The Xinjiang Papers: An Analysis of Key Findings and Implications for the Uyghur Tribunal in London

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Note: for a detailed overview of the 11 leaked Chinese government documents (numbered 1 to 11) that were given to the Uyghur Tribunal in September 2021, the methodology used for authenticating these documents, and downloading links to document transcripts, please refer to the main document titled “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction” on the website of the Uyghur Tribunal at https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/The-Xinjiang-Papers-An-Introduction-1.pdf.

Introduction

The Xinjiang Papers given to the Uyghur Tribunal provide important new insights into the role of the central government in injecting a long-term change in the direction of Xinjiang Work in 2014. In particular, they indicate how the central government, including Xi Jinping himself, mandated policy directions and made both demands and suggestions that would either directly or gradually result in the practices witnessed after 2016 under Xinjiang’s new Party Secretary Chen Quanguo.

Statements and demands made by Xi and other central government figures can be linked to the following subsequent policies: mass internment for re-education, poverty alleviation through coercive labor transfers, “optimizing” the ethnic population distribution by increasing Han population shares and adjusting birth control policies in ethnic regions, criminalizing customary religious practices, and the implementation of Chinese language-focused education in centralized boarding schools. Appendix A of “The Xinjiang Papers – An Introduction,” provides a detailed comparison of these statements with policies implemented after 2016/2017. In addition, central government mandates related to Xinjiang’s population structure and composition are also found in a classified and subsequently-published central government document from late 2017 that outlines this goal in greater detail (document no.7).

The significance of such connections for atrocity determinations is as follows: if a systematic attack against a civilian population is carried out as part of a long-term strategy pursued by the central government in Beijing, and if that strategy is said to be of great importance to ensuring China’s national security, then it is far more likely that related policies (and the resulting human rights violations) are systematically and rigorously pursued into the long-term – until the stated or implied goals are reached.

The material contained in the Xinjiang Papers leaked to the Tribunal does not provide dramatically new insights into the observable nature of these rights violations, beyond what is already known from witness statements and existing research. However, the material firstly provides important confirmation of our existing knowledge, including very clear and direct confirmation for an indiscriminate mandate to “round up all who should be rounded up.” Secondly, it indicates that Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang are implemented in order to achieve the central government’s long-term national security goals and related
national policies of high importance. Thirdly, the material testifies to the state’s intention that several key policies, including the re-education of ethnic minorities in dedicated internment facilities, are to be continued into the long-term.

The extensive linkages between central government statements (contained especially in documents nos. 1/2/5/7/10) and the unfolding crackdown in Xinjiang are further strengthened by the fact that the set of Xi’s top-secret speeches from April 2014 (document no.1) contains a cover letter from the Xinjiang government from October 2016 that mandates their study. Publicly available evidence, most of which has since been deleted, indicates that in late 2016, these documents as well as the three speeches delivered by Xi, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng in May 2014 at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (document no.2), were treated as containing the “strategic deployment of the Party Central Committee for Xinjiang work,”4 and studied as such.1 Local government study sessions of this material aimed to “convey and learn the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s series of important speeches, arrange and deploy current and future key tasks.”2 In late 2016, these “future key tasks” would have referred to the internment campaign and other policies including a dramatic upscaling of boarding schooling, which began in early 2017. Government reports indicate that in February 2017, just weeks prior to the internment campaign, leading cadres in prefectures and counties were subjected to an intensified study schedule of Xi’s two speeches for at least two hours every week, alongside Chen Quanguo’s own speeches.3 While the study of important speeches by political leaders and discourses that emphasize these speeches’ importance is common practice, both the particular timing and the repeated emphasis are of significance here. A February 8, 2017, work report from the Yili Prefecture government, a region with a predominantly non-Han ethnic population, reported a “serious and systematic study” of the speeches held by Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Xinjiang Work Conference in May 2014 (document no.2).4 To quote from this web page (likewise now removed):

The implementation of the series of important speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping is the first priority. Reaching a common understanding and unity of thought, such that the ideology is integrated into the comprehensive objective and target; all of this work must be planned and centered on advancing the general objective in order to truly achieve a unified pace and unified action.5

That report emphasizes that the spirit of Xi’s speeches must reach every single member of the village work teams. The author had previously argued that the deployment of these teams after Chinese New Year each year determined the timing of the start of the internment campaign, given that these teams constitute a crucial element in identifying those who were sent to the camps.6 These teams were then at

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5. 深入贯彻落实习近平总书记重要讲话放在首位，认真再统一，思工作要围绕总目标，在谋划推进，真正做到步调统一，行动统一

the forefront of investigating past birth control violations, and together with other local authorities, would monitor and count the population, population growth, and subsequent enforcement of birth control policies.\(^7\)

Similarly, a report published by the Tekes County government on October 27, 2016, only ten days after the issuance of the set of speeches, notes that on the 25\(^{th}\) of that month, the County Party Committee convened a study session that was only attended by a select number of key leaders.\(^8\) The report quotes the title of document no.1’s speech set (《习近平同志在新疆考察工作期间的讲话》). Together with the title of document no.2 (the set of speeches by Xi, Li and Yu in May 2014), the title of document no.1 is also mentioned in the context of an October 24, 2016 study session of the XUAR Forestry Department.\(^9\) This now-deleted report explains the significance and influence of Xi’s two speeches at a time when the region was at the cusp of embarking on a multipronged set of draconian measures:

\[\text{The speech made by General Secretary Xi Jinping during his inspection in Xinjiang and his speech at the second Central Xinjiang Work Symposium are the strategic deployment of the Party Central Committee for Xinjiang work. At present and for a period of time in the future, we must study them repeatedly and thoroughly to truly understand the core principles and grasp their spiritual essence, so as to make [them] enter the mind and heart, always remembering, creating a unity of knowledge and action, and let [them] take root. It is necessary to integrate the study of the spirit and essence of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech with the study and implementation of the spirit and essence of the series of speeches by the Secretary of the Party Committee of the Autonomous Region Chen Quanguo…}\(^10\)

Especially significant is the mandate to “study of the spirit and essence of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech [together] with the study … of the series of speeches by … Chen Quanguo.” This provides a direct conceptual link between mandates issued by Xi and their later implementation under Chen.

Then, the files contain four important documents from 2017 and 2018 that directly implicate Xinjiang’s Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and his second in command, Zhu Hailun, in the internment campaign. Compared to the material from 2014, these documents reflect an overall much more draconian approach to bring the region’s ethnic groups under control, without any of the conciliatory overtones found in the 2014 speeches. This more recent material contains direct evidence about the importance of the re-education camps and the need to intern substantial shares of the population by “rounding up all who should be rounded up.” In these speeches, Chen Quanguo repeatedly invokes the need to fulfil the will of the central government. In one instance, he directly states that the “vocational skills education

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\(^10\) …习近平总书记在新疆考察期间的讲话和在第二次中央新疆工作座谈会的讲话，是党中央对新疆工作作出的战略部署，当前和今后一个时期，我们要反复学、深入学，真正领会核心要义、把握精神实质，做到入脑入心、时刻铭记、知行合一、落地生根。要把学习习近平总书记重要讲话精神与学习贯彻自治区党委陈全国书记系列讲话精神结合起来…
training centers” are an example of the “good method [adopted by] Xinjiang to fully implement the central goal of the General Secretary [Xi Jinping] for Xinjiang work”\(^\text{11}\) (document no.4, p.1). Chen also states that “the vocational education training centers must be unwaveringly operated for a long time”\(^\text{12}\) (document no.8, p.7).

The two documents on the punishment of Xinjiang county-level party secretaries who failed to obey government orders show that cadres below Xinjiang’s immediate top leadership were expected to ruthlessly carry out whatever order they were given. Among other things, those who failed to “round up all who should be rounded up” faced severe consequences. This evidence further confirms that the responsibility for this atrocity squarely rests with the top-level leadership in both Xinjiang and Beijing.

The three documents issued by the central government on the “correct” history of Xinjiang, on improving the governance and control of Islam, and on the development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) in southern Xinjiang confirm the central government’s plans to fundamentally alter the spiritual and demographic realities in the region (and, in the case of Islam, likely in the entire nation). Again, this demonstrates how the central government itself is behind the broader intention to reengineer Xinjiang’s ethnic cultures and communities.

2 Evidence Pertaining to the Intent Behind the New Policies

The material provides important new evidence regarding the intent behind the policies implemented in Xinjiang after 2014. In a top-secret speech, Xi argues that the Belt and Road Initiative, his signature project, requires a stable domestic security environment. He asserts that the entire country’s national security and the achievement of China’s major goals in the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century are in jeopardy if the situation in southern Xinjiang cannot be brought under control. Xi argues that the “stability across Xinjiang and even the whole country depends on southern Xinjiang” (新疆乃至全国维稳看南疆; document no.1, p.29). In both of his speeches, Xi argues that the achievement of that goal is a matter of China’s “national security” (document no.1, pp.3, 6, 35; document no.2, pp.2, 4).

Xi demands that the region engages in an all-out battle to “prevent Xinjiang’s violent terrorist activities from spreading to the rest of China.” He notes that since violent acts have already spread to other regions of China, “[t]herefore we propose that Xinjiang [has entered] a … painful period of interventional treatment.” After Xi’s two speeches, this statement became very common among Xinjiang’s leadership, including during the time of Chen Quanguo.

Xi declares that Xinjiang’s stability maintenance work is “at a historical stage” (document no.2, p.7). He argues that “[w]e must have strong faith in our victory, make a determined effort, and even pay a special price sometimes” (document no.2, p.7).\(^\text{13}\)

In the face of rampant violent terrorist activities and frenzied violent terrorists, we must focus our current fight on a severe crackdown on violent terrorist activities. We must not hesitate or waver in the use of the weapons of the

\(^{11}\) Chinese (full sentence): 五是充分肯定了新疆贯彻落实总书记新疆工作总目标创造的好做法、好经验。如，职业技能教育培训转化中心。

\(^{12}\) Chinese: 要把职业教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去

\(^{13}\) 我们要坚定必胜信心，作出特别努力，有时还要付出特殊代价。
people’s democratic dictatorship, and focus our energy on executing a crushing blow that buys us time and initiative for solving the deep-seated issues regarding Xinjiang’s long-term peace and stability. (document no.2, p.8)\(^{14}\)

Especially the latter statement about “initiating a crushing blow that buys us time” constitutes an apt description of Beijing’s strategy in Xinjiang since Xi’s speech, and especially since early 2017, when the region initiated an unprecedented campaign of mass internment (along with a range of other severe measures).

In both of his speeches, Xi argues that the origins of Xinjiang’s “terrorism” problem are external, yet that such violence can flourish due to Xinjiang’s domestic conditions that render it susceptible to these external influences:

As I said before, there are ‘seeds’ outside the [national] borders, the ‘soil’ within the borders, and a ‘market’ online – these are the main causes behind the highly active occurrence of violent terrorist activities in Xinjiang. (document no.2, p.7; compare document no.1, p.4)\(^{15}\)

By firmly locating the reasons for Xinjiang’s ethnic conflict in a religious extremism that is predominantly identified as an external (foreign) force, Xi’s two 2014 speeches effectively set the stage for the region’s evolving counterterrorism-through-re-education strategy. If the key domestic issue was the fertile breeding ground in local minds for foreign fanatic influences, and if one believes that re-education can change minds and hearts, then “inoculating” the susceptible population through a period of re-education internment would be the logical response.

Another central government figure who made important remarks on the state’s intention is Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声). In 2014, he was head of the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组) and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC; 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会) – the latter post made him China’s fourth-highest ranked official at the time.

Yu emphasizes that in the current “painful period of interventionary treatment” (干预治疗阵痛期), the achievements of Xinjiang Work goals are paramount, not only for the region, but for the entire nation. Like Xi, he notes that the achievement of stability maintenance is a matter of “national security” (国家安全). To quote:

We must thoroughly comprehend that doing a proper job in Xinjiang is not only a matter concerning the region, but also a major issue for the whole party and the entire country. If the Xinjiang situation is not handled properly, it will affect the overall situation regarding reform, development and stability of the country, and the realization of the "Two Centennial Goals." (document no.2, p.64)\(^{16}\)

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14 “面对十分猖獗的暴力恐怖活动，面对丧心病狂的暴力恐怖分子，必须把严厉打击暴力恐怖活动作为当前斗争的重点，毫不迟疑、毫不动摇运用人民民主专政的武器，集中力量进行毁灭性打击，为从根本上解决影响新疆长治久安的深层次问题赢得时间和主动。”

15 “我说过，境外有“种子”、境内有“土壤”、网上有“市场”，是导致新疆暴力恐怖活动呈活跃态势的主要原因。

16 “要深刻认识做好新疆工作，不仅是新疆的事情，而且是全党全国的大事。如果新疆的问题处理不好，将会影响全国改革发展稳定大局，影响“两个一百年”奋斗目标的实现。”
China’s Two Centennial Goals are 1) to “build a moderately prosperous society” by 2021, the centenary of the CCP, and 2) to “build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by 2049, centenary of the People’s Republic of China. Together, they arguably constitute Beijing’s most important political goals in the coming decades.

Summary

The evidence from the new material shows that top Chinese leaders viewed the achievement of “stability maintenance” and related goals such as religious “de-extremification” in Xinjiang to be a matter of China’s national security, crucial to achieving primary long-term political goals.

The evidence further shows that in late 2016, right before the implementation of a set of unprecedented measures in Xinjiang, these statements by central government leaders were given to Xinjiang’s cadres as crucial study material, preparing their minds and hearts for the unconditional implementation of the upcoming measures.

3 Evidence Pertaining to the Campaign of Mass Internment

The new material provides evidence for important links between statements and demands made by central government figures and the subsequent campaign of mass internment in re-education camps.

One of the most significant links are provided by Xi Jinping in both of his 2014 speeches (see table below). Xi authorized the Xinjiang government to draft a local legal regulation to address religious extremism. The “relevant local regulations” highlighted by Xi refer to the “XUAR De-Extremification Regulation” which was issued in March 2017. It laid the foundation for the “normalization, standardization, and legalization” of Xinjiang’s re-education (lit. “transformation through education”; 教育转化) through “centralized education” involving “behavioral correction”. Re-education camp construction bids and anecdotal accounts from the ground indicated that Xinjiang’s campaign of mass internment began right around when the Regulation came into effect. The PRC has also stated that the Regulation constitutes the legal basis for the Vocational Skills Education and Training Center (VSETCs). The Regulation was revised in October 2018 to fully legitimize the VSETCs, referring to them as “re-

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education institutions” (教育转化机构). The author testified to the significance of this Regulation at the Tribunal’s second hearing – a more detailed account can be found in the footnote below.

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<td>We must hold high the banner of the rule of law and be good at using law-based ways of thinking and methods to solve problems. At the national level, the enacting of counterterrorism legislation must be sped up. Xinjiang can also formulate some local laws and regulations in response to prominent issues such as religious extremism, to promote the gradual normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance work. 要高举法治旗帜，善于运用法治思维和法治方式解决问题。国家层面要加快反恐立法，新疆也可以针对宗教极端等突出问题搞一些地方性法规和规章，推动反恐怖主义工作逐步实现常态化。</td>
<td>Regarding those who violate the law, those who should be seized should be seized, and those who should be sentenced should be sentenced, there must be no one above the law. The national level must expedite the process of [enacting] counterterrorism legislation, and Xinjiang should also draft relevant local regulations to promote the normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance work. 对违法犯罪的，该抓的抓，该判的判，决不能有法外之人。国家层面要加快反恐立法进程，新疆也要制定相关地方性法规，推动反恐怖主义工作实现常态化。</td>
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Of particular interest here is also Xi’s statement from his May 28, 2014 speech that “regarding those who violate the law, those who should be seized should be seized, and those who should be sentenced should be sentenced, there must be no one above the law” (对违法犯罪的，该抓的抓，该判的判，决不能有法外之人). This statement closely mirrors a statement found in several of Chen Quanguo’s speeches and highlighted in the New York Times article: “rounding up all who should be rounded up” (应收尽). Xi’s expression is mirrored word-for-word in a January 2015 government work report by Xinjiang’s Qiemo County.

One might argue that Xi specifically refers to persons who actually violated a law. However, later developments show that Xinjiang’s de-extremification strategy was already shifting from a focus on those who had perpetrated acts of violence to preemptively and extrajudicially detain “susceptible” problem populations for re-education purposes. The stress on "seizing all who should be seized" in Xi’s speeches from 2014 already suggests his maximalist approach to detentions. Given the immediate context of Xi’s words – the statement that Xinjiang could enact its own related legislation, which later became the legal basis for the re-education camps – it is not difficult to see how his call to seize and sentence those who should be seized and sentenced logically evolved into Chen Quanguo’s demand to “round up all who should be rounded up” into extrajudicial internment facilities. In the leaked files and in other publicly available government records, the command to “round up all who should be rounded up” is in several instances combined with the command to ensure the safety, quality and long-term continuation of the VSE TC re-education facilities.


Another set of highly pertinent statements relates to what Xi terms as Xinjiang’s “heart sickness” (心病; p.23). Xi argued that this “sickness” could only be cured with a “heart medicine” (心药) that would “support the correct, remove the evil” (扶正祛邪; p.23). In March 2015, Li Zishun (李子顺), then-Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the XUAR Party Committee (自治区党委政法委副书记), stated that Xi had said this in his speech at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum, and quoted the entire passage nearly verbatim (the table below shows identical passages marked in bold font). Similarly, a 2017 work report on re-education in a Uyghur region quoted part of Xi Jinping’s expression literally when stating that re-education must “support the correct, remove the evil.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement author, date and source document reference</th>
<th>Statement (English)</th>
<th>Statement (Chinese)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xi Jinping, May 2014, document no.2, p.9</td>
<td>“those who should be seized should be seized”</td>
<td>该抓的抓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xi Jinping, May 2014, document no.2, p.9</td>
<td>“those who should be sentenced should be sentenced”</td>
<td>该判的判</td>
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<tr>
<td>XUAR government, June 2017, document no.3, p. and p.7</td>
<td>“round up all who should be rounded up”</td>
<td>应收尽收</td>
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<tr>
<td>XUAR government, June 2017, document no.3, p.7</td>
<td>“detain all who should be detained”</td>
<td>应押尽押</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chen Quanguo, February 2018, document no.8, p.7</td>
<td>“do the round-up-all-who-should-be-rounded-up work well”</td>
<td>做好应收尽收工作</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XUAR government, March 2018, document no.9, p.8 and 17 (three instances in total)</td>
<td>“round up all who should be rounded up”</td>
<td>应收尽收</td>
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</table>

Identical sections are marked in bold font.

On the same page, Xi had expanded on his prior medical analogies for characterizing religious extremism as a pathogen, stating that Xinjiang’s cadres and masses must be equipped with great “immunity” (p.23). At the very time when Xi demanded that people’s “immunity” against extremist ideology must be increased, Uyghur regions were actively carrying out early forms of re-education and reported that these re-education efforts were “increasing the immunity...of ‘susceptible’ groups of people.” Subsequently, several instances can be identified where re-education (“transformation through education”, 教育转化) is directly associated with “increased immunity.”

For the Xinjiang context, Xi appears to have been the first person to employ this “immunity” analogy, providing an important and influential medical metaphor.

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In his April 30, 2014, speech, Xi argued that those ensnared by religious extremist thoughts had become “dehumanized” (丧失人性) and would “kill people without blinking an eye” (杀人不眨眼; document no.1, p.9). In his May 28 speech, he stated that those who “watched [extremist] videos or propaganda materials” were “turning from an ordinary person into a devil who kills without blinking an eye” (p.25). Strikingly, almost the exact same wording was used by a former re-education detainee at a February 10, 2021, propaganda press conference in Beijing:

[I now] see clearly the evilness of those religious extremists, who want to turn us into devils who kill without blinking an eye [杀人不眨眼的魔鬼]. They want us to serve as cannon fodder, violate the law and commit crimes. ... I deeply regret my prior stupid behaviors before which almost ruined my life. If I had not been saved by the education and training center, then I would have fallen deeper into the abyss of evil and become a devil who kills without blinking an eye [成为杀人不眨眼的魔鬼]. (emphasis added)

This statement represents one of several discursive linkages between Xi’s statements and the internment of persons who have not been convicted of having committed a crime into extralegal re-education facilities for preventative re-education.

In document no.1, Xi states that “[t]he psychological impact of extremist religious thought on people must never be underestimated.” In document no.2, he makes the following remarks:

Religious extremism is a powerful psychedelic drug. Under its toxic influence, some people are obsessed with "martyrdom." When committing violent and terrorist crimes, these people often lose their lives through their stubborn resistance – out of fear that they may not die. Some persons – even whole families – become reckless criminals. (p.24)

Without eradicating the violent and terrorist ideology of religious extremism, violent terrorist activities will continue to replicate and multiply like cancer cells. (p.25)

Parts of both statements, namely that religious extremism is like a “psychedelic drug” and that acts of terror will “multiply like cancer cells” if extremist thought is not eradicated, are quoted verbatim (and attributed to Xi) in a widely-cited March 31, 2017, government document that likens re-education to free medical treatment for “sick thinking.” (The table below is provided without translation, with identical passages in bold font to illustrate how Xi’s statements influenced later writings).
### Important Notes

- **Xi Jinping, May 28, 2014**
  - “老百姓说，魔鬼出现时，往往装扮成天使。宗教极端思想是一种强力迷幻药，在其毒害下，有人痴迷‘殉教’，实施暴力恐怖犯罪时往往顽抗送命，唯有不死，有的甚至一家子全成了亡命徒。这些人一心想著‘圣战’升天堂，最终走上邪恶的邪路！千万不要低估了宗教极端思想的毒害性，一旦信了它，就像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智，精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来。……一些暴力恐怖分子未必懂得什么‘泛伊斯兰主义’、‘泛突厥主义’，就是看了一些视频或宣传品，便从一个普通人变成了杀人不眨眼的魔鬼。……不根除宗教极端思想这一暴力恐怖的意识形态，暴力恐怖活动就会像癌细胞一样不断复制繁衍。”

- **Kashgar “Zero Distance” (state propaganda department), March 31, 2017**
  - “习近平总书记说：魔鬼出现时，往往装扮成天使；宗教极端思想是一种迷幻药，将其毒害下，有人当亡命徒；一旦信了宗教极端思想，就像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智，精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来。有的甚至全家都成了亡命徒。……这些人一心想着‘圣战’升天堂，最终走上罪恶的邪路！千万不要低估了宗教极端思想的毒害性，一旦信了它，就像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智，精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来。有的甚至全家都成了亡命徒。……一些暴力恐怖分子未必懂得什么‘泛伊斯兰主义’、‘泛突厥主义’，就是看了一些视频或宣传品，便从一个普通人变成了杀人不眨眼的魔鬼。宗教极端思想不根除，暴力恐怖活动就会像癌细胞一样不断复制繁衍。”

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**Passages in bold font are identical.**

Importantly, the Kashgar document from March 2017 notes that people have been sent for re-education despite the fact that they have not committed acts of violence, but simply because they “have been infected”:

> Although some people, after being affected by the infiltration of religious extremism and violent terrorist thoughts, have yet to carry out violent terrorist activities themselves, they have already been infected with the "virus" of religious extremism and violent terrorist thoughts and could act at any moment, endangering themselves and those around them. They must be sent to transformation through education classes to receive “hospitalized treatment” to eliminate the harm of the “virus” and restore their mental health.\(^3^4\)

This shows how Xi’s statements in 2014 undergirded a development that culminated in the preventative eradication of this alleged pathogen (“virus”, “drug”, “poison”) in re-education centers, even where illegal acts or acts of violence had not yet been committed. A later and widely cited academic paper on “transformation through education” by Qiu Yuanyuan from the Xinjiang Party School in 2017 likewise links re-education (“transformation through education”) with the removal of poisonous thinking.\(^3^5\)

Xi Jinping also comments directly on re-education in the context of transforming criminals. His speech in southern Xinjiang in April 2014 is the only recorded instance where he uses the terms “transformation through education” (教育转化) and “reform through education” (教育改造).

> It is important to do a good job with reform through education [教育改造] and transformation [through education; [教育]转化] of offenders,

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so as to prevent a practice of arrest and release in large numbers, as well as cross-infection. The problem of cross-infection should be effectively addressed, so that criminals cannot establish ties and engage in communications with each other whilst in educational transformation facilities, lest they become poisoned more deeply and do greater harm when they are released. ... Even after release, these people are to [be subjected to] continued transformation through education. \(^{(36)}\) (document no.1, p.30)

When saying “to prevent a practice of arrest and release,” Xi means that Xinjiang must achieve a thorough re-education result, so that those who have once been re-educated will not in the future be found to be in need of further re-education (and hence undergo multiple cycles of arrest, re-education and release). With this mandate, Xi effectively sets the stage for the more intensified (and likely more coercive and abusive) forms of re-education in dedicated “transformation through education” facilities.

Xi further mandates the ongoing re-education of those who have been released, a practice that has since been implemented. The leaked government document titled the Karakax List shows that when Xinjiang embarked on its campaign of mass internment in 2017, many were detained into re-education facilities simply because they had previously been interned or imprisoned. \(^{(37)}\)

The abovementioned statement, Xi directly warns that prisons and re-education facilities must prevent “cross-infection” (交叉感染), whereby detainees “poison” each other with their wrong thinking.

Document no.3 from June 2017, issued by the Xinjiang government during the ongoing re-education campaign, complains about a similar issue:

> Some transformation through education work is not sufficiently systematic and targeted, security measures and medical and health conditions are not up to par, and there is a high risk of cross-infection and incitement to wrongdoing in transformation through education facilities. (p.4) \(^{(38)}\)

It goes on to mandate the following:

> Strictly implement the internal management system of supervision [detention] facilities and education and training sites [VSETCs], improve the living conditions of detainees and education and training personnel, strengthen prison investigation methods, security and preventative measures, and strictly prevent cross-infection and potential damage from surprise attacks. (p.6) \(^{(39)}\)

The term “cross-infection” (交叉感染) was interpreted by the New York Times in a medical (and epidemiological) sense. While this could in theory be a valid interpretation for the first citation (p.4), ...
叉感染 is in the author’s view more likely linked to the following term “incitement to wrongdoing” than to the preceding reference to health conditions. Importantly,交叉感染 has a second interpretation that is certainly the only valid way to view its meaning in the second citation (p.6).

This meaning of “cross-infection” as the horizontal transmission of religious extremism or other “incorrect” thinking in re-education facilities is echoed by a well-known paper on re-education published by Qiu Yuanyuan from the Xinjiang Party School in 2017. Qiu critiques that transformation through education centers tend to use a “one-pot cooking” approach that places persons of different backgrounds into the same facility. The fact that they study and live together on a daily basis greatly increases the “hidden dangers of ‘cross-infection’” (p.7). This explains why Xinjiang’s re-education camps place great emphasis on complete surveillance and high degrees of control in order to prevent any communication between detainees.

Besides these connections between statements by Xi Jinping and the subsequent campaign of mass internment, the other documents also shed further light on this unprecedented measure.

For example, document no.8 (Chen Quanguo’s speech from February 2018) mandates to “do the round-up-all-who-should-be-rounded-up work well” (做好应收尽收工作; p.7). Similarly, document no.3, a Xinjiang government document issued in June 2017, mandates that “all persons with motives of committing crimes” or those who show “abnormal behavior” should be subjected to the command “round up all who should be rounded up” (应收尽收) and “detain all who should be detained” (应押尽押), in order to prevent the occurrence of “lone wolf” attacks (p.7). Document no. 9, which details the punishment of the former Yarkand County party secretary Wang Yongzhi, notes that he refused to “round up all who should be rounded up” (应收尽收; p.2). Document no.8, which contains a fragment of Chen Quanguo’s speech in February 2018, mandates that “the vocational education training centers must be unswervingly operated for a long time” (要把职业教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去; p.7).

The mandate to “round up all who should be rounded up” is not limited to leaked documents but can be corroborated from independent and publicly available sources. For example, the 2018 budget report for Urumqi’s Gaoxin District contains performance evaluation standards for the so-called convenience police stations (警务站) set up by Chen Quanguo. The main deliverable (output and effect) of these stations is to “strike” (打) according to the “‘round up all who should be rounded up’ work demand” (“应收尽收” 的工作要求). Another such reference can be found in a 2018 grassroots party building work report by the Yuli County government, which is cited below and in Table 6. Document no.8 contains a previously little-noticed but very significant term – the “Four Things” (四件事; see the table below). It is often found in Xinjiang government accounts from late 2017 as one of

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Chen Quanguo’s core demands (陈全国书记…要求), but the term is never explained.44 Now, based on the leaked material, we can for the first time understand that the first of these “Four Things” is the safety, quality and long-term continuation of the VSETC re-education facilities.

In document no.8, the “Four Things” are expressed as “Four Plus Two Things” (“4+2”件事), adding two tasks: 1) to use the Integrated Joint Operations Platform to “round up all who should be rounded up”; 2) to do a good job with border control. The combination of the “Four Things” with the command to “round up all who should be rounded up” is only logical, given that the VSETC re-education work is intimately linked to the task of comprehensively rounding up all whom the state wants to detain. The table below contains a comparison of the evidence, from across different documents and independent sources, regarding the intent to implement a program of mass internment and re-education.

(translations are in footnotes).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document no.</th>
<th>Chen speech August 30, 2017 (no.4)</th>
<th>Chen speech October 30, 2017 (no.6)</th>
<th>Chen speech Feb. 22, 2018 (no.8)</th>
<th>Knowledge of Very Important Theories (Xinjiang internal document, 19th Party Congress)45</th>
<th>Yuli county report, Feb 27, 201846</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statements pertaining to the significance of the internment facilities</td>
<td>五是充分肯定了新疆贯彻总书记重要指示精神的决心和取得的成绩。</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>要把职业教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去44</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandates regarding internment facility security</td>
<td>监所培训中心管理更加完善, “五防”任务必须到位, “四句话”必须落实。</td>
<td>持续抓好“四件事”（职业技能教育转化中心和监管场所绝对安全）</td>
<td>确保两所、一中心绝对安全, 特别要把职业教育培训中心绝对安全办下去41</td>
<td>确保职业技能教育转化中心绝对安全</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The “four things” (四件事)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>持续抓好“四件事”（职业技能教育转化中心和监管场所）</td>
<td>二是抓好“4+2”件事，确保两所、一中心绝对安全，特别</td>
<td>“4+2”，确保职业技能教育转化中心绝对安全，做好</td>
<td>抓好“四件事”和“一个应收尽收”，</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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44 See for example

45 An internal government MS Word document with the file name “Required Knowledge and Skills” (应知应会.doc) and the title “Knowledge of Very Important Theories” (重大理论知识). Obtained by the author in the autumn of 2019 as part of a set of non-public local government documents from a township primary school in Kargilik (Yecheng) County. For further information, see: Zenz. “Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts.” https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/. See Section 1.


47 “fifth, they fully affirmed Xinjiang’s good practices and experiences in implementing the general goals of the general secretary’s work in Xinjiang. For example, the vocational skills education and training transformation centers, network management innovations, and the establishment of an integrated platform.”

48 “The vocational education and training centers must be unswervingly run for a long time”

49 “The management of the prison training center has been perfected. The "Five Prevention" work must be in place, and absolute safety must be guaranteed. The top leader should take the overall responsibility, in charge of the comrades, and there must be no problems.”

50 “Continue to focus on the ‘four things’ (absolute safety of vocational skills education and training centers and supervision sites...)”

51 “Ensure the absolute safety of the ‘two facilities one center’, especially that the vocational education and training centers must be unswervingly operated for a long time”

52 “Ensure the absolute safety of the vocational skills education and training centers”
In document no.4, Chen Quanguo repeatedly invokes the need to fulfil the will of the central government. He then directly states that the “vocational skills education training transformation centers” (VSETCs) are an example of the “good method[s] [adopted by] Xinjiang to fully implement the central goal of the General Secretary [Xi Jinping] for Xinjiang work” (p.1).59

Documents no.4 and no.6 (speeches by Chen Quanguo) also mandate that the state must achieve the “Four Breaks” (四断), which refers to breaking the roots, lineages, connections and origins of religious extremists (断根、断代、断联、断源).60 Government documents cite the activity of implementing the “Four Breaks” in the context of the campaign of detaining persons in re-education facilities (VSETCs) and detention centers.61

Summary

The evidence presented in this section shows how statements by Xi Jinping in 2014 prepared the ground for the subsequent campaign of preventative extralegal internment for the purpose of political re-education. In some respects, his statements come close to demanding such a measure.

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53 “Continue to focus on the "four things" (absolute safety of vocational skills education and training centers and supervision sites, mass work, normalization of social prevention and control, and normalization of military and police forces)”
54 “The second is to do a good job of "4+2." To ensure the absolute safety of the two centers and one center, in particular, the vocational education and training center must be unswervingly run for a long time, run well and run with quality; meticulously do mass work; comprehensively strengthen social prevention and control; normalize and carry out armed pull. To do a good job in "rounding up all who should be rounded up", the border areas must prevent illegal entry of foreigners.”
55 “"4 + 2": Ensure the absolute safety of the vocational skills education and training center, do a good job in mass work, normalize social prevention and control, normalize military and police forces, and launch the "integrated platform" and crack down on violent and terrorist threats. “Round up all who should be rounded up”; do a good job of border control!”
56 “Grasp well the ‘the four things’ and ‘the one – round up all who should be rounded up’, establish a long-term mechanism for counterterrorism and social stability maintenance.”
57 “The break the roots, break the lineages, break the connections, break the origins – the ‘Four Breaks’ – must be evident [effective], achieve the treatment of both the root causes and symptoms of the issue [religious extremism], grassroots governance, comprehensive governance, and systemic governance”
58 “Make great efforts towards the “Four Breaks” (breaking the lineages, breaking the connections, breaking the origins), regarding those who utilize religious activities to propagate extremist ideas, find [them], and resolutely investigate and prosecute [them] according to the law, thoroughly eradicating religious extremist ideology from spreading and infiltrating the soil.”
59 Entire sentence: 五五是充分肯定了新疆贯彻落实总书记新疆工作总目标创造的好做法、好经验。如，职业技能教育培

Multiple other documents leaked to the Tribunal contain important information showing that from 2017, officials in Xinjiang were expected to carry out a campaign of indiscriminately interning masses of people into the VSETCs as part of achieving the “Four Breaks”, that these re-education facilities had to be “absolutely secure” in order to prevent escapes and other problems, and that they had to prevent serial communication and other interactions between detainees in order to contain the spread of the “poison” of their “wrong thinking.”

4 Evidence Pertaining to Birth Prevention and Population Optimization

The leaked documents show that plans to optimize the ethnic population composition, which are connected to Xinjiang’s campaign of suppressing births, can be linked to statements and demands made by the central government.

In his May 2014 speech, Xi demanded that birth control policies in southern Xinjiang were to be made “equal for all ethnic groups” (document no.2, p.22). This statement about birth control “equality” reflects a euphemism that since 2017 undergirded policies that drastically reduced birth rates of ethnic groups. To give just one pertinent example, Xinjiang’s Health Commission established a set of performance targets in 2019 for a special initiative funded with 120 million Chinese Yuan (CNY) that employed the exact same phrase – “implement a birth control policy that is equal for all ethnic groups” – as the stated overall goal behind a new mandate to reduce birth rates in southern Xinjiang by “at least 4 per mille,” to provide free birth control surgeries that included female sterilization procedures, and to achieve an adoption rate of “long-term effective birth prevention” measures of at least 90 percent in rural regions (these measures include IUD insertions and sterilization surgeries).

Document no.7 from December 2017 makes a similar demand, to “enact birth control policies that are equal for each ethnic group” (落实各民族平等的计划生育政策), yet bluntly adds that this measure is specifically designed to “promote equal population growth for each ethnic group” (促进各民族人口均衡发展; document no.7, p.20). This mandate is exactly in line with recommendations made by numerous Xinjiang academics and experts on population growth and “population optimization,” who have unilaterally called for precisely such measures.

Xi’s top-secret April 29, 2014 speech to the XPCC symposium (document no.1) contains a section dedicated to the sensitive topic of population structure and optimization. There, he argues that Xinjiang must “give play to the XPCC’s role in optimizing population resources [to] become a transit point for optimizing the population” (要发挥兵团优化人口资源的作用，成为优化人口的中转站; p.40). The
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is Beijing’s paramilitary colonial settler entity in Xinjiang that operates with the mandate to develop and control the region.

Xi then goes on to say that “population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability” (人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础). This same exact wording is then later contained in document no.7, a classified central government directive regarding the development of the XPCC in southern Xinjiang. In that document, Beijing mandates that by 2022, at least 300,000 settlers (mostly Han from eastern China) are to be moved to regions in southern Xinjiang. The same phrase that “population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability” was then used by Liu Yilei, deputy secretary-general of the party committee of Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), in an important July 2020 speech, when arguing that:

...the problem in southern Xinjiang is mainly the unbalanced population structure. Population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability. The proportion of the Han population in southern Xinjiang is too low, less than 15%. The problem of demographic imbalance is southern Xinjiang’s core issue. (emphasis added)

Document no.7 on the development of the XPCC in southern Xinjiang likewise contains statements about the need to address “severe imbalances in the structure of the ethnic population” (人口民族结构严重失衡) in southern Xinjiang. A comparison of statements by sources is shown in the table below (translations are in footnotes).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Document no.7</th>
<th>Xi’s speeches</th>
<th>Liu Yilei’s July 2020 speech</th>
<th>Xinjiang academics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The population structure of Southern Xinjiang is monolithic (monoethnic)</td>
<td>南疆地区人口结构极为单一</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>主要基于维吾尔族人口增长快, 数量大, 使南疆的民族单一性, 宗教单一性特征更为突出 (Lu Xiaoxia, 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The population and ethnic structure are seriously unbalanced</td>
<td>人口民族结构严重失衡</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>人口结构失衡问题是南疆问题的核心</td>
<td>在南疆汉人口结构失衡严重影响不可思议的程度 (Liao Zhaoyu, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statements on population structure / security</td>
<td>人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础</td>
<td>人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础 (document no.1, p.40)</td>
<td>人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础, 南疆汉族人口比重</td>
<td>新疆边境地区民族结构变化势必会影响民族之间的交流和团结, 成为造成族群隔离, 影响民族关系, 阻</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66 “Southern Xinjiang’s population structure is monolithic”
68 “The ethnic population structure is severely unbalanced”
69 “The problem of demographic imbalance is southern Xinjiang’s core issue”
71 “Population ratio and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability”
72 “Population ratio and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability”
Other evidence pertains to the concept of population embedding described by the author in his academic paper on Population Optimization at the first Tribunal hearing.79

A 2017 research paper published by Gao Xuejing and Li Ming, researchers from the Xinjiang Police Academy and the State Forestry Administration Police Officer Training Center, argues that “population embedding” (renkou qianru 人口嵌入) is the key strategy to eradicate terrorism by “rapidly optimizing the population structure.”80 A 2018 study of the Hotan Unity New Village, a classic example of community-level embedding strategies in southern Xinjiang, clarifies that the village employs a Han to Uyghur ethnic population ratio of 50:50 to counter “hidden dangers for ethnic estrangement” that arise from an “extremely and seriously unbalanced population structure” (Chen, Xu, and Chen 2018, 93).81

Population embedding is part of population optimization strategies and seeks to dilute “problem” populations by embedding “positive” (i.e. Han) populations within them, thus reducing the monoethnic nature of southern Xinjiang, and decreasing the space for religious “extremism” and hence “terrorism” to develop. This, in turn, requires a shifting of significant Han populations to southern Xinjiang, while simultaneously curbing the growth (or size) of the local ethnic (Uyghur) population.

Much of the literature on population embedding traces the origins of the concept and the mandate to implement it to Xi’s May 2014 speech (document no.2, p.5; see quote in the table above). Other quotes can be found in several other documents leaked to the Tribunal, confirming the official nature and importance of this strategy, as shown in the table on the previous page.

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73 “Population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability. The proportion of the Han population in southern Xinjiang is too low, less than 15%.”

74 “Changes in the ethnic structure of Xinjiang’s frontier/ border areas of Xinjiang certainly will affect the exchanges and unity of ethnic groups, which is bound to create ethnic segregation, affect ethnic relations, hinder the development of Xinjiang and is a hidden danger, and threatens population security.” Liang, Feifei. 2019. “Bianjijq diqu renkou luchu wenti ji diqu renkou qianru xi yu Xinjiang weil” [On the Problem of Population Outflow in the Borders and Resultant Countermeasures — Take Xinjiang as an Example].” Journal of Jiangxi Police Institute (06):55-63.

75 “By 2030, the overall strength of the XPCG in southern Xinjiang will be noticeably enhanced, and its role in optimizing the population structure will be reflected in an outstanding manner.”

76 “Focus on retaining the local population, attract population from eastern China, unleash [the XPCG’s] utility in optimizing population resources”

77 “bring into play the XPCG’s role in optimizing population resources and become a staging area for optimizing the population”

78 “Given that the current state of the Han population in Southern Xinjiang is 15% of the total population of the region, optimizing population resources can be said to be an important foundation for ensuring population safety in Xinjiang.” Wang, Qiaolong. 2018. “Bingtuan youhua nanjiang renkou qianru yanjiu [Research on XPCC’s Optimization of Population Resources in Southern Xinjiang].” Labor Security World (33): 79-81.


Document no.2 (Yu Zhengsheng’s speech) likewise states that in southern Xinjiang, “the population structure is monolithic” (人口结构单一), adding that there is a concentration of poor people and a “distorted religious atmosphere” (宗教氛围扭曲; p.67). Only months later, Yu’s statement was repeated nearly verbatim by Xinjiang’s then-Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian. This link between a concentrated ethnic population in one particular region and a related overly “dense” (or here: “distorted” or “contorted”) religious atmosphere is significant, because this exact link explains the threat perception behind concentrated Uyghur populations in southern Xinjiang – and hence the need to mitigate this threat through population embedding and other “population optimization” strategies.

Yu’s statement, which was soon after adopted by Zhang Chunxian, constitutes an important extension and elaboration of Xi Jinping’s statements about the nexus of “population proportion and population security.” Taken together, they provide strong confirmation that “population optimization” strategies are a significant consideration and concern of the central government. The explicit links between such “optimization” strategies and national security considerations are therefore not merely part of an intra-Xinjiang discourse among academics and a few scholar-cadres, as previously outlined by the author. Rather, they are consistently stated in classified central government discourses. Even by itself, this particular finding is of highest importance for our understanding of currently unfolding policies pertaining to population control and birth prevention, and for our assessment of likely future trends: the policy of “population optimization” began and was frequently reiterated by top PRC leaders.

In addition, Li Keqiang’s speech in document 2 contains a strong focus on the scarcity of water. In 2014, Li argues that Xinjiang had already exceeded the water usage “control target” set by the government for 2030 (p.48). Li refers to water resources as the “biggest bottleneck in Xinjiang’s development, the shortcoming of shortcomings” (p.47). This author has previously argued that due to the severely limited ecological carrying capacity of southern Xinjiang’s natural resources, the state cannot simply add large numbers of Han to the region’s existing ethnic minority populations, as it is planning to do (compare also document no.7). Consequently, the systematic embedding of Han into Xinjiang’s non-Han ethnic populations requires the state to reduce the latter’s growth – and perhaps total size – through a combination of cross-regional labor transfers and sustained birth prevention, so as not to increase water demand. Again, Li’s statements provide important confirmation that concerns surrounding the ecological carrying capacity are not merely local in nature, but an issue that was explicitly raised by the central government.

Summary

The new material from the leaked Xinjiang Papers provides crucial linkages between discourses of birth control, the equalizing of population growth between different ethnic groups, the deployment of Han Chinese settlers to alter southern Xinjiang’s ethnic population structure, the need to create an ethnically embedded social environment in southern Xinjiang, and the connections between population proportions, population security and national security. It further shows how these discourses and conceptual linkages originate from within the central government in Beijing.
Importantly, Xi Jinping himself argued that Xinjiang’s (and especially southern Xinjiang’s) population structure is of concern for China’s overall national security. The evidence points to the significant influence of Xi’s statements on ethnic population distribution issues on the subsequent evolution of related population optimization discourses and strategies. This evolution is further linked to the central government through document no.7, which was issued in late 2017.

The new evidence is of high significance. It permits a much stronger case to be made for the argument that the specific demands made by high-ranking Xinjiang academics and Liu Yilei in 2017 and 2020 – to optimize Xinjiang’s ethnic population structure – reflect the previously articulated will of the central government. If southern Xinjiang’s “unbalanced” and “monoethnic” population structure is of concern for China’s national security, then related countermeasures, including a policy of “equalizing” ethnic population growth (i.e. curbing Uyghur population growth), are very likely to be pursued into the longer-term (until the perceived “problem” is resolved; the author previously published about potential specific target rates that would have to be achieved in order to satisfactorily address the state’s concerns regarding the Uyghur population). 85

According to a 2017 research publication (Liu 2017) titled “Research on the issue of Optimizing the Population Resources of Southern Xinjiang,” the central government in Beijing “attaches great importance to the problem of Xinjiang’s population structure and population security.” 86 In light of the new evidence, this statement seems all the more pertinent.

The new material also sheds important new light on another previously-reported fact: an August 2017 health and family planning work promotion meeting held by Kizilsu’s Health and Family Planning Commission references an unpublished family planning document (Kizilsu Health and Family Planning Commission 2018). 87 Issued in 2017 by Xinjiang’s New Population Planning Office, its title is: "Minutes of the Work Meeting on Earnestly and Thoroughly Implementing the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Instructions, Researching and Advancing the Work of Optimizing the Ethnic Population Structure in Southern Xinjiang."88

Before, it was speculative whether Xi Jinping himself had in fact commented on the sensitive and complex topic of population optimization. Now, it seems very likely that he did in fact issue “Important Instructions” on southern Xinjiang’s population optimization. If true, then Xi himself would be directly implicated in what could possibly considered to be an unfolding genocide through systematic, state-sponsored birth prevention.

86 Chinese: “优化南疆人口资源问题研究” and “高度重视新疆人口结构和人口安全问题”
88 Chinese: “关于认真贯彻落实习近平总书记在重要批示精神研究推进南疆民族人口结构优化工作会议纪要”
5 Evidence Pertaining to Coercive Labor Transfers

In document no.2 (May 2014), Xi states that ethnic groups should be put into enterprise work. He argues that large numbers of unemployed persons will “provoke trouble” (无事生非; p.20). Employment in enterprises is in contrast “conducive to ethnic interaction, exchanges and blending” (有利于民族交往交流交融) and therefore helps ethnic groups to “resist religious extremist thinking” (抵制宗教极端思想; ibid.). Such employment also makes them “imperceptibly study Chinese culture” (潜移默化学习中华文化; ibid.).

Similar sentiments are reiterated in the subsequent speeches by Chinese premier Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng.

In document no.2, Premier Li Keqiang (China’s second-highest politician) focuses on what he perceives to be Xinjiang’s key livelihood predicament: a lack of sufficient employment opportunities (p.39). He notes that Xinjiang has “about 3 million urban and rural laborers in Xinjiang who need to find employment, which is equivalent to about one-sixth of the labor force in the region” (p.39). He adds that the problem of surplus labor in southern Xinjiang is “particularly prominent” (尤为突出; ibid.). This is not merely an economic problem. Li argues that:

[P]eople without land, employment or a fixed income have nothing to do and wander around all day; not only will this breed dissatisfaction, but they will also be easily exploited by evildoers. (p.40)

Similar views are reflected in a 2017 report by the Huafu Fashion Corporation in Aksu Prefecture. This company actively absorbs so-called rural surplus laborers from ethnic regions, using state-mandated forms of militarized vocational training and intensified political indoctrination. The since-deleted report argues that “a large number of rural surplus laborers are idle at home, which increases the burden on their families and brings hidden dangers to public security.”

However, many enterprises in Xinjiang struggle to recruit workers. Li suggests a reason for this:

There is an old saying in Xinjiang, "I would rather eat bread at home than eat mutton soup outside." On the one hand, this shows people’s strong feelings for their hometown, while on the other, it indicates that their awareness regarding [the need for] leaving their hometown to work or start a business is weak.

89 现在新疆大约有 300 万城乡劳动力需要解决就业，相当于全区劳动力的约六分之一
90 无地、无业、无固定收入人员没事做，整天游逛，不仅会滋生不满情绪，还容易被坏人利用
92 Compare section 9 in Zenz, Dr. Adrian. “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang.” The Journal of Political Risk, 12, 7 (December 2019).
Changing this situation requires patience and time, as well as improving the management [and] training methods for new employees. (p.40)93

Li argues that Xinjiang must therefore “transform [people’s] way of thinking about employment” (转变就业观念) and “vigorously develop labor-intensive industries that absorb more employment” (大力发展吸纳就业多的劳动密集型产业; p.40). He states that the task of employment promotion in southern Xinjiang is “urgent” and cannot wait (p.53). Related mandates were soon implemented. In mid-2016, XUAR government documents on labor transfer through poverty alleviation began to mandate “thought transformation” in order to “transform views on employment” (推动就业观念转变).94

Further statements on this subject are made in document no.2 by Yu Zhengsheng. Yu makes it clear that economic development “must absolutely be subservient to [the goals of] social and long-term peace and stability” (一定要服从服务于社会稳定和长治久安; p.65). To quote:

For example, in Xinjiang, the requirements for the development of labor-intensive industries are particularly urgent. Although these industries may not contribute more to economic growth and taxation than other industries, they are particularly important for employment and for promoting exchanges and the integration of various ethnic groups. (p.65)95

Yu further clarifies the nature of this plan:

For example, a series of supporting policies and requirements have been put forward for the development of the textile and garment industry, which is to drive at least one million people into employment. This matter is of vital importance to Xinjiang’s social stability and long-term stability. To develop the textile and garment industry, we must rely on the environment, incentivize enterprises to transfer their production [to Xinjiang] ... (p.72)96

The policy goal of placing at least 1 million workers into jobs in textile and garment industries by 2023, with 650,000 of them coming from the southern Uyghur majority regions, was publicly announced on July 18, 2014, and then formalized in February 2018.97 Since 2016, substantial numbers of ethnic group

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93 新疆有句老话，“宁肯在家里吃苞谷馕，也不到外地喝羊肉汤”。这一方面表明，群众的恋乡之情很浓，另一方面表明大家外出就业创业的意识不强。改变这种状况需要耐心和时间，也需要改进对新就业人员的管理培训方式。
95 比如，在新疆，对发展劳动密集型产业的要求尤为迫切，虽然这些产业对经济增长和税收的贡献不一定比其他产业多，但对就业尤为重要，对促进各民族交往交流交融尤为重要...
96 比如，对发展纺织服装产业提出了一系列的扶持政策和要求，是要带动至少一百万人就业，这件事对新疆社会稳定和长治久安至关重要。把纺织服装产业搞上去，要靠环境，要让企业愿意把产业转移到来...
members, mostly Uyghurs, have been placed into related jobs, including persons recently released from internment camps.\textsuperscript{98}

Often, this involves the so-called Pairing Assistance (对口援疆) program through which provinces and cities in eastern China are paired with ethnic minority prefectures in Xinjiang. These pairing connections then facilitate construction of factories in Xinjiang for local employment, and implement the transfer of ethnic surplus laborers to work in factories in eastern Chinese locations.

To strengthen the coordination and planning of projects funded by the Pairing Assistance [program]....For example, focusing on employment, education, talent recruitment, etc., we should put into consideration the number of labor-intensive enterprises to be brought in[to Xinjiang], the number of Xinjiang workers to be employed in other parts of China, the number of bilingual teachers and vocational education teachers to be supported and trained, the extent to which bilingual education and vocational education should be popularized, the number of talents to be introduced and the number of talents to be trained, etc. These factors should be included in the project planning of [the] Pairing Assistance [program], enforcing responsibility and conducting strict assessments. (p.76)\textsuperscript{99}

In document no.2, Xi similarly calls for an increase in placing ethnic groups from Xinjiang into work positions in eastern China:

[S]ystematically expand the scale of [relocating] Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities to other parts of China to receive education, employment, and residence, and promote better understanding and enhance [mutual] feelings among different ethnic groups through producing, living, working, and studying together. (p.15)\textsuperscript{100}

Finally, Yu makes a very interesting statement when arguing that:

Given that southern Xinjiang has poor natural conditions, a weak economic foundation, poor employment conditions, a monolithic population structure, there are many people who face difficulties, a distorted religious atmosphere, a complicated surrounding environment, and a situation involving severe struggles, how can we solve the problems of Southern Xinjiang, maintain social stability and realize long-term peace and stability without implementing special policies? (p.67)\textsuperscript{101}


\textsuperscript{99}加强援疆资金项目统筹规划……比如，围绕就业、教育、人才等工作，要把引进多少劳动密集型企业，在内地解决多少新疆籍劳动力就业，支援和培训多少双语教师和职业教育教师，把双语教育和职业教育普及率提高到什么程度，引进多少人才，培训多少人才等，纳入援疆工作规划，落实责任，严格考核。

\textsuperscript{100}有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模，促进各族群众在共同生产生活和学习中加深了解、增进感情。

\textsuperscript{101}南疆自然条件不好，经济基础薄弱，就业条件差，人口结构单一，群众困难比较多，宗教氛围扭曲，周边环境复杂，斗争形势严峻，不给特殊政策怎么解决南疆问题，怎么维护社会稳定和实现长治久安?
This statement is of great interest, given that it links different aspects together, such as poor employment, a monolithic (i.e., monoethnic) population structure, and a “distorted religious atmosphere” (due to an excessive presence of ethnic groups that predominantly believe in one religion - Islam). Similar linkages are made in discourses found among cadres and scholars in Xinjiang regarding the need to “optimize” southern Xinjiang’s population (see discussion in the related section).

Summary

Starting soon after the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum, but especially from late 2016, Xinjiang developed a much more coercive system of labor transfers for rural surplus laborers especially in southern Xinjiang, with a focus on placing them into labor-intensive industries, especially garment and textile factories. There are strong indications that the mandates contained in the Xinjiang Papers quite directly undergird the implementation of significantly more coercive labor transfer mechanisms, both within Xinjiang and to other provinces. They have also mandated conditions conducive to the coercive placement for VSETC “graduates” into employment especially in factory parks, placements that have often been in industries related to the production of textiles and garments.

6 Evidence Pertaining to Predictive Policing and Surveillance

Xi Jinping’s speech focus on other policies adopted in Xinjiang, including the need for preventative policing, the expansion of big data analysis, and the general need for major improvements in intelligence gathering. Xi speaks of these measures as providing a form of “preemptive control of the enemy” (document no.2, p.10). He bluntly notes that Xinjiang’s “intelligence work is overall weak” and that current counterterrorism efforts are akin to “fighting against the enemy with one eye blacked out” (p.10). Xi notes that the region must “compare and correlate massive amounts of data” (p.10), but also that technology cannot replace human resources (he cites the example that Bin Laden was found thanks to informants).

Xi also calls for a strengthening of the establishment of “early warning mechanisms” (预警机制) and for “increasing the efficiency and quality of intelligence” (提高情报效率和质量; document no.1, p.29). Like his speech in Beijing in May 2014 (document no.2), a significant portion of his remaining speech focuses on strengthening grassroots control and securitization – a mandate that not only Xinjiang’s then-Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian, but especially his successor Chen Quanguo implemented with relentless efficiency. Here, Xi highlights an example from his visit to Konasheher (Ch. Shufu) County of a village-level “triadic” or “three-in-one” (三位一体) work pattern, consisting of village-level organizations, village-based work teams, and village police offices (document no.1, p.23). The same system is mentioned in a September 2014 report on village work teams that describes Xinjiang’s first campaign of

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103 先发制敌
104 我们的情报工作总体还是薄弱 and 对敌斗争，两眼一抹黑.
105 对海量数据进行比对和关联
106 村一级形成了村级组织、驻村工作组、村警务室“三位一体”的工作格局
sending 200,000 cadres into villages and rural regions in areas with a predominantly ethnic population. The same mechanism is also mentioned in a pivotal and widely cited early article on Xinjiang’s initial re-education efforts. Village-based work teams and related grassroots mechanisms played a central role in the subsequent campaign of mass internment.

Subsequent developments show how Xi’s demands shaped Xinjiang’s policing strategy. On the one hand, in 2014, Xinjiang began to install a massive surveillance system and to invest in big data-driven policing. On the other hand, between 2014 and 2016, the region recruited more police and security-related staff than in the preceding decade.

Other documents, notably document no.3, speak of deficiencies in Xinjiang’s surveillance and policing apparatus in mid-2017, and mandate stricter measures and a surveillance without blind spots. In document no.4, Chen Quanguo states that the “vocational skills education training transformation centers” (VSETCs) and the “Integrated Platform” (and abbreviation for the Integrated Joint Operations Platform or IJOP which constitutes the core of Xinjiang’s surveillance and predictive policing system) are an example of the “good methods [adopted by] Xinjiang to fully implement the central goal of the General Secretary [Xi Jinping] for Xinjiang work” (p.1).

7 Evidence Pertaining to Other Aspects: Education and Boarding Schooling

In his May 2014 speech (document no.2), Xi explicitly calls for a systematic expansion of Xinjiang’s boarding school system. Using fairly direct language, Xi demands that students should “learn in school, live in school, and grow up in school” (p.21). In a May 2016 China Daily article on the “Spirit of Xi’s important speech” (referring to his May 28, 2014, speech), this exact same phrase is repeated. It is then again found in a XUAR government document from Kashgar Prefecture from 2018 on strengthening compulsory education and preventing dropouts.

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111 Entire sentence: 五是充分肯定了新疆贯彻落实总书记新疆工作总目标创造的好做法、好经验。如, 职业技能培训转化中心, 网络管理创新, 建立一体化平台。
112 让适龄的孩子们学习在学校、生活在学校、成长在学校
Xi also encouraged more intimate relations between the Han and the ethnic groups. His statements may have been the basis for subsequent policies of pairing Han and ethnic groups through the highly intrusive “Becoming Family” (结对认亲) campaign that is being used by the authorities to promote ethnic assimilation and to spy on ethnic families.\footnote{杨明方, 李亚楠, and 阿尔达克. “新疆百万干部职工与各族群众结对认亲.” 人民网, November 7, 2018. http://web.archive.org/web/20181107042727/http://gongyi.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1107/c151132-30386143.html. and “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here’s What They Think They’re Doing.” ChinaFile, November 9, 2018. https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang.} To quote:

Cadres and people of all ethnic groups must move to interact with each other on multiple levels, in multiple ways, and in multiple forms. This is an important task that must be done under the current situation. ... Party and government agencies, enterprises and institutions, civic organizations, and democratic parties must take the initiative to do something harmonious and with sentiment. Uyghur and Han cadres and workers must engage in activities together and find a weekend once a month to do an activity together. Cadres of all ethnic groups can take the initiative to drop by, to visit, to take their family members and children and go on walks together, chat, have a meal, all of these are viable options. (p.15-16)\footnote{各族干部群众要多层次、多方式、多形式走动互动起来, 这是当前形势下必须要做的一项重要工作。...党政机关、企事业单位、人民团体、民主党派等都要主动做一些融洽感情的事情。维汉干部职工一起活动活动，一个月找一个周末在一起搞个活动。各族干部可以带头串串门，带着家人、孩子等一起走走，聊聊天、吃个饭都可以。}


As with other policies discussed in sections above, it is clear that the expansion of boarding schools and the "Becoming Family" program closely reflect concepts and mandates previously laid out by Xi Jinping in his 2014 series of speeches (see also Appendix A of “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction”).

8 Evidence Pertaining to Ethnic Policy and Religious Affairs

In the leaked documents, Xi defends China’s ethnic policy framework. Rather than largely dismantling ethnic distinctions and categorizations, or even the system of regional autonomy, as had been suggested by proponents of a so-called Second Generation of Ethnic Policies (第二代民族政策)\footnote{See Zenz, “Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State.” https://jamestown.org/program/toward-a-second-generation-of-ethnic-policies/} Xi argues that it would be a “political mistake” (政治错误) to try to deemphasize ethnic distinctions, given that they only tend to dissolve as the “result of a long process of social development” (社会发展长过程的结果; p.12). Instead, China must “must unwaveringly adhere to the party's ethnic policies and the system of ethnic regional autonomy” (p.13), which he argues are superior to those of western countries.\footnote{我们要坚定不移坚持党的民族政策、坚持民族区域自治制度}
historical processes. While these distinctions continue to exist, the continuation of current policies is therefore a pragmatic solution to these two ‘problems’ (the ‘problems’ being the continued existence of ethnic groups and religious beliefs).

These statements come not as a surprise. In fact, they are both in line with author ongoing assessment of Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, and with the unfolding atrocities that have been observed. Since the more lenient ethnic policy approach under Deng Xiaoping, subsequent Chinese leaders have adopted an increasingly assimilationist stance within the existing ethnic policy framework. The system of regional autonomy that supposedly allows ethnic groups to self-govern politically never in reality afforded any such freedoms. With few exceptions, ethnic minority education systems have typically facilitated cultural-linguistic assimilation rather than genuinely promoting ethnic language skills (and if so, then merely as a crutch to help ethnic students learn Chinese). Similarly, Beijing’s continued use of the ethnic policy framework, supposedly even in Xinjiang, simply means that it will continue to identify citizens based on belonging to officially-sanctioned ethnic groups, that it continues to uphold a purely nominal form of political self-governance through the regional autonomy framework, and that only those officially-sanctioned expressions of ethnic difference will continue to be permitted. These latter include singing, dancing, ethnic food, certain limited expression of ethnic languages (provided that ethnic groups become fluent in Chinese), and superficial expressions and practices of religiosity – provided that these do not, to quote from Xi’s own speech, “interfere with matters of the secular life.”

In essence, China’s ethnic policy framework has been and remains useful for the state in that it permits it to substantially redefine the contents and meaning of ethnic belonging – even entirely against the will of the ethnic groups themselves. It comprises a framework within which the state attempts to destroy and reconstruct these identities according to its own goals.

In short, Xi’s and other officials’ assertions about the maintenance of Beijing’s general current framework of ethnic policies are entirely compatible with acts that serve to thoroughly dismantle and destroy ethnic identity markers – meaning acts, customs or beliefs that constitute the essential and predominant core of ethnic and related religious identities. They are compatible with acts that may be found to constitute of Crimes Against Humanity or of genocide.

Even so, Xi expresses alarm at what he describes as a soaring negative ethnic consciousness between Han and ethnic groups after the Urumqi riots in 2009, which he says even extends to young people (p.15). He condemns ethnic discrimination, and argues that growing phenomena such as that of ethnic groups living in separate communities (分族而居) must be countered with policies that promote “a social structure and community environment where all ethnic groups are embedded in each other” (p.15).

According to Xi, the practical solution to this is as follows:

[S]ystematically expand the scale of [relocating] Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities to other parts of China, to receive education, find employment, and residence, and promote better understanding and enhance [mutual] feelings among different ethnic groups.

120 While Xi’s original quote from document no.1 (p.33) refers to acts of interference that “some religious people do,” subsequent policies in Xinjiang have taken them to mean any customary religious involvement in daily lives undertaken by any ethnic minority citizen. Arguably, Xi’s subsequent statements have provided the context for precisely such a development (see the author’s Introduction to document no.1 for further discussion).

121推动建立各民族相互嵌入式的社会结构和社区环境
ethnic groups through producing, living, working, and studying together. (p.15)

By elevating of the phrase “ethnic interaction, exchanges and blending” (民族交往交流交融), which features twice in his speech, Xi marks a clear turn towards a much more assimilationist ethnic policy. Immediately preceding this mandate is also Xi’s statement about creating an embedded social structure, where all ethnic groups are embedded into each other (a “population optimization” strategy). Xi’s ethnic policy approach needs to be therefore understood in this context.

In regards to religion, Xi Jinping’s April 2014 speech states that religious extremism continues to flourish despite the state’s “strike hard” (严打) campaign, and that attacks have even continued to increase in some regions. This is because a “dense religious atmosphere provides the soil and the climate for it [religious extremism]” (浓厚的宗教氛围为其提供土壤和气候, p.32). Xi goes on to argue that “[t]herefore, [we must] strengthen the management of religious affairs in accordance with the law.” He states that “we must protect the freedom of religious belief, but we must not lead religion to the crooked path of unlimited, disorderly, and extreme development” (p.33). While this statement may come as a surprise in light of recent developments in the region, they are easily misinterpreted without taking note of another statement. After pointing to the need to protect of religious freedom, Xi stated that:

> There are some religious people who interfere with secular life, such as intervening in marriages, funerals, and lifestyles. This cannot be allowed to spread. (p.33)

This position arguably contradicts any meaningful notions of religious freedom, given that many religions, including Islam, Christianity or Tibetan Buddhism are intimately involved in marriage and funeral ceremonies, as well as other rites of passage and many important aspects of daily life. Notably, the statement that “religious people” or “extremists” “interfere with secular life,” and his subsequent statement that religion [in general] must not interfere in these matters (p.25), is never attributed to Xi Jinping, and apparently did not exist in state discourse prior to Xi’s speech. The notion is picked up and turned into a slightly more formal mandate in an November 2014 opinion issued by Xinjiang’s CCP Central Office which states that “religion is strictly forbidden to interfere with the secular lifestyle” (严禁宗教干预世俗化的生活方式). This exact statement is then mirrored in a crucial 2015 report on de-extremification and re-education that was cited by this author in his 2018 report on the internment camps over the statements that about 30 percent of the population has been polluted by religious

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122 有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模，促进各族群众在共同生产生活和工作学习中加深了解、增进感情。


124 Full sentence in Chinese: 要从加强民族交流、促进民族团结的高度,推进双语教育,推动建立各民族相互嵌入式的社会结构和社区环境,有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模,促进各族群众在共同生产生活和工作学习中加深了解、增进感情。 (document no.2, p.15)

125 有一些信教的人干预世俗化生活的事情,如干预婚丧嫁娶、生活方式等,这个也是不能让它蔓延开来的。

extremism, and that once "30 percent of them have been transformed [through re-education], ... a village has basically been cleansed."127

Xi’s views on ethnicity and religious freedom are broadly consistent with the subsequently unfolding re-education policies and crackdown on expressions of religiosity in public life. The leaked document titled the “Karakax List” outlined how from 2017, people were sent to re-education camps because in years past they practiced customary religious rites at marriages or funerals.128 Xi said in his speeches that religions will gradually become extinct over time as the conditions for their existence decrease, since people’s ideological awareness will improve (he quoted this as argued by one of the fathers of Marxism, Friedrich Engels; document no.2, p.17). He argued however that this will only realistically occur through longer-term historic processes. Rather than supporting the existence of religions, Xi’s words appear to reflect a sober realism vis-a-vis religions’ historical resilience. He calls for strong measures to vigorously push back against Islam’s influence in Uyghur society. To quote:

It is necessary to vigorously disseminate modern cultural concepts and behaviors, produce large numbers of modern cultural products that transmit modern culture in their values, convey the real life of ethnic minorities in their contents, and appeal to the public through their styles and techniques, so as to guide the masses towards secularization and modernization in their spiritual and emotional interests. (document no.2, p.28)129

Xi further mandates that:

A secularized atmosphere has to be vigorously cultivated and promoted, and continuously maintained. Xinjiang has long been known as the land of songs and dances, where multiple cultures coexist. (document no.2, p.27-28)130

Xi’s references to a vigorous promotion of a secularized atmosphere and to singing and dancing instead of religiosity is an apt summary of the drastic and coercive sociocultural transformations witnessed in the region since late 2016.

Summary

Overall, Beijing’s strategy for religion and culture in Xinjiang appears to be akin to what scholars have referred to as a form of “museumification”131: to preserve an outer shell and appearance, especially for tourism, but to eradicate its influence on and practice in daily life, and its significance for and role in ethnic identity.

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127 赵文. “独家重磅新疆去极端化调查.”
https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/
129 要大力传播现代文化理念和行为方式，制作一大批价值观念上透射现代文化理念、内容上反映少数民族现实生活、形式和技巧上吸引人的文化作品，引导群众在精神和情趣上向世俗化、现代化靠近。
130 世俗化氛围要大力培养和提倡，继续保持这种氛围。新疆历来就是多元文化荟萃、多种文化并存，素有歌舞之乡的美称。
The Xinjiang Papers confirm that this is not just a local or regional policy or experiment, but a faithful realization of the plans, strategies and demands which emanated from the central government in Beijing, which characterized them as a matter of national security. This explains why China responds strongly to western actions and sanctions on Xinjiang (sanctioning Xinjiang officials, divesting from Xinjiang-linked supply chains) with counter-sanctions and counterstrikes against western companies speaking out on forced labor. Given such strong responses from Beijing, which come despite the diplomatic, political and economic risks they entail, we had so far assumed that Beijing not only supported all the actions in Xinjiang, but actively wanted them. Knowing that the policies in Xinjiang reflect Beijing’s national security considerations as articulated as early as 2014 adds a whole new level of certainty to this assessment.

Given the historical record and the actual real-life implementation of China’s system of regional ethnic autonomy in real life, Xi’s affirmation of China’s ethnic policy approach is not in contradiction to the subsequent attacks on ethnic identity in Xinjiang. In fact, Xi made several pertinent statements regarding how to push back against ethnic difference and expressions of religiosity in everyday life that were subsequently implemented with ruthless efficiency.

9 Conclusions

In sum, the new evidence:

a) Confirms our existing knowledge of the various aspects of the atrocities committed in the region.

b) Confirms that these acts are not merely local or regional in nature, but are in most instances in line with direct demands made by the central government, including Xi Jinping himself.

c) Confirms that these acts are broadly pursued with the explicit intent to safeguard key national policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Two Centennial Goals, and so to safeguard China’s national security and the long-term rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

d) Confirms the author’s prior view that Beijing is not seeking to eliminate the Uyghurs and other ethnic groups physically as entire groups, but is seeking to thoroughly assimilate them, to change their social structures, and to alter the ethnic population structure and distribution – which has led to a drastic campaign of preventing births that is likely to continue until related population optimization targets have been met (they author had outlined arguments at the first Tribunal hearing when and how these targets might be met – namely through a state-enforced near-zero or slightly negative population growth rate until the year 2040 that could lead to a loss of between 2.6 and 4.5 million lives through measures designed to prevent births).

Attachment: Personal Opinion on the Question of Genocide

When analyzing the new evidence, the author was asked by the Tribunal to be prepared to give his personal evaluation regarding a possible genocide determination – in light of the new evidence.
The new evidence provides crucial information regarding the nature and intensity of the government’s intent in regard to its actions in Xinjiang. It underscores the author’s prior arguments that the systematic prevention of births among Uyghurs and other ethnic groups is a critical and necessary part of China’s overall “optimization” policy in Xinjiang—a policy considered to be a matter of national security. Empirically, the potential non-birth of up to 2.6 million non-Han ethnic people (according to the lowest-estimate scenario) who would otherwise have been born but for the birth prevention measures enacted by the Chinese party-state, represents at least 20 percent of southern Xinjiang’s ethnic population in 2018 of 9.49 million, with the high estimate resulting in a growth curtailment of population by roughly one third. These non-births comprise a physical “destruction in part,” whose impact needs to be considered in tandem with other measures, notably the targeted attack on religious, cultural and economic elites, the separation of children from parents along with a breaking apart of family units, the dismantling of traditional communities, the suppression of language, the destruction of historical cultural patrimony, and so on.

The author understands that the explicit purpose of the United Nations’ 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is not merely to undertake after-the-fact genocide determinations. Rather, its stated purpose is to bind the “Contracting Parties” to “undertake to prevent” genocide from taking place.

To this end, the U.N. Office on Genocide Prevention identified risk factors for “atrocity crimes” (meaning genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity) in its Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. Risk factor 10, which is specific to genocide, provides indicators for “signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group” (p.19). In the document’s introduction, then-U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon notes that “[a]trocity crimes...are not spontaneous or isolated events; they are processes, with histories, precursors and triggering factors...” (p.iii).

This approach informs the author’s views on the matter. When examining the risk factor indicators on page 19 of the U.N. Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, the author concludes that many of the eight listed indicators have been met to a very considerable degree. This helps to evaluate the level of risk – the risk that a genocide has is currently in process or is likely to occur in the near future. The author evaluates this risk to be very high.

Overall, while author cannot say that millions of births have already been prevented at this time (although many thousands have), the risk that they will be prevented in the coming decades is – in light of the evidence – very high.

In light of both new and existing evidence, the author’s analysis and opinion is as follows:

1. **Nature of the destruction in part**: Beijing’s actions and policies in Xinjiang constitute a very high risk of a genocide – a genocide that has already begun and is set to unfold and considerably

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increase in impact during the coming several decades. This genocide is occurring mainly through the intentional and systematic suppression of births – along with several other important acts that directly and materially threaten the continued existence of the affected ethnic groups ‘as groups’.

2. **Intent behind the destruction in part:** Beijing’s intent (both inferred and explicitly stated) behind these actions and policies is to effectively contain the perceived threat posed by a concentrated, growing and increasingly resistant ethnic population especially in southern Xinjiang, in order to:

   a) Safeguard China’s domestic social stability
   b) Safeguard China’s national security, as perceived Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
   c) Achieve the politically important Two Centennial Goals (explained above)
   d) And therefore, safeguard the long-term rule of the CCP and the personal role and leadership of Xi Jinping

Here, the new evidence confirms that the stated intent behind the policies implemented in Xinjiang is the long-term survival of the political leadership that is mandating and implementing these policies.