether you think that actually the independence movements in the years leading up*
153 *to 1949, actually underlie many of the current attitudes of the Chinese state and the*
154 *way they behave?*

155 JM – That is a good question. Perhaps a good corrective. I would say they underlie
156 some of the PRC concerns. There were efforts to create an independent Turkic state
157 or Uyghur state in the period from the fall of the Ching Empire in 1912 up and through
158 1940 or 1949. The reason why I was trying to draw attention to 1949 I guess is; as a
159 historian we work with interpretation and emphasis and how we tell the story. I've
160 changed a little. If any of you have read all 400 pages, you'll notice a change in tone
161 between the last chapter, which I sent you part of my testimony and before that. That
162 is of course occasioned by my own disappointment and horror by what has happened
163 in recent years. I wasn't sure which way it would go, when I finished that book in the
164 2000s. Now unfortunately it is looking much worse. I am drawing attention to 1949
165 because I think the effects of... , First of all most of the Han that have moved into the
166 region, have not been there since the Han empire. Most of them have been come in
167 since 1949. The main institutional means by which this colonisation or development
168 or whatever you want to call it, is going on here that too is also established in 1949s
169 or early 1950s, namely the Binghtuan Xinjing Construction Corp. Although there have
170 been efforts, you might call them dreams of colonising Xinjiang even under the

171 nationalist government. Sun Yat-Sen in one of his books has a chapter on the
172 colonisation of Xinjiang and Mongolia; because colonisation was not a bad word in the
173 early 20th Century. Those dreams were largely aspirational they were never realised.
174 In 1949 and since then the PRC has started putting them into practice. That is why I
175 draw more attention to that dividing line.

176 *PANEL – With regard to separatism and independence, one of the ways forward*
177 *towards achieving such a thing in a western democracy is through a plebiscite. And*
178 *such a thing is of course not possible in a totalitarian state or communist state. Do you*
179 *think that means by definition such states are guilty of contravention of international*
180 *human rights?*

181 JM – Simply because of plebiscites or other kinds of... are not possible? That is a good
182 question. I have not thought about this myself. I did not read all of my preamble or oral
183 testimony. One of the points I wanted to make in that, is that the PRC had a way of
184 managing diversity. Which they put in place, with the system of 56 minzu, the so-called
185 territorial regional autonomy system and various things like that. Although it was not
186 always observed and honestly practised, there were periods when in fact it was. The
187 early 1950s and 1980s. Many non-Han peoples in Xinjiang, including the Uyghur
188 scholar Ilham Tohti has said that the period of the 1980s was in some way a golden
189 age for Uyghurs in Xinjiang, it shows the way in which the system could actually work
190 to prevent majoritarian control by Han to celebrate cultural difference rather than
191 suppress it. We have seen this ourselves. A very different approach in the 2008 Beijing
192 Olympics, where some may remember the children dressed up in costumes of all the
193 different peoples were paraded around. Some criticism and snarky comments about
194 that, it seemed mainly Han children dressed up in minzu costumes. That is the kind of
195 problem we wish we had now. Rather than erase those differences, the state

196 publicises them and celebrated them. I am not saying... It is hard to compare a top
197 down system of comparing diversity with the ideals of diversity management in a liberal
198 democracy. You can certainly compare it with the reality of what can happen even in
199 liberal democracies, pointing at the United States. I make a point that in 1950s Jim
200 Crow America was arguably and I think quite clearly a worst place to be non-white
201 than Xinjiang was to be non-Han in the 1950s, at that point right? So *ipso facto* being
202 in a party state such as the PRC does not mean ethnic suppression, that cultural
203 erasure and so on and so forth has to happen. That is why I draw attention to their
204 systems and approaches of the early PRC. In a way the Soviet Union has a similar
205 kind of system in some way as well.

206 *PANEL – Those system changes that occur where responsibility for religious and*
207 *cultural changed from State to party, did that really matter? In a party state isn't*
208 *everything under the control of the party anyway? Is that they really significant move?*

209 JM – It is a common perception that... We are hearing the word totalitarian being
210 applied to China again more and more. It is a common perception that it is highly
211 centralised, the centre has control over everything that is going on. Of course China
212 is a very big place, it is a place with provincial differences and local differences; many
213 many...A very large and complicated bureaucracy. So the move of religious Affairs
214 and ethnic affairs into the party, is part of Xi Jinping's broader efforts to assert direct
215 control over key aspects of governance in China. The very fact that he does this shows
216 he feels he wanted closer control over that. The quick answer is that it was not as
217 centralised as you might have thought before, having things out in the government
218 bureaucracy kept them out of direct control of the supreme leader.

219 *PANEL – Thank you. My final quick question. If I may quote the final part of your*
220 *chapter you kindly gave us. You say, “a ruler may use an arsenal of technologist to*
221 *terrorise a vast territory but when he confuses with harmony with uniformity, he will be*
222 *weak and his country will be small in the eyes of the world.” Is that intended as a rather*
223 *pessimistic statement or is it full of optimism that the inherent weakness in the system*
224 *will soon going to lead to a change at government or change of regime?*

225 JM - I suppose my feelings when I wrote that a year ago, were an uncomfortable
226 mixture of both perhaps meant as a warning; not that Xi Jinping is reading my book.
227 Should he or others read it, I would hope that they would see that. And also of course
228 trying to invoke the notion of harmony which was much more central than previous...
229 Ten years or so ago in China. , I would hope that they would see that. And also of
230 course trying to evoke the notion of harmony which was much more central than
231 previous... Ten years or so ago in China. I think it is more intrinsically a Chinese value
232 or than homogenisation or uniformity would be.

233 *PANEL – The study of genocide is in many places a separate field of study, correct?*
234 *You are a historian and I know that Georgetown has various departments that include*
235 *genocide as part of their work; the Jewish Centre and other activities. Correct?*

236 JM – Yes.

237 *PANEL – Would you feel in any way comfortable dealing with the genocide discipline*
238 *– which is essentially I think sociological but also historical, would you be comfortable*
239 *in dealing with how it might assess what is been happening in Xinjiang?*

240 JM - Not by virtue of having colleagues down the hall who do that, I think. Not to be
241 dismissive of your question: not being a jurist myself or international jurist, I have been
242 reading and learning about definitions under meanings of genocide myself throughout

243 this process. It was not something I paid sufficient attention to earlier on. As I
244 mentioned before I have been convinced by studies I mentioned by Adrian Zenz and
245 by others of intent to do things which fit definitions as I read them of genocide. I do on
246 occasion use their term, I am not running away from that term myself. I do not see
247 myself in any position to comment on whether there isn't a genocide in a technical
248 sense.

249 *PANEL – I wonder if you can help us at all with forced assimilation of the kind you*
250 *describe, not natural assimilation, might qualify within that larger Venn Diagram circle*
251 *as genocide. The sociological concept.*

252 JM – Sure. Within the larger Venn Diagram and perhaps the narrower one as well. To
253 put a historical cast on it, I think that current policies in Xinjiang have in a way, whether
254 it is conscious or not I don't know, they have in a sense reinvented the wheel by
255 approaching some of the same issues that were seen as existential problems say in
256 the 19th Century in Europe or through the actions of colonialism and efforts to achieve
257 Control to open wilderness to achieve a kind of state control and to securitise areas;
258 through all those same kinds of processes. I think we have seen very similar things
259 going on in Xinjiang now that we saw in the American west that led to the treatment of
260 first nations in Canada or Australia; or even to inter-ethnic or inter-communal strife in
261 Europe in the early 19th or 20th century. I don't know what is in the heads of Chinese
262 leaders who propose this, I think they're coming at it perhaps from a more Chinese
263 point of view, that is thinking about this educational transformation; which has roots in
264 Confucian thinking as well as in communist policies. And so drawing on that but then
265 as those impulses flow together with artificial intelligence and with security concerns
266 and with modern industrialisation and all of these modern and political tools; they came

267 to this same kind of a place... They have come to the same kind of place as we have
268 seen in other parts of the world that we do call genocides.

269 *PANEL – We've heard a lot about brainwashing. One of the questions is, does*
270 *brainwashing ever work? Or is brainwashing simply a part of the enforcement of*
271 *behaviour by terror? Your experience as a historian, does brainwashing ever work?*
272 *Do people really ever change?*

273 JM – So I prefer to use the term the Chinese themselves have been using, 'educational
274 transformation'. I don't mean that as a euphemism. To say that these places are
275 vocational camps or vocational schools, that is a lie. That is untrue. Part of their goal
276 is this transformation, I think is true. It is right there in black and white. Now we can
277 translate that as brainwashing or re-education, these are slightly different connoted
278 terms for the same sort of thing. Coercive efforts to change people's mentalities, they
279 work the way you just said they work. They work because of there coercive nature or
280 they can work because of that. Because of the threat of force and the continued threat
281 of force and because of [*Inaudible – 8:29:07*] and psychological torture and all of those
282 things. They don't work as a benign process but I think that unfortunately have an
283 effect of beating down people in such a way. Whether it will reach the goals which the
284 Chinese Communist Party says it wants to reach in Xinjiang is another question. It can
285 reduce a potentially festive population to submission.

286 *PANEL – Professor Millward, men and women are experiencing muscular blast*
287 *furnace assimilation quite differently are they not?*

288 JM – Yes, I would say that is definitely true.

289 *PANEL – Can you elaborate for us? I wonder about whether it is too simplistic what is*
290 *going on as a policy of, assimilate if you can but attack if you must.*

291 JM – You are alluding to the particular pressures that women have been put under
292 and forced suppression and all of those. And of course the experience in various types
293 of incarceration and internment at least from the cases that we know; you have heard
294 many eye witness accounts from that we know that experience is different from women
295 than men. Arguably much more horrific. Certainly in the area of reproduction and
296 women in society, even before the really hard-edged policies began in 2017, there
297 were policies about don't wear the veil. Trying to discourage women from wearing the
298 veil or any kinds of face or head coverings. It is interesting the way they were carried
299 out. I have forgotten the precise term for it but the beauty campaign; "let your beautiful
300 hair fly and let your beautiful face be revealed." And there is a consistent discourse
301 about, that continues despite everything else and despite narrative about terrorism
302 and so on about how beautiful Uyghur women are. This has been officially part of the
303 portrayal of Uyghur women for decades. They sing, they dance, they are beautiful,
304 they have long hair and so on and so forth. I'm not capable of talking about this as
305 many of my colleagues are of talking about this in gendered terms. It is very clear that
306 the push for marriage and the way in which the State advertisements of marriages
307 between Han and Uyghurs have been played out/have been shown. Then of course
308 the pressure on reproduction. This is a very sharp edge of this that, and thank you for
309 the question I need to give some more thought to it myself, if we do really look from
310 the women's point of view on this; the biological aspects of it are much more clear.

311 *PANEL – You made some comparison in regard to the treatment the PRC is meting*
312 *out to its indigenous population with that meted out to the indigenous population in the*
313 *US, perhaps most notably under President Jackson's presidency and of course others.*
314 *But in that case it was almost entirely, unless you are going to correct me, motivated*
315 *around land and the acquisition of land or the appropriation of land. It would appear*

316 *from the evidence we have heard it is in part a motive, in regard to the PRC and the*
317 *Uyghurs. Could you expand as to whether you think there are other motives other than*
318 *that relatively simple one?*

319 JM - Meaning more to material motives perhaps and not just land grabs? You are
320 speaking of the Xinjiang case not the American case. Well, here is where the cotton
321 industry is quite interesting, the cotton growing and cotton spinning. And its been a
322 process of at least twenty years whereby acreage on which cotton was grown has
323 moved from eastern China out into Xinjiang. But more than that and more recently, the
324 spinning industry, the spindles on which factories spinning of cotton has moved
325 progressively from eastern China into Xinjiang. This has been part of a couple of five
326 year plans, talking about this. A combination of perhaps market forces but also pushed
327 by the State. And I think it is quite clear why this is happening. As the cost of labour in
328 eastern China has gone up and there have been efforts to move manufacturing in
329 China – in eastern parts of China - up the value chain then the lower valued industries
330 of textile manufacturing has been pushed out further into Xinjiang, into the corner.
331 Really to the last place where labour is still cheap or the cheapest labour in China. An
332 argument could be made that the need to control Xinjiang more effectively from the
333 eye of the state is tied to the push of cotton growing and in particular spinning and
334 textile manufacture we've seen out there. This is to a certain extent corroborated by
335 not all by the factories built, but many of the factories that have been built through the
336 Pairing Partnership Programme some of them even adjacent to or within the same
337 compounds within the internment camps. Many of these are in fact textile firms/ textile
338 factories. Many of the so-called vocational training and the factory labour that people
339 have been transferred to from camps or encouraged or coerced into from their villages
340 are textiles. So we are seeing... You could argue that there is a process here of

341 proletarianising poor farmers in Xinjiang and moving them into factory labour, in
342 particular in these low value electronics assembly, textiles and other things like that. I
343 want to evoke Ilhan Tohti again. I mention him in the chapter. Many of you may have
344 seen that. His argument was that the types of market reforms which were so effective
345 for raising standards of living in the rest of China from the late 70s on, in particular
346 opening up... Making the market accessible to farmers. That has not happened in
347 Xinjiang. Poor Uyghur farmers have not been permitted to do that. It is not exactly the
348 same kind of political economy of chasing people off the land, that you referred to.
349 There is arguably an economic motive behind these sorts of forced changes that have
350 been imposed on the people of Xinjiang.