



AN INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL

Witness Name: Adrian Zenz		
Witness category:	fact <input type="checkbox"/>	expert <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Date of testimony: 7 June 2021		
Link to recording*: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aI-wr9TtYo&t=14833s		
Time stamp (start/end): 07:52:30 – 09:42:20		
Report included:	yes <input type="checkbox"/>	no <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Statement included:	yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	no <input type="checkbox"/>
Transcript included:	yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	no <input type="checkbox"/>
Presentation included:	yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	no <input type="checkbox"/>

*Please note that all recordings of the Uyghur Tribunal hearings can be found on You Tube: [Uyghur Tribunal - YouTube](#)

Adrian Zenz [An Analysis of Beijing’s “Population Structure Optimization” Strategy in Southern Xinjiang – Testimony for the Uyghur Tribunal]

Chinese academics and politicians argue that Xinjiang’s “terrorism” problem can only be solved by “optimizing” its ethnic population structure. High ethnic minority population concentrations are considered a national security threat. “Optimizing” such concentrations requires embedding substantial Han populations, whose “positive culture” can mitigate the Uyghur “human problem.” Scenarios that do not overburden the region’s ecological carrying capacity entail drastic reductions in ethnic minority natural population growth, potentially decreasing their populations. Population optimization discourses and related policies provide a basis to assess Beijing’s “intent” to destroy an ethnic minority population in part through birth prevention per the 1948 U.N. Genocide Convention. The “destruction in part” can be assessed as the difference between projected natural population growth without substantial government interference, and reduced growth scenarios in line with population optimization requirements. Based on population projections by Chinese researchers, this difference could range between 2.6 and 4.5 million lives by the year 2040.

7219

7 June 2021 (07:52:30 – 09:42:20)7220 **Adrian Zenz**

7221

7222 AZ – Previously, we have been able to gather substantial evidence of a campaign of birth
7223 suppression and mass sterilisation from Chinese documents and witness statements.
7224 Together with official data showing declines in birth rates. This evidence raises but did
7225 not answer the question of the ultimate intent of which the Chinese state is pursuing these
7226 policies besides referring that this would make the Uyghur population easier to control by
7227 reducing its size. If these policies continued, they would depress the population, but will
7228 they, any what population loss would the suppression potentially cause?

7229 Today I would like to attempt to provide evidence regarding these urgent questions by
7230 presenting new research that provides evidence of the Chinese's state's likely intent to
7231 substantially reduce ethnic minority natural population growth in Xinjiang on the long term
7232 by optimising Chinese *youthua* (优化) - the ethnic population. This refers to a targeted
7233 dilution of populations deemed problematic by the state with Han Chinese through in-
7234 migration, which results in so-called 'processes of embedding Chinese [inaudible]'.
7235 Besides providing evidence on intend, the research seeks to quantify the destruction that
7236 was part results from this intent.

7237 Between 2015-2018, combined natural population birth rates in the four prefectures of
7238 Southern Xinjiang declined by 73%. In 2019, rates continued to decline. In ethnic minority
7239 countries, birth rates declined by 50% and in Han countries by 20%. On comparison,
7240 national figures in decline are only 4%. These figures have a leverage effect on national
7241 population growth because most natural population growth is birth rate – death rate and
7242 if birth rates decline but death rates stay the same, the when birth rates approach the
7243 level of death rates, the national population birth rate in terms of percentage declines
7244 much faster than the birth rate and we are quickly getting to a point where natural
7245 population growth approach 0.

7246 Prefectures with both, data for 2018 and 2019, and individual counties weighted by
7247 population. In the provided population growth sample, the average national population

7248 growth rate on these Uyghur counties fell from 5.19 per mil in 2018 to 1.66 in 2019. Now
7249 only amounting half of the national natural population growth. In several regions birth rate
7250 reductions result or will result in growth rates that are near 0 or below 0. In my view, this
7251 growth rate is not a coincidence. Today I am not focusing on the numbers but I am
7252 focusing on the long-term planning behind them. I argue that growth rates near or below
7253 0 are directly consistent with Beijing's long-term plans for ethnic groups in Xinjiang. I will
7254 now present the evidence.

7255 In an otherwise, unremarkable report, about August 2019 Health and Family Planning
7256 Work commissioned in the Uyghur region references an unpublished population growth
7257 document issued in 2017 by Xinjiang's new population planning office, its title is 'Meeting
7258 minutes on honestly and thoroughly implementing the spirit of General Secretary Xi
7259 Jinping's important instructions, researching and advancing the work of optimising the
7260 ethnic population structure in Southern Xinjiang'. This document has not been made
7261 public rather it points us in the right direction mentioning Xi Jinping himself with this
7262 intention to 'optimise' Xinjiang's ethnic population.

7263 According to a 2017 research paper on optimising Xinjiang's population structure, the
7264 central government in Beijing 'attaches great importance to the problem of Xinjiang's
7265 population structure and population security'. Expressions such as 'optimising the ethnic
7266 population structure' or just optimising the population structure in reference to Southern
7267 Xinjiang and ethnic minorities are very common to the academic literature on Xinjiang's
7268 counter- terrorism and they are consistently linked to birth control measures.

7269 These sentiments behind these terms was bluntly expressed by a Dean of Tarim
7270 University at a 2015 academic event. When discussing methods to solve Xinjiang's
7271 problems, Liao Zhaoyu, the state must 'change the population structure and layout [and]
7272 end the dominance of the Uyghur ethnic group'. It refers to their numeric dominance in
7273 Southern Xinjiang.

7274 In a 2016 academic publication, he also argues that the underlying reason for Xinjiang's
7275 unrest was the high concentration of Uyghur population in Southern Xinjiang. Due to a
7276 recent exodus of Han Chinese, the 'imbalance of the ethnic minority and Han population
7277 composition in Southern Xinjiang has reached an unbelievably serious degree'. These

7278 sentiments are echoed by Xu Jianying, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of
7279 Social Sciences. In 2014, Xu argued in an interview with the Global Times that to counter
7280 the terror threat, the state must ‘change Southern Xinjiang’s population structure’. It
7281 should be noted that nearly all of this research is funded by the state, often funded directly
7282 by specific government projects. Some of them on the topic of counter-terrorism.

7283 Xinjiang’s most authoritative voice on the subject is arguably Liu Yileu, deputy secretary
7284 general of Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). He is also a Dean at
7285 Xinjiang university. At a July 2020 symposium with over 300 experts and scholars from
7286 across China, Liu notes that despite all progress ‘the root of Xinjiang’s social stability
7287 problems have not yet been resolved’. That’s quite remarkable after all they have done
7288 so far. To quote directly from his speech, ‘the problem in Southern Xinjiang is mainly the
7289 unbalanced population structure. Population proportion and population security are
7290 important foundations for long-term peace and stability. The proportion of the Han
7291 population in Southern Xinjiang is too low, less than 15%. The problem of demographic
7292 imbalance is Southern Xinjiang’s core issue’. Just to note, in the four heartland Uyghur
7293 prefectures of Southern Xinjiang, this share of the Han population in 2018 was only about
7294 half of that, 8.4%. Liu included Bayangol Prefecture in his calculations on Xinjiang. You
7295 can do either one, both are common.

7296 In 2018, Liu had argued that Xinjiang’s population structure are unreasonable and that
7297 Xinjiang must ‘afresh analyse its population structure and ethnic structure...from a
7298 viewpoint of national security’. One of the most sophisticated accounts of this perceived
7299 population problem or threat is found in a 2017 research brief by Li Xiaoxia, director of
7300 the institute of Sociology at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences. She has published
7301 major reports in Xinjiang population and was used to write attack pieces against myself.
7302 She is very high-profile. She defends the government’s birth prevention policies.

7303 In her paper, Li argues that ‘the population gap between ethnic minorities and the Han
7304 continues to widen, which has made the concentration of a single ethnic group in certain
7305 regions more obvious. The lack of communications between different ethnic groups and
7306 cultures has caused the three factors of ethnicity, religion, and land area to overlap,
7307 strengthening the view-point that one ethnic group owns a particular land area, thereby

7308 weakening national identity and identification with the Chinese-Nation-Race, impacting
7309 long-term rule and stability’.

7310 Consequently, controlling the growth rate of the ethnic minority population and adjusting
7311 the regional ethnic population structure are considered to be important ways to achieve
7312 long-term stability in Xinjiang. Written in 2017, the very year when the crack-down and
7313 birth prevention really took off.

7314 Liu Yilei argues that ‘the population structure is one of the roots of Xinjiang’s problems’.
7315 Soon after this population, in 2017, in Xinjiang new initiatives to prevent births were set-
7316 up in ethnic minority regions. Specific outcome indicators of these initiatives was the
7317 mandated target to ‘optimise the population structure’. Or more commonly ‘to balance the
7318 population structure. To this end, family planning officers are required to ‘formulate the
7319 counties mid, and long-term population development plan and annual plan; be
7320 responsible for the macro-control of the county’s new born population and the review of
7321 applications for birthing another child due to special circumstances; manage the county’s
7322 information system for women of childbearing age...’

7323 By the end of 2018 or 2019, Xinjiang was fully equipped to forecast population growth at
7324 an extremely detailed level and you find some more information on that in my full paper.
7325 The region had created the precondition for optimising its ethnic population structure. A
7326 detailed review of this literature shows that a deep threat arising from concentrated
7327 Uyghur population centres around the four following themes:

7328 First, Uyghur overpopulation creates an excessively large rural surplus workforce, posing
7329 economic and therefore social stability risks. Secondly, high ethnic minority population
7330 concentrations in sensitive border regions pose an inherent security risk. Thirdly, high
7331 Uyghur population density breeds a “‘dense religious atmosphere’ and creates reduced
7332 identification with the Chinese nation, promoting a dangerous identification of one ethnic
7333 group with what they consider to be ‘their’ land. Last, high minority population growth in
7334 southern Xinjiang poses a risk to ‘population security’ by exceeding the carrying capacity
7335 of the land.

7336 Other Chinese researchers have argued that the solution to solve Xinjiang's problems is
7337 to 'solve the human problem'. Specifically, this requires 'diluting the proportions of ethnic
7338 populations' by increasing the Han populations share, reducing shares of populations with
7339 negative energy referring to religious or traditionally minded Uyghurs. This process of
7340 targeted ethnic dilution was first proposed by Xi Jinping in 2014 at a world conference in
7341 Xinjiang after declaring the war on terror on Xinjiang. It was referred through as population
7342 embedding – *renkou qianru* (人口嵌入) in Chinese.

7343 A 2017 report published by two researchers from the Xinjiang Police Academy argues
7344 that population embedding is the key strategy to eradicate terrorism by rapidly optimising
7345 the population structure. That's a quote. 'To completely eradicate terrorists crimes in
7346 Xinjiang, it is a necessity to completely eradicate the 'soil, the growth conditions and the
7347 environment in which terrorist produce crimes. To do so it is necessary to rationalise the
7348 population structure'.

7349 Specifically, the academic suggest that population embedding requires a careful
7350 balancing of desirable versus less desirable populations. To quote from them: 'Therefore
7351 optimising the proportions of the populations and improving and enhancing the quality of
7352 the population – which is to solve the human problem - is the foundation of solving
7353 Xinjiang's counterterrorism problem. Embedding the population is one of the simplest and
7354 most direct ways to solve the human problem...

7355 This will achieve the goal of diluting the proportion of the poor population, the proportion
7356 of the unemployed, the proportion of the low-educated, the proportion of certain ethnic
7357 population...the proportion of the population with a criminal history, etc. We see that
7358 embedding involved a targeted dilution of undesirable population segments such as low-
7359 income, less-educated, more traditionally minded ethnic minorities. Who are seen as
7360 more susceptible to extremism and other so-called crimes.

7361 In a 2019 publication, Chinese academic, Li Ming, argues that the establishment of
7362 embedded communities requires 'calculating precise embedding targets'. The Han ethnic
7363 majority population ratios should range between 50 to 50 and 40 to 60. He is not the only
7364 one, that's a very common ratio that you also see in government documents.

7365 The goal of the targeted embedding is the creation of a cultural counter-terrorism,
 7366 Chinese – *wenhua fankong* (文化反恐) . A multi-ethnic environment where religious
 7367 extremism is unlikely to take root. To quote from his paper: ‘For example, according to
 7368 the village’s cultural counterterrorism needs, the scope of the population with positive
 7369 energy in the village should be expanded to 80% or 90% in a planned, step-by-step, and
 7370 methodical manner, and the scope of the population with negative energy in the village
 7371 should be reduced to seven percent or less than three percent. Here, persons with
 7372 ‘positive energy’ or positive Chinese culture even – Chinese *zheng wenhua* (正文化) are
 7373 those who are more highly educated, more secular, more resistant to the crippling
 7374 influence of ‘religious extremist thought’ especially Han, while those with negative energy
 7375 – Chinese *fu nengliang* (负能量) are more susceptible to extremist thought meaning
 7376 Uyghurs. Researchers argue that plans must achieve counter-terrorism outcomes on
 7377 these problem regions based on specific qualitative indicators, qualitative ratios,
 7378 population ratios and detailed target indicators.

7379 This is not mere hypothesis, starting in 2014, Kashgar, other regions...Hotan established
 7380 embedded communities at a cost of several billions on Chinese Yuan of investment but
 7381 involving tens of thousands of populations each. This continues and much money is spent
 7382 on these. The Associated Press visited one in 2018 and so on.

7383 To boost Han population shares, Beijing has to get millions of Han to move to Southern
 7384 Xinjiang. By 2022, it has a specific plan already to settle 300.000 Han settlers to Southern
 7385 Xinjiang by 2022. But there is a problem. The South is also Xinjiang’s most fragile region.
 7386 Arable land and water are scarce. Industrialisation and development vastly increased.
 7387 The capital resource allocation is ecological footprint. There are a bunch of Chinese
 7388 studies, I only cite one here. They say ‘Xinjiang as a whole is already overpopulated by
 7389 2.3 million humans in 2015.’ Significantly exceeding its ecological population carrying
 7390 capacity. One study founded by the government found that Hotan prefecture; the Uyghur
 7391 prefecture in Southern Xinjiang started to enter red alert state in terms of exceeding its
 7392 carrying capacity in 2008.

7393 Once the so-called overpopulation is in rural Southern Xinjiang meaning Uyghurs...that
7394 means the state cannot simply transfer millions of Han to Southern Xinjiang to optimise
7395 the population structure. It has to find a different solution as well on top of that. So part of
7396 the population optimisation is also achieved through labour transfers of Uyghurs. Labour
7397 transfers, one form of forced labour, do not have to imply physical relocation, they are
7398 primarily being referred to a transfer of ecocultural surplus laborers, Chinese *fuyu*
7399 *laodongli* (富余劳动力) out of the primary and into secondary and tertiary sectors. The
7400 problem was extended to all of Xinjiang in 2005, so it has been going for a while but it
7401 became increasingly coercive especially after 2014 and then 2017, as I have
7402 documented.

7403 It is different from labour transfers of released former camp detainees, who are often
7404 called Chinese *jiaozhuan ren yuan* (教专人员) from the internment camp; the re-education.

7405 The latter, the re-education forced labour programme began in 2018 and came into full
7406 force in later half of 2018 and into 2019. The forced labour linked to the camps targets
7407 predominately men, given that over 85% of such detainees are typically male from
7408 different database sets that we have. Whereas the coercive labour transfer targets
7409 persons who typically were never detained, with a particular focus with getting women out
7410 of traditional household roles and into full-time work especially in the textile industries.

7411 According to official figures Xinjiang had 2.59 million rural surplus laborers in 2019 and
7412 1.65 million of them in Southern Xinjiang, therefore Uyghur prefectures. The first ten
7413 months of 2018 about 13% of all labour transfers, 360 000 were outside broad people
7414 outside their home prefectures. 25 000 of them or 1% went to other provinces. Labour
7415 transfers have intentionally and disproportionately displaced persons from Uyghur majority
7416 regions and especially targeted the Southern Uyghur heartlands and poor households. In
7417 2018, the overall percentage of labour transfer from Xinjiang to other provinces was only
7418 around 1% where labour transfer efforts target poor households and therefore mostly
7419 ethnic minorities, transferred 11% to other provinces. Even so labour transfers that this
7420 place ethnic minorities by coercing them to work in... outside their home regions, so
7421 outside of Southern Xinjiang. They help with the problem to optimise the population but

7422 in themselves they only have comparatively small numbers ...they are entirely insufficient
7423 to achieve the above mention population optimisation goals. They alleviate, they help to
7424 alleviate the pressure on the land by reducing the Uyghur population in Southern Xinjiang.

7425 A Chinese academic report, called than Nankai report, admitted that labour transfers are
7426 a method to 'reduce Uyghur population density in Southern Xinjiang'. However, the
7427 numbers of transferred labours are too small, especially given that annual transfer
7428 numbers often refer to the same persons being transferred again each year, sometimes
7429 twice a year and then they double the number. Labour transfers do not necessarily
7430 constitute permanent relocations. In fact, often refer to seasonal labour like cotton picking
7431 and harvesting of different kinds. Evidence of longer-term re-location does exist but is
7432 very limited though. Importantly the Nankai report notes that Uyghurs with problematic or
7433 criminal backgrounds are typically not accepted, not eligible for cross-provincial transfers
7434 meaning that labour transfer focus persons concentrated in Southern Xinjiang which is
7435 not in line with population optimisation needs. They do that for security reasons, other
7436 provinces wouldn't accept 'dangerous Uyghurs'.

7437 As a result, nearly all of the cited academics and officials strongly urge birth prevention
7438 as a primary means to optimise ethnic population ratios. One of the analyses confirms
7439 that indeed the only way the state can significantly increase Han population shares
7440 without having to transfer unrealistic numbers of Han to Southern Xinjiang, which will be
7441 very expensive, difficult, and cause severe overpopulation. The only way to avoid this is
7442 to limit ethnic minority population growth.

7443 My analysis shows that the most ideal rate for this growth is in fact negative, around - 2.5
7444 per mil. By 2040, the state could boost Han population shares in Southern Xinjiang to
7445 nearly 25% by settling 1.9 million Han there. This would dilute Uyghur populations
7446 concentrations in line with counter terrorism targets. 25% Han means the state can
7447 embed half the Uyghur population at 50:50 ratio, which we have heard about above,
7448 diluting so called problem populations and neutralising these concentrated ethnic minority
7449 populations which would be considered a human problem. This would also align Southern
7450 Xinjiang's Han population share much closer than 25% for currently 35 % for Han
7451 population share percent for all of Xinjiang. So, what is the ramification of all this?

7452 As a result, ethnic minority population in Southern Xinjiang would shrink at the 2.5% mil
7453 scenario from currently 9.5 million to 9 million by 2040, which is a decline that could pass
7454 unnoticed by outside observers. A smaller population is also easier to control and
7455 assimilate. The destruction in part resulting from these aims is assessed as the difference
7456 between a. projected natural population growth without substantial government
7457 interference with still some level of family planning especially now that everybody can
7458 have three kids supposedly and b. a reduced growth scenario due to birth prevention in
7459 line with the state's intent to achieve counter-terrorism goals by optimising the Uyghur
7460 population structure.

7461 Based on adapted projections that were recently published by Chinese researchers in a
7462 peer-reviewed international journal, Southern Xinjiang's ethnic minority population could
7463 increase to an estimated, and this is a conservative estimate, there could be higher
7464 estimates than this, to an estimated 13.1 million by the year 2040 without severe
7465 measures to prevent births, broadly based on existing family-planning, especially now
7466 with three children. The 4.1 million discrepancy between 9 million and 13.1 million can be
7467 understood as constituting destruction in part caused by the state's intent to optimise the
7468 ethnic population and dilute the problem populations. This would reduce the projected
7469 ethnic minority population in Southern Xinjiang alone. Not in other parts of Xinjiang. In the
7470 four prefectures of Southern Xinjiang alone, this would reduce the projected ethnic
7471 minority population in the coming twenty years by 31%, nearly one third. How realistic is
7472 this plan?

7473 My paper goes into more detail on that. Natural population growth firstly in Southern
7474 Xinjiang is already trending in this range +2.5 to -2.5 per mil toward that at least. In some
7475 cases, has reached that. Recently Xinjiang told family planning officers to optimise the
7476 population structure and to carry out population monitoring and early warning also with a
7477 view to avoid overpopulation in relation to the ecological carrying capacity. The region
7478 has created pre-conditions for optimising the ethnic population structure. And the final
7479 point: it no longer reports or calculates population growth by regional ethnic group leaving
7480 the researchers in the dark and covering its tracks.

7481 These findings shed important light on Beijing's intent to physically destroy in part the
7482 Uyghur ethnic group. Other measures aimed at achieving ethnic population changes,
7483 such as Han in migration and Uyghur out migration, are in themselves insufficient. There
7484 has to be systematic birth prevention and it is a matter of national security. The whole
7485 thing here is a matter of national security. This distinguishes the situation in Xinjiang and
7486 Southern Xinjiang from China's general policy and population control measures to other
7487 ethnic groups, including the Han.

7488 The new findings shouldn't be seen without other impertinent aspects such as targeted
7489 internment and imprisonment of leading community figures and elites. Many intellectuals
7490 have been sentenced to long prison terms. Internal documents show entire families by
7491 internments status show that the re-education campaign mainly targets heads of
7492 households. The main influencers within families. In some regions between 25 and 50%
7493 of heads of households were shown as detained in camps in 2018. This strategy enables
7494 the state to use the absence of men husband and fathers to separate children from
7495 parents and subject women to birth control surgeries.

7496 According to official data, the number of students in Xinjiang who live in boarding facilities
7497 increased by 77% from half a million to 880 000 between 2017 and 2019. Evidence from
7498 non-public Xinjiang government spreadsheets shows over 10 000 children just in one
7499 county Yarkant county is having at least one parent in detention. 10% of them have both
7500 parents in detention. Some are being kept in orphanages although this most achieved
7501 through boarding schooling.

7502 Beijing's population control strategy consists of a combination of internment and
7503 imprisonment, coercive labour, parent- child separation and birth prevention. All four of
7504 the [inaudible]. Key intellectuals and community influencers have been sentenced to long
7505 prison terms of around twenty years removing them from cultural transmission.

7506 Forced labour separates families and enables greater state control over the next
7507 generation. Again, a generation to adulthood is also roughly twenty years. Birth
7508 prevention is the cornerstone of raising Han population shares and neutralising the
7509 minorities through embedding and dilution. Over the next twenty years all of these aspects
7510 can be expected to work enteral, just to set a sort of foreseeable time frame. Within this

7511 time frame, we can expect to see a substantial destruction in part resulting from birth
7512 prevention together with the severe impact on the distinct identity and unique
7513 characteristic of these groups as groups.

7514 My final statement is that the most concerning aspect of official and academic discourse
7515 about these minorities is that they are demonised and framed as a problem, that threatens
7516 an otherwise healthy society quoting from Sean Robert's book. Some Chinese scholars
7517 even call it a human problem. This language is akin to purport statements by Xinjiang
7518 officials that problem populations are like 'weeds hidden among the crops'. Out of the
7519 same quote, where the state 'needs to spray chemicals to kill them all'. While this
7520 statement refers to re-education itself in camps and not directly to mass slaughter, it is a
7521 metaphor. Mind you a very problematic one. The framing of Uyghurs and others as a
7522 human problem and their concentrated populations and growth as a threat to China's
7523 national security is a cause for grave concern.

7524 *Counsel – You referred to the so-called second generations of ethnic policy and the calls*
7525 *by CCP officials from 2014 to equalise minority birth rates with Han Chinese birth rates.*
7526 *Can you tell us whether such equalisation policies are necessarily discriminatory?*

7527 AZ – Uyghur birth rates have for a long time been substantially higher than Han Chinese
7528 birth rates one could interpret...due to both preferential policy; meaning they were officially
7529 allowed to have more children and a laxer enforcement for cultural sensitivity reasons
7530 because it is a Muslim region. On one level, if the state would say OK, we are now
7531 equalise this, which it did officially in law in 2017. In 2017 the Han were also allowed in
7532 Xinjiang if they are urban to have two children and if they are rural to have three children.
7533 So the equalising was achieved by increasing the Han birth rate quota and of course
7534 Xinjiang also says that the stricter enforcement of birth control is a form of equalising.

7535 However, if you look at the birth rates statistics and how they decline and how Southern
7536 Xinjiang birth and natural population growth rate is by 2019 now significantly lower, less
7537 than half of Xinjiang and half of national. You are looking at a situation where the
7538 prevention of Uyghur births is going to a level that is extremely dangerous for maintaining
7539 positive population growth and of course states in complete contrast to the promotion of
7540 babies now, having more children among the Han. Han are now encouraged, almost

7541 semi-coerced or exhorted to have more kids. Now everybody can have three kids. The
 7542 contrast between that and the nature of the enforcement that Uyghurs are put into an
 7543 internment camp as punishment for exceeding birth control. That's just paying fines etc
 7544 and the drastic surge in ratios of IUDs and also the plans for mass sterilisation,
 7545 specifically in two Uyghur counties documented my research of [...] Between 40 – 44%
 7546 of all women of child-bearing age. These are really unprecedented measures.

7547 *Counsel – You stated that from 2017 onwards the birth policy in Xinjiang did allow the*
 7548 *same number of births between Han and Uyghurs. You also stated that family planning*
 7549 *policies since 2017 have been draconian. Can you clarify whether the policy of*
 7550 *equalization itself is draconian, or the means and methods by which it is enforced or*
 7551 *implemented?*

7552 AZ – If you look at the evidence, it's a bit like with the re-education campaign. With the
 7553 re-education campaign, right before it started, they put out a new legal amendment that
 7554 makes re-education legal. Called it psychological counselling. We all know what re-
 7555 education actually is. The same is going on here, they put out a new law about equalizing
 7556 ethnic birth quotas, while in reality, both in terms of the policy enforcement in Uyghur
 7557 regions and the national birth rate and population growth declines. Speaks another
 7558 language; they speak of a suppression of ethnic minority growth rates significantly below
 7559 the Han and continuing to decline even further in 2019. After they already fell by huge
 7560 amount in 2017 and 2018. The draconian punishments to suppress them and keep them
 7561 low, very low targets, are in complete contrast with the policies for the Han. Leading to a
 7562 level where Uyghur, Uyghur natural population growth rates are below the national
 7563 average. Not equalised to even the national which wouldn't be realistic actually. You
 7564 would expect Uyghur birth rates to decline gradually and maybe development and maybe
 7565 adjustment just a little bit and then align a little bit. Now you have it like this [points
 7566 downwards with hand]. So draconian that the belief that this is just a mere equalising is
 7567 just like believing that a re-education camp does just psychological counselling.

7568 *Counsel – Is it possible to have a draconian implementation policy but still have a*
 7569 *reasonable policy objective of lower relative birth rates between the two populations, is it*
 7570 *not? Even if only theoretical?*

7571 AZ – You would have to define reasonable. If you say okay Uyghur birth rates were very
 7572 high; maybe two to three times as high as Han. Maybe four times as high in some regions.
 7573 If you define a ‘reasonable’ policy as gradually lowering them to the level of the Han that
 7574 is one thing, but if you see that within 12 or 24 months, they are in free-fall and now most
 7575 recently going below that of the Han, then the equivalence that you are making here
 7576 between a draconian enforcement of a potentially reasonable policy...I would question
 7577 the definition of ‘reasonable policy’ because I think a draconian enforcement of a
 7578 ‘reasonable policy’ might, yes it might bring it down quite a bit but not below Han level.
 7579 Even so it would not be at that speed. Because if you are aiming for really low the you
 7580 shoot lower faster. If you are just aiming at equalising, you would have a slightly different
 7581 trajectory.

7582 *Counsel – You selected Southern Xinjiang for your study, is it because of the Uyghur*
 7583 *majority prefecture are in the South as opposed to the North?*

7584 AZ – Yes. The North has individual counties with significant Uyghur population shares,
 7585 but approximately 80% of the Uyghur population is in Southern Xinjiang. I did this in order
 7586 to focus on the projection. If you are trying to extrapolate the Chinese population
 7587 projection from Hotan prefecture, beyond Southern Xinjiang you end up with more
 7588 problems and also in the narratives; there is a quantitative analysis reason for doing so
 7589 but there is also a qualitative analysis reason because the narrative focuses on Southern
 7590 Xinjiang, which has been the location of acts of violent resistance, bomb-attacks, etc. And
 7591 the highest concentration of Uyghurs.

7592 *Counsel – You stated in your report that academics associated with the state or state*
 7593 *officials see the population distribution in Northern Xinjiang as reasonable. Would it be*
 7594 *correct to say that draconian enforcement of the equalisation policy is therefore not as*
 7595 *pronounced in the North as opposed to the South?*

7596 AZ – Yes and no. It is draconian enforcement in Uyghur counties that are outside of the
 7597 four Uyghur majority prefectures, such as in Bayangol. But some of the threats of
 7598 internment, we see at some of these Uyghur majority counties but on the whole there is
 7599 clear that the enforcement and targets are specifically focused on Southern Xinjiang.

7600 *Counsel – Would it be correct to say that there is a clear distinction here between*
7601 *equalisation of birth rates and equalisation of population growth between Uyghurs and*
7602 *Han?*

7603 AZ – You mean equalising birth rates and natural population growth between Uyghurs
7604 and Han?

7605 *Counsel – Yes. On the one hand you equalise birth rates and on the one hand you*
7606 *equalise the proportions of the population. There are two distinct concepts.*

7607 AZ – Yes, academics and official statements make a clear link between the need to
7608 optimise the ethnic population ration, meaning increasing the Han population, and the
7609 need to achieve so, not just by Han in migration but also curbing, some say drastically
7610 curbing, Uyghur population growth. Yes, there is a very clear link between the two.

7611 *Counsel – Is it correct to say it is not official state policy to equalise population numbers,*
7612 *i.e., to equalise the number of Uyghurs and Han within a prefecture?*

7613 AZ – The officially stated policy target is to balance or optimize the population, which
7614 leaves open a number of things...without directly saying that this refers to Uyghur
7615 proportion needs to be reduced. Except for the statement by Liu Yilei, although that's not
7616 a policy. Not a written policy statement. We are making some inferences from the
7617 substantial body of discourses in statements and constraints and from what is already
7618 going on. It is very common like with the re-education camps. We often don't have the
7619 one single smoking gun statement that says we are doing this.

7620 *Counsel – Is the decline between 2015 and 2018 of combined natural population growth*
7621 *rates in Southern Xinjiang of 73.5%, is that consistent with an equalisation in birth or is*
7622 *this in practice tending towards absolute decline in population growth?*

7623 AZ – This decline is in some ways both. It does bring Southern Xinjiang closer to Xinjiang
7624 as a whole but at the same time...I think by 2018 we see a strong alignment through this
7625 decline. Starting, especially, in 2019, but for some regions already in 2018, we see even
7626 that it goes below. Southern Xinjiang goes below Xinjiang; below the national. Some

7627 Uyghur majority counties in 2018 even started having a slightly negative birth rate or just
7628 above 0. So significantly below.

7629 *Counsel – Is it not possible that the authorities could forcibly sterilise the vast majority of*
7630 *women in one or even in most prefectures in the South of Xinjiang, but that overall, they*
7631 *can maintain an equalisation policy for the whole of Xinjiang?*

7632 AZ – If you sterilise up to a certain percentage of women, then you technically still could
7633 have plenty of other women to still give birth and maintain an equal birth rate. You also
7634 have to take into account however that the Han birth rate in Xinjiang was negative
7635 because it was affected by Han out migration leaving Xinjiang. There were also declines
7636 in birth rates among the Han that can be attributed some of these population shifts and
7637 population dynamics which can be corroborated with witness statements published by
7638 media by Han who are saying ‘we are getting out of here’.

7639 The question is what is your baseline. If you accept a baseline a little bit before that, the
7640 difference becomes even more pronounced. Maybe you could set the baseline to the rest
7641 of China but even if you did that, the question is... my projection or quantification of the
7642 destruction in part is based on the manifest intent of the Uyghur population. The Uyghur
7643 population has sought and wanted to have certain numbers of births of children that are
7644 significantly higher than Han population. In my opinion the baseline for Chinese
7645 government policy to assess genocide is not just or maybe shouldn't be the Han birth
7646 rates especially under certain circumstances. It should be the demonstrated historic intent
7647 of the Uyghur population.

7648 Sorry if that was a counter-point to your question.

7649 *Counsel – You quote the Deputy Secretary-General of the Party Committee of the*
7650 *Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) saying the 15% Han Chinese*
7651 *population in Southern Xinjiang is too low and it needs to be higher to achieve the better*
7652 *proportion. Now, assuming that that policy is pursued, do you think a proportion of 50/50*
7653 *Uyghur Han birth rate would satisfy the XPCC and others who raised concerns about*
7654 *population imbalance?*

7655 AZ – In my research paper, I have taken... narrowed it a little bit to the four prefectures of
7656 Southern Xinjiang where this share is not 15% but 8%, even much more problematic. In
7657 my opinion, taking various things into account, to satisfy these requirements at a minimum
7658 it would have to increase to 25% in these four prefectures. That means in the five
7659 prefectures, that Liu Yilei referred to with the 15% Han share, the Han share would then
7660 probably have to increase to 30% or 35% to be more similar to the average in Xinjiang,
7661 which is 34%.

7662 I argue that in the four prefectures under consideration you will have to at least have 25%,
7663 which is still lower than the whole rest of Xinjiang but at least you could embed half of the
7664 Uyghur population. You could embed in some way in a 50:50 setting for which you would
7665 have to have 25% Han. That's how I argue. I stand by that – so 25%.

7666 *Counsel – If that percentage stopped, would you argue that intent is the biological*
7667 *destruction of Uyghurs in part?*

7668 AZ – At that point, a crucial objective, a minimum level would have been achieved. The
7669 question is it is unpredictable how the intent will change. There is a possibility that the
7670 intent would then be achieved. They would not let the Uyghur population grow
7671 significantly. There are reasons who speak against that mainly the policing costs, the
7672 assimilation problem, the surveillance and everything. So, they might then allow for a
7673 natural population growth that is a little bit above 0 or maybe slightly similar to the Han. I
7674 think they will still want to reduce it, because in 20 years and even at 50% embedding
7675 there will still be a risk. People who have been traumatised in the internment camps.
7676 There are significant doubts that they would stop at that but they would review their
7677 policies if there were more problems. If Uyghur start violent terrorist attacks, they might
7678 go for much higher. They might not stop until it is double that. We don't know, I think there
7679 is a good chance they would continue to suppress Uyghur birth rates. I am almost certain
7680 that they would suppress Uyghur birth rates significantly below that used to be when the
7681 Uyghur could have more freedom to have as many children as they wanted.

7682 *Counsel – Is there a risk that with such widespread sterilisation in Southern Xinjiang, the*
7683 *population may collapse completely?*

7684 AZ – I argued in my paper that it is unlikely that they will reduce birth rate to 0 because
7685 that would cause a collapse of the education system. It would become very obvious to
7686 external observer. It would cause a collapse of society in many ways. It would go against...
7687 I have always maintained that the aim is to totally integrate the Uyghurs. I think the
7688 complete annihilation of the Uyghurs; its physical annihilation is unlikely. I think, that
7689 unless there was a major emergency, and they think they didn't have much of a choice,
7690 they would always try to maintain a Uyghur population and a certain birth rate.

7691 *Counsel – You've looked into the carrying capacity for Xinjiang and identified that*
7692 *Southern Xinjiang can only absorb a certain amount of Han Chinese and that the current*
7693 *population of Xinjiang is almost at capacity. How is that consistent with reducing Uyghur*
7694 *population numbers but significantly increasing Han Chinese numbers without birth*
7695 *restriction, subsequently on the Han Chinese?*

7696 AZ – Han Chinese natural population rate has been very low. They have stopped the
7697 report. The distinction between Han and Uyghur population growth a while ago but for the
7698 XPCC regions, which are predominately Han. Han natural population growth in the last
7699 7-8 years it has been below 1.5% per mil. Very low. It is more expensive to bring in Han,
7700 to attract Han and prevent them from leaving. They would be stupid to try to prevent Han
7701 births in these regions. Even though birth control policy was applied to the Han and is
7702 being applied to the Han. I think they try to maintain some level of consistency but of
7703 course, the Han the natural population growth is below the quota. Below new one of three,
7704 which is three kids for everybody. They want to bring in Han, not 10 million, about 1.9
7705 million would be enough to achieve the 25% goal if they can reduce Uyghur population
7706 growth and slightly reduce the Uyghur population.

7707 *Counsel – On the empirical basis for meeting the test of genocide: Do you accept that*
7708 *you could have measures intended to restrict birth, but that not all measures intended to*
7709 *restrict births are necessarily intended to destroy a group physically or biologically?*

7710 AZ – Certainly. They are not trying to commit genocide on the Han majority even though
7711 there were drastic curbs. It is a matter of interpretation and of the relationship. I think you
7712 need to look at what is the relationship; what is the percentage for example of the
7713 destruction in part that could result from long-term birth prevention. In this case, if it is

7714 between 20 and 30%, possibly over 30%. That is very significant. Especially if you
7715 combine that with other measures to attack the group as in attacking the elites, separating
7716 parents from children, looking at that in tandem, I think that's really huge in terms of a
7717 genocidal determination.

7718 I would agree that you could have measures to prevent births that - it depends on the
7719 magnitude and the intentionality. So, what is the resulting quantifiable destruction, in
7720 terms of loss of life, firstly, and secondly, and what is the intent behind it? The intent to
7721 dilute and embed that is not just a physical destruction through birth prevention but there
7722 is also an identity destruction of the identity of a group as a group is also reflected in the
7723 embedding and dilution. You have kind of a dual thing and I know some who view the
7724 genocide determination a little bit more physical, others see a bit more of the distinct
7725 group as a group and yet others see both of them as significant. Population optimisation
7726 relates effectively to both of them.

7727 *Counsel – I have four short propositions derive from you report: Firstly, you state that it is*
7728 *unlikely that birth would be reduced to 0 because that would quickly become noticeable.*
7729 *Secondly, you state that there is likely to remain some restrictions in Han birth rate due*
7730 *to carrying capacity in the region, so Han will be subject to some form of birth restrictions*
7731 *even if less disproportionately than against Uyghurs. Third, you argue that the state does*
7732 *not wish to see societal collapse, or educational collapse, or indeed heightened*
7733 *international scrutiny, so the population is managed rather than eliminated. Fourth, you*
7734 *have accepted that forced labour programmes and re-education programmes do not*
7735 *permanently render Uyghurs estranged from Xinjiang. Are these four propositions*
7736 *consistent with an intent to physically or biologically destroy the Uyghurs?*

7737 AZ – Regarding the second point, I would seek some correction. I have said that family
7738 planning restrictions have also been applied in Han regions, however we now see the
7739 promotion of up to three children and even policies planned that promote that which is
7740 significantly above current Han birth rate. For Southern Xinjiang it would be especially not
7741 interested to suppress Han birth rates because of the targeted embedding. So, I would sort
7742 of disagree with this statement about family...applied family planning in Xinjiang. I think
7743 it is basically irrelevant especially with the latest point on three children.

7744 Generally, I think it is not likely that they would try to, through birth prevention, eliminate
 7745 physically all Uyghur population. The aim is not to bring them down to 0 but to cut them
 7746 drastically, significantly, especially in order to manage their identity and who they are for
 7747 assimilation means we see a very likely very substantial birth prevention. Now genocide
 7748 determination is another matter. I am not an expert on genocide determination so I would
 7749 actually ask not to answer this question. Because genocide determination could be made
 7750 even if 10% of a population is destroyed. You don't need, and I think a lot of experts would
 7751 say that on genocide and I am not an expert on genocide. A lot of experts would say that
 7752 the complete physical destruction, like a 0 birth rate of 100 years whatever... that is not
 7753 necessary apparently for genocide determination because it has a wider, more complex
 7754 meaning. A question whether these three points whether have left standing of yours
 7755 contradict...genocide determination is not for me to answer.

7756 *Panel - Your focus on birth rates is predicated on stability of the mortality rate. Could you*
 7757 *confirm that that really is stable in the Uyghur population? Could you tell me the sensitivity*
 7758 *of the mortality rates analysis? What's sort of change would you be capable of detecting?*

7759 AZ – The reported mortality rates in Xinjiang can fluctuate in quiet interesting ways. Not
 7760 all of which I would say might be consistent or I fully understand. I would not say that
 7761 mortality rates is my area of expertise. I would very much like to preface it by saying that.
 7762 However, the numbers are relatively stable. More or less. There is a stability to those
 7763 numbers on the whole. Some individual regions have some fluctuation. Maybe slight
 7764 declines. I do not think that mortality rates are sort of colouring this analysis in an overly
 7765 drastic way but they would influence it and this would ideally be subjected to further
 7766 research.

7767 *Panel – How confident can we be that the quotations you made from Chinese academics*
 7768 *are a true reflection of central party policy?*

7769 AZ – Several of them come from so-called scholar cadres both government officials.
 7770 Some in a fairly high position. Also these institutions where they work at are closely
 7771 affiliated with the government in some cases like the Chinese Academy of Sciences is
 7772 strongly affiliated and funded by the central government and has historically influenced
 7773 central government policy. These academic studies inform policy, they make demands

7774 and if you see, of course they are not free of censorship, they all follow an official line, an
7775 official thinking and if you see a high degree of consistency between statements,
7776 discourses and conclusions and demands made by these statements. It is often a matter
7777 of time before they become policy or especially if it more sensitive, they already reflect
7778 policy. We see the same pattern, for example the calls for counter-terrorism measures to
7779 change thinking. We see the same sort of pattern with the labour transfers, the labour
7780 problem and labour transfers become more and more enforced and the problem of the
7781 Uyghurs not sticking with labour transfers and them leaving, and not being enforced and
7782 they are not skilled enough and they are not good enough for the Chinese bosses. That
7783 is happening now. Same with counter-terrorism, re-education, eliminating and rooting out
7784 the extremism, that is also happening now.

7785 *Panel – If at the moment, all women having compulsory birth control, there is going to be*
7786 *a time when there will not be enough women to work – how will this play out?*

7787 AZ – You are saying that compulsory birth control leads to women not to be able to go
7788 out of the house?

7789 *Panel – In time, there won't be many babies yet you say that they need the workforce to*
7790 *get women out into the textile factories. You haven't got enough Han there anywhere and*
7791 *you seem to be having difficulty in getting them in – there seems to be a labour problem*
7792 *in the future?*

7793 AZ – It would create an imbalance between generations in terms of the workforce
7794 sustaining how many elderly which China currently has. The main goal of labour transfer
7795 is arguably, not economic or cheap labour, that is side benefit. The main goal is control
7796 population and to shift around population and prevent the threat of Uyghurs being idle
7797 and hanging around and not being busy. They are shifting them into controlled factories
7798 which they can't just leave. There is a fence, a camera, can't go to the mosque on Friday
7799 because they are working. The kids are at boarding schools. Families are separated. The
7800 main goal of labour transfers is not economic and therefore I would say the argument you
7801 make is severely impacted by that fact. Long-term generational demographic imbalance
7802 would be created by such low birth rates but I think they would accept that. Let the old
7803 generation die out and the shrinking smaller population is easier to assimilate and

7804 indoctrinate. The whole population dimension and my new research shows this: the
7805 primary consideration, the national security consideration of the Chinese state is to
7806 manage the population.

7807 *Panel – Can you impute anything into suspension of the data about the number of births*
7808 *as split between indigenous and majority population?*

7809 AZ – Yes, I believe I have imputed and I can be more implicit. They are no longer reporting
7810 births or birth control measures, population counts by prefecture and county, breakdown
7811 by ethnicity. There is no independent or academic way to ascertain based on any official
7812 data, which they could make up. I think they prefer not to report it. It is impossible to
7813 assess - birth rate projections that I have shown you and that other researchers have.
7814 They are impossible. 2019 maybe last year where we can have any meaningful
7815 subsample of any kind and that's it. After that they may throw around propaganda number
7816 that can't be verified and has no breakdown. That's what they want. They can cover their
7817 tracks and that's also why I think just a slightly negative population growth, slightly over
7818 20 years, reducing Uyghurs by 450,000 which would be easy to cover up if you don't
7819 publish detailed data. I see it as a direct link. It is piece of evidence for what they are
7820 doing to be blunt.

7821

7822 *Panel – What was the particular haste to publish your article? Can we be certain of the*
7823 *robustness of the peer-reviewing process for that paper?*

7824 AZ – Yes. The peer-review was expedited but not by reducing quality but by asking peer
7825 reviewers to turn around in shorter time-frame than the usual several months. What
7826 happens in peer review is that it sits on your desk until you got around it and most
7827 academics read it in a couple of days and then write a report. This is a process that you
7828 can condense down to a few weeks if you cut out the slack. In fact, what happened in my
7829 case was the opposite, I knew it would be publicised and feature at the tribunal and
7830 everything. The journal went the other way and slapped me with a few extra peer
7831 reviewers, which also meant that I nearly wasn't able to testify on this today. Production
7832 is not happening yet but the manuscript has been accepted for peer review and the final

7833 version will be copy edited now and will come out in a bit. I had 4 peer reviewers, instead
7834 of 2 or 3 there were 4 peer reviewers look at this paper.

7835 *Panel – I am well aware of how peer-reviewing works. What was the haste?*

7836 AZ – I asked the journal to do speedy peer review that would give reviewers appropriate
7837 time but not drag it out for several months and I hoped that it would be published in time
7838 as genocide determinations are being made. It is a significant piece of research. The main
7839 consideration was quality and the journal did that. The journal said yes, we can said...we
7840 will ask peer reviewers if they can review it in a certain time-frame but not at expense of
7841 quality. The expense of quality was never a consideration. Then they invited more peer
7842 reviewers to look at the statistics and to look at the whole thing again. We ended up with
7843 a more thorough peer reviewed than is normal as a result.

7844 *Panel – A broader question. It requires enormous financial resources to run these*
7845 *policies, the surveillance, the detention facilities, etc, do you have any sense of budgets*
7846 *allocated to these purposes?*

7847 AZ – In 2017-2018, I published three articles in total, the *Jamestown Foundation* on
7848 China's domestic security budget, especially on the near doubling of this budget in
7849 Xinjiang between 2016 and 2017. Then a follow-up piece looking at multiplying in one
7850 case and even quadrupling on expenses on specific categories e.g., detention centre
7851 management and some larger spending, which you would use for the surveillance system
7852 and infrastructure including quite likely the internment camps. These papers were
7853 published and they contain detailed breakdowns of the cost. Since then, it is hard to trace
7854 spending. Since 2017/2018, some of these budgets are no longer published but they were
7855 staggering percentage increases.

7856 *Panel – The officials and academics that have you drawn to our attention and others that*
7857 *you have evidence of what they have said on the optimisation policy, which is the most*
7858 *senior, the highest authority, amongst all of those?*

7859 AZ – Liu Yilei from the XPCC and I would also mention Li Xiaoxia – a very high profile
7860 academic and she wrote the main kind of new population report of Xinjiang that came out
7861 in 2021, which was largely a refutation of my work from last year and really thought to

7862 challenge the international criticism and based on her report the Chinese embassy in New
7863 York tweeted that Uyghurs are no longer baby making machines. Liu Yilei undoubtedly is
7864 the highest.

7865 *Panel – I would like to draw on your experience with long-term plans in China. Amongst*
7866 *the material that the tribunal has been presented with was one document said to be 40-*
7867 *year 3 Points CCP Plan – how credible is it, if it is, what could be its source? It broadens*
7868 *into geopolitics and it overlaps with some of what you have been saying. The first part is*
7869 *2014: assimilation of ethnic groups...how credible is it? I will say the main points for*
7870 *everyone's benefit. Elimination of those who don't assimilate and in 2016 in the North of*
7871 *the region... that's the first point. Second point is 2020 – 2025: controlling neighbouring*
7872 *countries, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan and other borderlands due to the BRI and the third point*
7873 *is 2025-2055: China on focusing to extend influence in Europe. Could you tell us what*
7874 *you think about this?*

7875 AZ – This is not my own research and I have not spend time on verifying it. I can only
7876 state limited points on it but I am not a main authority on it. That's the limitation on what I
7877 can say about it. A somewhat similar statement albeit a somewhat different was published
7878 by Bitter Winter through interviews with Kazakh witnesses, which was the testimony of a
7879 person who attended regular flag raising ceremonies – and some sort of similar scheme
7880 is what was taught to ethnic minorities during flag raising.

7881 I have also been told by the publisher of the German book of this witness Sayragul
7882 Sauytbay who testified as to this that there are one or two others who have similar
7883 statements against which this could be corroborated. I requested from the German author
7884 of the book so that I could take a look at this. What I think based on this limited available
7885 evidence and what Mrs Sauytbay said herself about this. She said she believes this was
7886 done in order to scare and discourage detainees to show them that China has plan to
7887 dominate the world, especially starting in Central Asia, which is significant because
7888 Central Asia might be the only hope in this Kazakh majority region. It is strategic to say
7889 we will hold influence over other countries so that they have to do what we tell them but
7890 then it is gonna go to Europe you know and etc. So, you can't put your hope into these
7891 countries. We control you; you are ours and if you collaborate with us you will benefit from

7892 it on the long term. To me this makes sense however in itself this is not a corroboration
7893 of this document. Further corroboration would be helpful.

7894 *Panel – Who could we go to for corroboration?*

7895 AZ – I can put you in touch with the respective person and I would recommend this. Do
7896 consider the interpretation given by Sauytbay and others as to why they think this is being
7897 taught.

7898 *Panel – If it is credible where would it have come from in the CCP?*

7899 AZ – This is a difficult and interesting question. In terms of general authorship of this
7900 whole internment campaign and plan I have some speculations in my February 2020
7901 paper on the Karakax list, where I argue that this is premediated and must have come
7902 from Beijing. We have some other corroboration of that, scattered bits. Telling detainees
7903 something like this, I am not sure if the government in Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo, had the
7904 authority to single-handedly say OK that's what we will do. That's true or not. They could
7905 tell this to detainees regardless of whether it's an actual real plan or not. It could be a
7906 psychological strategy but who knows. It would have to be authorised by the central
7907 government, if I you look at Xi Jinping and his leadership style, I think that a lot of things,
7908 especially significant things have to be authorised by him and I am not entirely sure how
7909 much free reign Chen Quanguo has... I think he has some but my impression is that this
7910 was ultimately authorised by Beijing.

7911 *Panel – In your report you talk about incentives to bring Han into the region with promises*
7912 *of free land, housing, education, and government jobs – when did these incentives come*
7913 *about? Can we link them to confiscation of property/land and those people who lost their*
7914 *government jobs who ended up in detention or prison?*

7915 AZ – Starting in 2016, with Chen Quanguo, you had a real increase in the advertisement
7916 for police jobs but then also of Chinese language teaching jobs in Uyghur regions and a
7917 lot of them targeting Eastern China. Of course, that would be a way to get people in.
7918 Some of the teaching jobs especially promised free housing and other benefits. The police
7919 jobs came with different benefits. Certainly not all of them would have promised free
7920 housing. Then we find more dedicated advertising and I have to look...out of my head it

7921 is a bit difficult but I am pretty sure this would be in 2017 that they ramped up some effort
7922 to attract Han to the region through promises of land, housing etc... Like a direct colonial
7923 settler strategy. In 2018, we have the official policy published. Ideally a bit more research
7924 would be done on that to see if that aligns and then of course, land confiscation – much
7925 more anecdotal or limited evidence to find correlations. That should ideally be a bit of a
7926 dedicated research effort, which I have not conducted at this point.

7927 *Panel – Anyone doing this research?*

7928 AZ – I get so many requests. It seems I have gotten some requests by somebody. I can't
7929 disclose this publicly. Some work has been done on this.

7930 *Panel – I want to follow on from my colleague's reference to the forty-year plan. The PRC*
7931 *is well known for long term plans, your research draws a line or makes a relationship*
7932 *between academic study from leading Chinese academics and state policy. In your*
7933 *opinion, and from that you infer intentionality, does a further link need to be made between*
7934 *existing policies and long-term planning to determine intentionality?*

7935 AZ – Intentionality on birth prevention?

7936 *Panel – Intentionality on questions around genocide for example.*

7937 AZ – In general yes. As an empirical researcher, I hope to always see more empirical
7938 evidence, as much as possible. For purposes of a genocide determination, I think the
7939 evidence is quite sufficient. The reason for that is, that a genocide determination,
7940 arguably, is not been made against a country as it is against an individual human being
7941 – you convict a human being of being a perpetrator of genocide on the highest bar of
7942 evidence, the presumption of innocence and safeguards. But to determine whether a
7943 country could be engaged in an on-going or planned genocide in order to meet obligations
7944 to prevent genocide, making a determination of a country doing a genocide in order to
7945 meet obligations; treaty obligations to prevent it, that is a different standard. That is what
7946 I argue with a colleague, Erin Rosenberg actually, if we take the latter, which I think is the
7947 more appropriate one, although legal experts would speak better to that, to determine this
7948 intentionality on that level, rather than trying to convict an individual on the presumption
7949 of evidence, I think the evidence is quite strong.

7950 *Panel – We have heard from a number of witnesses that, faced with forced abortions, the*
 7951 *possibility of children of two or three in Xinjiang. There are possibilities of paying a fine to*
 7952 *escape from that – is that official system? Are you able to maintain the increase in your*
 7953 *family by paying a fine or money in other form or is that something that happens on a*
 7954 *more informal basis?*

7955 AZ – It is an official system that you have to pay a fine if you have a child in excess of
 7956 birth quota. The system also at the same time; this formal system was exploited informally
 7957 allowing Uyghurs to pay officials off in order to have more children. Often that is how they
 7958 were able to have more children. It was a formal system – the formal system did not exist
 7959 to enable Uyghurs to have more children, which is pay money. It was meant as a deterrent
 7960 and other problems could come with it. We see that this changed significantly, even
 7961 though fines remained. They were increased but remained.

7962 We see another factors in 2017 and 2018, the threat of internment. Now I think the
 7963 strategy has completely shifted. In the past, both with policing and pre-empting attacks
 7964 and with birth control, the state was kind of running behind. A knife or bomb attack and
 7965 then oh you have to come in. Or there is too many kids, so you come in. Now the state
 7966 works preventative. Preventative policing. Preventative birth control. You plug their
 7967 vaginas, so women cannot physically have children without state permission. IUDs are
 7968 non-removable except through surgery by a state-approved institution or you sterilise or
 7969 do whatever is needed. The preventative method greatly changes the dynamics of the
 7970 whole system but preventing unplanned births outside of state control from taking place
 7971 in the first place. That's why you have the zero-birth violation policy, a term that I used in
 7972 my research from last year. I cite it again in this current research, zero-birth evaluation
 7973 policy. That is how you achieve that not by running behind and collecting fines...You
 7974 achieve it through preventative birth prevention.

7975 *Panel – The linkage between academic statements and policy – it this because, on the*
 7976 *one hand, in a state like China, it would be impossible for academics, certainly senior*
 7977 *academics like this to publish statements like that, unless they reflected government*
 7978 *policy this but still gives the government one step of deniability so to speak? Or is there*

7979 *a policy around somewhere and we just haven't found the statement by a government*
7980 *official?*

7981 AZ – If the Chinese state would publish as policy that it is reducing the Uygur population,
7982 it might as well put out a policy to say they are putting millions of people in camps. Just
7983 to preface my response. There are of course things the Chinese government will never
7984 say officially. Oftentimes we find a precursor to action a policy in academic statements as
7985 I have said before. The answer is yes to one of your points.

7986 We find, for example calls for more coercive labour transfers, systematic labour transfers
7987 in academic publishing. We find calls for much tougher calls for counterterrorism and re-
7988 education in publishing. So yes. They cannot just wildly throw around their own ideas,
7989 they can to some extent but if twenty of them agree on the same thing more or less, of
7990 course you can see a pattern. That's within the approved. Then you also have the scholar
7991 cadres who have much more...like Liu Yileu for example, who have much more direct
7992 political power, also. Their statements, I think, especially in front of these experts at the
7993 symposium have to be taken at a different level. That is the second layer of evidence.

7994 I would argue for and the third layer of evidence is actual policy. We have actual policy
7995 evidence. It just doesn't say: we gonna do what I wrote in my research paper. You know
7996 there is the directive from Xi Jinping about optimising the population structure in Southern
7997 Xinjiang and using the exact same term terminology as in these academic papers
7998 published before. We have the mandate for family planning officers to optimise or balance
7999 the population. Again, referring to the same. We can of course refer to other
8000 things...balancing the gender ratio. Can refer to a number of things but also it certainly
8001 refers to that in the Xinjiang context.

8002 We have the data point of the birth rate declining and we also have further policy evidence
8003 of officers to forecast population growth, population early warning system. In one chapter
8004 in my report, I make this very strong link between the carrying capacity research funded
8005 by the early warning project and the early warning project being implemented after that.
8006 Government officials saying it, the link is even stronger, for population carrying capacity
8007 we have the strongest link to policy. I think we have evidence on three levels.

8008 *Panel – Your reports seem to assume that there may be legal ways of forcing birth control,*
8009 *is that correct? Is your report premised on the fact that people can be forced to have birth*
8010 *control? To have their bodies invaded by IUDs. Is it legal? Is there any country which has*
8011 *forced birth control on people and if tested as lawful, found it to be in compliance with*
8012 *human rights?*

8013 AZ – My research doesn't assume that anything that China does is necessary legal, it
8014 doesn't evaluate legality or morality whether specifically in Chinese law or generally. I
8015 keep my personal opinion out of it. I think it is inappropriate and morally abhorrent to make
8016 women get IUDs inserted against their will. That's my personal opinion kept out of the
8017 research. Women might be willing to have that done. On questions of legality, I would be
8018 careful. I would remain in own field of expertise and I do not feel that I am up o
8019 commenting on legality of things.

8020 *Panel – It is not for us but I know that it's for some people. Were there to be any*
8021 *inclinations soon/fairly soon on the part of the PRC to become fully compliant with human*
8022 *rights – what sort of change in policy could meet their objectives?*

8023 AZ – If China did nothing to prevent Uyghur births, we would see a significant increase. I
8024 have sought to quantify this based on Chinese researchers own research and I have
8025 taken lowest prediction and also cut it by an additional 30% because we are using Hotan
8026 as the basis for four different prefectures. I am using very conservative caveats built in. It
8027 is entirely possible that the ethnic minority population by 2040 would not just go to 13.1
8028 million, it could be below that for various reasons. People can change their mind but it
8029 could be 15 million, 14 million is an easy projection, it could be higher. It could go beyond
8030 that, the longer you go out the more imprecise the projection become; that's one of the
8031 reasons why I limited it to 2014. Also, to have a more imminent policy. In twenty years,
8032 you will have a policy risen so absolutely. It is inconceivable, how many million Han would
8033 they have to bring in to archive 25% or more of Han and then the carrying capacity...in
8034 my opinion, entirely inconceivable which is the argument of my paper is, they have to
8035 systematically to prevent millions of births.

8036 *Panel – With your experience, is your report bound to draw criticism from PRC or fellow*
8037 *academics? To plan whether to allow colleagues more questions or not and await*
8038 *challenge to your report until September hearings.*


8039 AZ – I see some denialist corner who may try to launch criticisms and with a population
8040 projection, you can always criticise something. I am not claiming it is 100% accurate. It is
8041 a broad estimate just like internment figures, they are very broad estimates. They give us
8042 an impression of scale. If you say I might anticipate significant justified constructive
8043 criticism on this work, I would be surprised given peer review process and other informal
8044 comments I have received in the process, I would be surprised if there were problematic
8045 level of criticism. I am happy to be back either way.

8046


8047 *Panel – If my colleagues might make requests in writing, would you reply to those in order*
8048 *to assist in the meantime?*

8049 AZ – I would be happy to reply in writing and I can certainly testify by video again in
8050 September.

BIRTH RATE DECLINES CONTINUE IN 2019



Natural Population Growth in a Sample of Southern Xinjiang Counties (in per mille)



DEAN OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRONTIER HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY AT TARIM UNIVERSITY

“[C]hange the population structure and layout, **end the dominance of the Uyghur ethnic group**”. (2015)

“[T]he imbalance of the ethnic minority and Han population composition in southern Xinjiang has reached an **unbelievably serious degree.**” (2016)

LIU YILEI, DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PARTY COMMITTEE
OF THE XPCC, DEAN OF XINJIANG UNIVERSITY

[T]he problem in southern Xinjiang is mainly the unbalanced population structure. Population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability. The proportion of the Han population in southern Xinjiang is too low, less than 15%. The problem of demographic imbalance is southern Xinjiang's core issue (July 2020).

LIUYILEI (2018)

“Xinjiang’s population structure [and] ethnic structure ... are unreasonable”.

Xinjiang must “afresh analyze [its] population structure [and] ethnic structure...from a viewpoint of national security”.

LI XIAOXIA, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY AT THE XINJIANG ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

The population gap between ethnic minorities and the Han continues to widen, which has made the concentration of a single ethnic group in certain regions more obvious. The lack of interaction and exchanges between different ethnic groups has caused the three factors of ethnicity, religion and land area to become superimposed, thereby strengthening the viewpoint that one ethnic group owns a [particular] land area, [thereby] weakening national identity and identification with the Chinese Nation, [adversely] impacting peace and long-term stability.

Consequently, controlling the growth rate of the ethnic minority population and adjusting the regional ethnic population structure are considered to be important ways to achieve long-term peace and stability in Xinjiang. (Li 2017a, 68)

FAMILY PLANNING MANDATES FOR COUNTIES

“Formulate the county's mid- and long-term population development plan and annual plan; be responsible for the macro-control of the county's newborn population ...; manage the county's information system for women of childbearing age...”

(Kuqa County Government 2019)

SUMMARY: UYGHUR POPULATION THREAT

1. Excessive ethnic minority population growth creates a growing rural surplus workforce that suffers underemployment, creating risks to social stability. Large numbers of unemployed young Uyghurs constitute a "severely excessive" rural surplus labor population, created by lax family planning policies, that pose a "latent threat to the current regime." (e.g. Zhao and Song 2017, 30)
2. High ethnic minority population density combined with low mobility breeds a "hardened" society with a "dense religious atmosphere," creating a breeding ground for religious extremism and terrorism (e.g. Lu and Guo, 2017, 194).
3. High ethnic minority population concentrations create a dangerous sense of identification with their homeland, weakening identification with the central government (e.g. Li 2017a, 68).
4. High ethnic minority population ratios and resulting low Han population shares are a national security risk in sensitive border regions (which includes southern Xinjiang) (e.g. Liang 2019; Wang 2018).

2017 PAPER PUBLISHED BY TWO RESEARCHERS FROM THE XINJIANG POLICE ACADEMY

“[T]o completely eradicate terrorist crimes in Xinjiang it is necessary to completely eradicate the soil, the growth conditions and the environment in which terrorist mobs produce crimes. [To do so]..., it is necessary to rationalize the population structure...”

2017 PAPER
PUBLISHED BY
TWO
RESEARCHERS
FROM THE
XINJIANG
POLICE
ACADEMY

Therefore, optimizing the proportions of the population and improving and enhancing the quality of the population - which is to solve the **human problem** - is the foundation of solving Xinjiang's counterterrorism (and other) problems. Embedding the population is one of the simplest and most direct ways to solve the **human problem**. ...

This will achieve the goal of diluting the proportion of the poor population, the proportion of the unemployed population, the proportion of the low-educated population, the proportion of [certain] ethnic populations, ... the proportion of the population with a criminal history, etc.

LI MING (2019),
COUNTER-
TERRORISM
RESEARCHER

For example, according to the village's cultural counterterrorism needs, the scope of the population with positive energy in the village should be expanded to 80% or 90% in a planned, step-by-step, and methodical manner, and the scope of the population with negative energy in the village should be reduced to 7%, or less than 3%. (Li 2019, 110)

LABOR TRANSFERS MOVE THE UYGHUR POPULATION

- In 2019, Xinjiang had 2.59 million rural surplus laborers million of them in the four southern Uyghur-majority prefectures.
- In the first 10 months of 2018, 364,000 or 13.3 percent of all labor transfers were outside people's home prefectures, and 25,000 or 1 percent were to other provinces.
- In 2018, the overall percentage of labor transfers from Xinjiang to outside provinces was only around 1 percent, while labor transfer efforts targeting poor households and therefore mostly ethnic minorities transferred 11 percent.

HAN POPULATION SHARE TARGETS

- Current Han population share in southern Xinjiang (4 prefectures): 8.4%
- Current Han population share in Xinjiang overall: 34%
- Current Han population share in northern Xinjiang (praised by academics and officials as “reasonable”): 56%
- Assumed minimum Han population share to achieve “optimization goals: 25% (allows embedding to 50% of Uyghur population at 50:50)

“DESTRUCTION IN PART” CALCULATION

- Most ideal growth rate to achieve “optimization” targets within carrying capacity constraints: -2.5 per mille
- Current ethnic population in southern Xinjiang: 9.5 million
- Projected ethnic population in southern Xinjiang by 2040 without draconian state interference: 13.1 million
- Ethnic population in southern Xinjiang at -2.5 per mille growth by 2040: 9 million
- “Destruction in part” discrepancy: $13.1 - 9.0 = 4.1$ million lost lives through birth prevention

FOUR ASPECTS AFFECTING ETHNIC POPULATION

1. Internment and imprisonment
2. Coercive labor
3. Parent-child separation
4. Birth prevention