

The Xinjiang Papers – Document No.2

Speeches by Comrades Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (May 28-29, 2014)

《习近平、李克强、俞正声同志
在第二次中央新疆工作座谈会上的讲话》

Introduction, Authentication and Transcription¹

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1. Overview and Context

The original document was provided to the Uyghur Tribunal (based in London) via an anonymous intermediary. For details on this, please refer to the report “The Xinjiang Papers – An Introduction.”

This document (no.2) contains a set of three speeches given by General Secretary Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng between May 28 and 29, 2014, at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (第二次中央新疆工作座谈会). The set was originally issued as a circular of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP (中国共产党中央委员会办公厅 or short 中办) as the Central Office Announcement issue number 25 (《习近平、李克强、俞正声同志在第二次中央新疆工作座谈会上的讲话》(中办通报〔2014〕第25期)). It contains the following three speeches (in the order featured in the document):

- Comrade Xi Jinping’s speech (May 28, 2014)
习近平同志的讲话（2014年5月28日）
- Comrade Li Keqiang’s speech (May 28, 2014)
李克强同志的讲话（2014年5月28日）
- Comrade Yu Zhengsheng’s concluding speech (May 29, 2014)
俞正声同志的总结讲话（2014年5月29日）

¹ The author would like to thank Dr. James Millward, professor at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and Dr. David Tobin, lecturer in East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, for performing a thorough a very helpful peer review of this introduction.

The set consists of 77 pages. All pages contain page numbers, ranging from 1 to 78. The page numbering shows that page number three of Xi's May 28, 2014 speech is missing.

The set is classified as “secret” (机密), which represents the second of three secrecy levels and is defined as pertaining to “important national secrets whose divulgence will cause severe harm to the nation’s security and interests.”² For comparison, this is the secrecy level specified on the main document of the China Cables.³

A detailed overview of the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum is provided by related Chinese state media reporting, which also provides a significant number of literal quotes from the original speeches.⁴ The Central Office Announcement with the same issue year, number and title can be found in a publication titled “Excerpts from Xi Jinping's ‘Three Stricts and Three Honests’” (三严三实).⁵ Published as part of a series titled “General Secretary Xi Jinping's Excerpts from 39 Essays” on the website of the China Policy Research Network, the publication accurately quotes a sentence from document no.2 that cannot be found anywhere else on the Chinese Internet.⁶

Together with the Xinjiang Papers Document No.1, this document set is also mentioned in the context of an October 24, 2016, study session of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Forestry Department.⁷ That report, published on the XUAR government website on October 26th, notes that “the speeches made by General Secretary Xi Jinping during his inspection in Xinjiang and at the second Central Xinjiang Work Symposium represent the strategic deployment of the Party Central Committee for Xinjiang work.”⁸

2. Comparison to New York Times Article from November 16, 2019

The New York Times article which first reported on the Xinjiang Papers refers to Xi's speech at a “May 2014 leadership conference” without giving further details.⁹

² “新疆：处置问题线索 69817 件 谈话函询 14441 次。” 中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法. 中国人大网, March 4, 2020. http://web.archive.org/web/20191127023402/http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_4509.htm.

³ See Zenz, Adrian. “Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign.” Journal of Political Risk. Journal of Political Risk, November 24, 2019. <https://www.ipolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>. OR Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany et al. “Exposed: China's Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm.” ICIJ. November 25, 2019. <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/>.

⁴ See e.g., 马俊卿, ed. “习近平在第二次中央新疆工作座谈会上发表重要讲话.” 新华网, May 29, 2014. http://web.archive.org/web/20180608025413/http://www.xinhuanet.com/photo/2014-05/29/c_126564529.htm. And “习近平：坚持依法治疆团结稳疆长期建疆 团结各族人民建设社会主义新疆.” 人民网 - 人民日报, May 30, 2014. <http://web.archive.org/web/20140603172650/http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0530/c64094-25083518.html>.

⁵ “出版说明.” 青马先生. March 2015. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211016202829/http://zgzcinfo.cn/upload/202109/10/202109101746345685.pdf>, page 7. Download page with title: “习近平总书记 39 本论述摘编,” March 21, 2021. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211017174317/http://www.zgzcinfo.cn/index/show-24511.html>. Related information on

the Three Stricts and Three Honests: ““党建知识：党的基础理论知识.” 成都市新经济委, June 6, 2020. <https://archive.md/Afxoa> OR http://cdxj.chengdu.gov.cn/xjfw/c005100004/2021-03/11/content_310032ebceb144f6a34dbfc546449ce1.shtml.

⁶ 各级领导干部都要按照“三严三实”要求严格规范自己的行为，不要贪小便宜，不要搞特权，不要让干部群众戳脊梁骨。(p.7 of China Policy Research Network document and p.32 of document no.2)

⁷ <https://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/xinjiang/bmdt/201610/67ce208a120c481b987ef061e6d11c18.shtml> (since deleted), archived “自治区林业厅召开干部大会传达学习习近平总书记重要讲话.” 新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府网. 自治区林业厅, October 26, 2016. <https://archive.md/wip/6uSlv>.

⁸ 习近平总书记在新疆考察期间的讲话和在第二次中央新疆工作座谈会上的讲话，是党中央对新疆工作作出的战略部署

⁹ Ramzy, Austin, and Chris Buckley. “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims.” The New York Times, November 16, 2019.

The author used both English and Chinese¹⁰ versions of the New York Times article to identify identical quotes contained the document leaked to the Uyghur Tribunal (the Times' Chinese version quotes directly from the original). They are as follows:

Page number (in document leaked to Uyghur Tribunal)	Chinese quote (N.Y. Times quote in bold, with added surrounding text from the leaked document)	English translation (for the matching passage, taken from the N.Y. Times article)
P.6-7	当前，新疆工作的总目标是社会稳定和长治久安，要抓住这个总目标，起一个领头作用，其他工作都围绕这个总目标来展开和推进。 我们说，发展是第一要务，是实现长治久安的基础，这是对的， ”习近平说。“ 但不能认为发展起来了一切问题就能迎刃而解了，可以断定在新疆不是这种情况。	“We say that development is the top priority and the basis for achieving lasting security, and that’s right” ... “But it would be wrong to believe that with development every problem solves itself.”
P.7	新疆这些年发展速度很快、人民生活水平不断提高，但民族分裂活动和暴力恐怖活动仍然呈上升趋势。这说明，经济发展并不能自然而然带来长治久安，不能用发展问题代替稳定问题。	“In recent years, Xinjiang has grown very quickly and the standard of living has consistently risen, but even so ethnic separatism and terrorist violence have still been on the rise” ... “This goes to show that economic development does not automatically bring lasting order and security.”
P.7	从全国来看，不打败“三股势力”的挑战， 社会稳定就会受到冲击，各族人民大团结就会受到破坏，改革发展稳定大局就会受到影响。	“social stability will suffer shocks, the general unity of people of every ethnicity will be damaged, and the broad outlook for reform, development and stability will be affected.”
P.8	面对十分猖獗的暴力恐怖活动，面对丧心病狂的暴力恐怖分子，必须把严厉打击暴力恐怖活动作为当前斗争的重点， 毫不迟疑、毫不动摇运用人民民主专政的武器，集中力量进行毁灭性打击，为从根本上解决影响新疆长治久安的深层次问题赢得时间和主动。	“The weapons of the people’s democratic dictatorship must be wielded without any hesitation or wavering.”
P.8	要着力堵塞漏洞、消除隐患、完善机制、提升能力，下重手、出重拳，立足打早打小打苗头，挖根子、拔钉子、端窝点、打团伙、追逃犯、揪幕后，追着打、压着打、挖着打，不给暴力恐怖分子任何喘息之机。 不要怕敌对势力说三道四，也不要怕敌对势力抹黑新疆形象。暴力恐怖活动不打掉，天理不容！谁要说三道四、指手画脚，都要坚决顶回去！	“Don’t be afraid if hostile forces whine, or if hostile forces malign the image of Xinjiang,”
P.9-10	信息员可以在全美任何地方拨打免费电话，向有关部门报告“可疑行为”，该信息将被立即转到有关部门参考查证。“ 打人民战争，应该是我们共产党人的拿手好戏，我们最善于做组织起来的工作。 ”要广泛发动各族群众积极配合反恐行动，完善相应机制，鼓励检举揭发，加强社会面防控，加强流动人口管理，加强重要目标、要害部位、重点行业等安全防范，除了要加强人防物防技防建设外，也要发动群众共同来做，形成全方位立体式的社会防控体系。	“We Communists should be naturals at fighting a people’s war” ... “We’re the best at organizing for a task.”
P.11	新疆边境线长达 5600 公里，地形地势十分复杂，有不少薄弱点，防不胜防，“三股势力”渗入危险加剧。“ 美国从阿富汗撤军以后，盘踞在阿巴边境的暴力恐怖组织可能很	“After the United States pulls troops out of Afghanistan, terrorist organizations positioned on the

<http://web.archive.org/web/20191116135003/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html>.

¹⁰ Ramzy and Buckley. “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detention of Muslims.”

<http://web.archive.org/web/20191118083058/https://www.nytimes.com/zh/2019/11/16/world/asia/xinjiang-documents-chinese.html>.

	快向中亚渗透、在叙利亚、阿富汗等地接受实战化训练的‘东突’恐怖组织人员随时可能在新疆发动暴力恐怖活动。所以，我们必须关口前移、力量前置，实施对境外“东突”恐怖组织专项侦查打击行动。	frontiers of Afghanistan and Pakistan may quickly infiltrate into Central Asia” ... “East Turkestan’s terrorists who have received real-war training in Syria and Afghanistan could at any time launch terrorist attacks in Xinjiang.”
P.17	四、全面贯彻执行党的宗教政策一段时间以来， [致使]由于分裂势力、暴力恐怖势力都打着伊斯兰教的旗号，于是一些人认为，应该遏制伊斯兰教发展，甚至提出要消除伊斯兰教的存在。 这种观点同样是片面的、甚至是错误的。宗教是人类社会的客观存在，经过漫长发展演变，至今对信教群众有重要影响力。恩格斯说，一切宗教都只不过是支配着人们日常生活的外部力量在人们头脑中的幻想的反映。	“In light of separatist and terrorist forces under the banner of Islam, some people have argued that Islam should be restricted or even eradicated” [He called that view] “biased, even wrong.”
P.24	这些人一心想着“圣战”升天堂，最终走上罪恶的邪路！千万不要低估了 宗教极端思想的毒性 ，一旦信了它就 像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智、精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来。	“the toxicity of religious extremism.” ... “As soon as you believe in it” ... “it’s like taking a drug, and you lose your sense, go crazy and will do anything.”
P.62	会上，习近平总书记发表重要讲话，李克强总理对新疆经济社会发展作出部署，中央将下发《关于进一步维护新疆社会稳定和实现长治久安的意见》，这些充分体现了我们党在新形势下的治疆方略， 为进一步做好新疆工作指明了方向。	“set the direction for making a success of Xinjiang.”

Table 1. Identical sections are marked in bold font.

3. Comparison to Literal Quotations from State Media Reports

Below is a comparison of the original documents with state media reports that quoted literally or quasi-literally from Xi’s April 2014 speeches. Identical passages are marked in bold font. The comparison shows that while some more generic statements are quoted in substantial blocks, other sections, especially those pertaining to potentially more sensitive statements, are drawn very selectively from across the original speeches.

Media source and date	Media quotes	Quotes from the original (leaked) document set
Xi Jinping’s speech (May 28, 2014)		
CPC News, May 30, 2014 Archived URL: https://archive.is/cizRe	习近平在讲话中指出， 做好新疆工作是全党全国的大事，必须从战略全局高度，谋长远之策，行固本之举，建久安之势，成长治之业。 党中央历来高度重视新疆工作，作出一系列重大决策部署，推动新疆改革发展、民族团结、社会进步、民生改善、边防巩固取得了历史性成就。实践证明，我们党的治疆方略是正确的，必须长期坚持，保持战略定力。同时，我们要结合新疆形势充实和完善党的治疆方略，坚持长期建疆，多管齐下，久久为功，扎实做好打基础利长远的工作，为社会稳定和长治久安打下坚实基础。	做好新疆工作是全党全国的大事，必须从战略全局高度，谋长远之策，行固本之举，建久安之势，成长治之业。 党中央历来高度重视新疆工作。“一唱雄鸡天下白，万方乐奏有于阗。”毛泽东同志这一诗句，显示了新中国成立后我们党建设新疆的豪迈气概。以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体为经略和建设新疆付出了巨大心血，取得了巨大成就。改革开放以来，党中央对新疆工作作出一系列重大决策部署。(p. 2) ... 这些重大决策部署， 推动新疆改革发展、民族团结、社会进步、民生改善、边防巩固取得了历史性成就， 为我们做好新形势下新疆工作提供了重要理论指导和实践经验，奠定了各方面的工作基础。 实践证明，我们党的治疆方略是正确的，必须长期坚 [rest of sentence is on page 3 which is missing from the set](p. 2) 要坚持长期建疆，多管齐下，久久为功，积小胜为大胜，图近功至恒远，扎实做好打基础利长远的工作，一环扣一环解

		决各种深层次矛盾和问题， 为社会稳定和长治久安打下坚实基础。 (p. 6)
	习近平强调， 社会稳定和长治久安是新疆工作的总目标。必须把严厉打击暴力恐怖活动作为当前斗争的重点，高举社会主义法治旗帜，大力提高群防群治预警能力，筑起铜墙铁壁、构建天罗地网。要并行推进国内国际两条战线，强化国际反恐合作。	<p>二、牢牢把握新形势下新疆工作的着眼点和着力点党中央已经明确，社会稳定和长治久安是新疆工作的总目标。这是党中央根据新疆形势和全国大局作出的重大战略判断，明确了当前和今后一个时期新疆工作的着眼点和着力点。(p. 6)</p> <p>”面对十分猖獗的暴力恐怖活动，面对丧心病狂的暴力恐怖分子，必须把严厉打击暴力恐怖活动作为当前斗争的重点，毫不迟疑、毫不动摇运用人民民主专政的武器，集中力量进行毁灭性打击，为从根本上解决影响新疆长治久安的深层次问题赢得时间和主动。(p. 8)</p> <p>要高举社会主义法治旗帜，高举宪法和法律旗帜，增强各族群众法律意识，使他们懂得法律是底线，也是高压线，知道什么是合法、什么是违法，什么事能做、什么事不能做。(p. 8)</p> <p>要大力提高群防群治预警能力，加强宣传教育，引导各族群众擦亮眼睛、明辨是非、提高反恐意识，认清维护稳定就是维护自身利益，坚定站在党和政府一边。要组织动员各族群众加强联防联控、群防群治，筑起铜墙铁壁、构建天罗地网，使暴力恐怖分子成为“过街老鼠、人人喊打”。(p. 9)</p> <p>开展反恐斗争，还要并行推进国内国际两条战线，强化国际反恐合作，开展“境外清源”。(p. 11)</p>
CPC News, May 30, 2014. Archived URL: https://archive.is/cizRe	习近平指出， 新疆的问题最长远的还是民族团结问题。民族分裂势力越是企图破坏民族团结，我们越要加强民族团结，筑牢各族人民共同维护祖国统一、维护民族团结、维护社会稳定的钢铁长城。要坚定不移坚持党的民族政策、坚持民族区域自治制度。民族团结是各族人民的生命线。	<p>三、坚定不移贯彻党的民族政策</p> <p>新疆的问题最长远的还是民族团结问题。民族分裂势力越是企图破坏民族团结，我们越要加强民族团结，筑牢各族人民共同维护祖国统一、维护民族团结、维护社会稳定的钢铁长城。(p. 12)...</p> <p>我们要坚定不移坚持党的民族政策、坚持民族区域自治制度。要深入细致开展党的民族政策宣传和思想政治工作，坚决克服和防止简单化、片面化，坚决克服和防止忽左忽右、摇摆不定。随着形势发展，需要完善的可以完善，需要改革的可以改革，但不能在根本立场上动摇。团结稳定是福，分裂动乱是祸。民族团结是各族人民的生命线。(p. 13)</p>
	习近平强调，要 精心做好宗教工作，积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应，发挥好宗教界人士和信教群众在促进经济社会发展中的积极作用。处理宗教问题的基本原则，就是保护合法、制止非法、遏制极端、抵御渗透、打击犯罪。要依法保障信教群众正常宗教需求，尊重信教群众的习俗，稳步拓宽信教群众正确掌握宗教常识的合法渠道。要重视培养爱国宗教教职人员队伍，采取有力措施提高宗教界人士素质，确保宗教组织领导权牢牢掌握在爱国爱教人士手中。	新疆少数民族大多数群众都信教，必须 精心做好宗教工作，积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应，发挥好宗教界人士和信教群众在促进经济社会发展中的积极作用。处理宗教问题的基本原则，就是保护合法、制止非法、遏制极端、抵御渗透、打击犯罪。满足信教群众正常宗教需求，是减少非法宗教活动的重要举措。要按照有序、适度、可控原则，依法保障信教群众正常宗教需求，尊重信教群众的习俗，稳步拓宽信教群众正确掌握宗教常识的合法渠道。要重视培养爱国宗教教职人员队伍，采取有力措施提高宗教界人士素质，确保宗教组织领导权牢牢掌握在爱国爱教人士手中。 (p. 18)
CPC News, May 30, 2014 Archived URL: https://archive.is/cizRe	习近平强调，要在各族群众中牢固树立 正确的祖国观、民族观，弘扬社会主义核心价值观体系 and 社会主义核心价值观，增强各族群众对伟大祖国的认同、对中华民族的认同、对中华文化的认同、对中国特色社会主义道路的认同。要加强思想政治工作，营造昂扬向上的社会氛围，引导各族群众追	心病还需心药医。对新疆来说，这副“心药”就是 正确的祖国观、民族观，就是中华文化，就是社会主义核心价值观体系 and 社会主义核心价值观，要用这味药扶正祛邪、健体强心。要采取有效措施，增强各族群众对伟大祖国的认同、对中华民族的认同、对中华文化的认同、对中国特色社会主义道路的认同。 (p. 23-24)

	求现代文明生活。要为群众提供丰富多彩、喜闻乐见的文化生活，完善公共文化服务体系，加强基层场地设施建设，加强互联网建设和管理，激发各族群众热爱新疆的美好情感。	要形成主流舆论压倒性优势，营造昂扬向上的社会氛围，引导各族群众追求现代文明生活。宣传教育要注意方式方法。(p. 27) 要弘扬少数民族文化优秀传统文化，增强各族群众自信心和自豪感，激发各族群众热爱新疆的美好情感。要充分利用电视、广播、报纸、网络、文艺团体等资源，为群众提供丰富多彩、喜闻乐见的文化生活，让各族群众接触到更多更好的现代和传统文化艺术。要大力传播现代文化理念和行为方式，制作一大批价值观念上透射现代文化理念、内容上反映少数民族现实生活、形式和技巧上吸引人的文化作品，引导群众在精神和情趣上向世俗化、现代化靠近。要提高流行文化影响力，把比较成功的一些流行文化形式，如“感动中国”、“最美人物”、“中国好歌曲”、“星光大道”等引入新疆社会推广，发掘新疆尤其是少数民族文艺元素和亮点，提高群众文化参与度，实现文化类型多元化。要完善公共文化服务体系，加强基层场地设施建设，让村村、乡乡、县县都可以广泛开展文化体育活动。(p. 28)
Korla Zero Distance (库尔勒零距离) via Sohu News, September 23, 2017 Archived URL: https://archive.md/O3YtL	习近平总书记在第二次新疆工作座谈会上指出：“千万不要低估了宗教极端思想的毒害性，一旦信了它就像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智、精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来”。	这些人一心想着“圣战”升天堂，最终走上罪恶的邪路！千万不要低估了宗教极端思想的毒害性，一旦信了它就像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智、精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来。
Xinhua, May 29, 2014. Archived URL: https://archive.md/bQev2	各民族要相互了解、相互尊重、相互包容、相互欣赏、相互学习、相互帮助，像石榴籽那样紧紧抱在一起。要加强民族交往交流交融，部署和开展多种形式的共建工作，推进“双语”教育，推动建立各民族相互嵌入式的社会结构和社区环境，有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模，促进各族群众在共同生产生活和工作学习中加深了解、增进感情。	各民族要相互了解、相互尊重、相互包容、相互欣赏、相互学习、相互帮助。昆明“3·01”事件发生后，一位维吾尔族干部在微信上呼吁，新疆各族人民要像石榴籽那样紧紧抱在一起，说得很好，全国各族人民都应该像石榴籽那样紧紧抱在一起。(p. 14) 消除隔阂、抚平伤口，只有加强民族交往交流交融这一条道。要从加强民族交流、促进民族团结的高度，推进双语教育，推动建立各民族相互嵌入式的社会结构和社区环境，有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模，促进各族群众在共同生产生活和工作学习中加深了解、增进感情。(p. 15)
China Daily, May 31, 2016. Archived URL: https://archive.md/IEZ1Y	要坚持教育优先，培养优秀人才，全面提高入学率，让适龄的孩子们学习在学校、生活在学校、成长在学校。要吸引更多优秀人才投身教育，国家的教育经费要多往新疆投。	要抓紧推进农牧区和偏远地区标准化寄宿制学校建设，全面提高入学率，让适龄的孩子们学习在学校、生活在学校、成长在学校。要以就业为导向，加强职业教育，实现初高中未就业毕业生职业培训全覆盖，使他们在校学一手、就业有技能。学校教育，教师是关键。要制定激励政策，吸引更多优秀人才投身教育，对乡村教师尤其要高看一眼、厚爱三分，确保招得进、留得住、教得好。(p. 21)
Li Keqiang's speech (May 28, 2014)		
CPC News, May 30, 2014 Archived URL: https://archive.is/cizRe	李克强强调，就业是新疆最大的民生问题，而民生牵动着民心。要从新疆安疆的战略高度出发，以增加就业为重点，加快改善民生，促进社会稳定。在新疆的所有企业和投资项目，都要重视吸纳当地劳动力。吸引内地企业向新疆有序转移、集中布局、集聚发展，实现集中规范就业，积极发展民族特色手工业，同时鼓励新疆群众到内地就业。中央在政策上给予大力和	二、以增加就业为重点加快改善民生现在新疆大约有 300 万城乡劳动力需要解决就业，相当于全区劳动力的约六分之一，南疆富余劳动力问题尤为突出。就业是新疆最大的民生问题，而民生牵动着民心，民心不稳，社会就难以稳定。就业是民生之本、稳定之基，我们要从新疆安疆的战略高度来认识和解决就业与民生问题，使新疆的发展立足就业惠及民生。(p. 39-40) 在新疆的所有企业和投资项目，都要重视吸纳当地劳动力，招用当地员工特别是民族员工不能低于一定比例，各类企业

	<p>特殊支持。把教育搞上去，是实现新疆经济发展、社会进步和长治久安的治本之策，也是扩大就业、改善民生的基础。要扎实办好义务教育等各级各类教育，积极推进“双语”教育和职业教育，帮助新疆各族群众特别是年轻人学好用好国家通用语言文字，为他们带来更多发展机遇。新疆的发展要用好特色优势资源，在资源开发利用上，要让新疆更多受益，提高当地加工、深加工比例，把资源优势转化为经济优势，增强地方自我发展能力，更好地造福当地各族人民。</p>	<p>都要切实增强社会责任感，政府对企业招用新疆籍员工应给予培训和社保补贴。要采取有力措施，确保城镇零就业家庭至少有一人就业，如果一个家庭没有一个人就业，这个家庭就毫无生机和希望。还要支持当地高校毕业生就业创业。新疆那么大，从南到北、从西到东，内部转移就业的空间和潜力也很大，新疆各地州市都要为吸纳劳动力特别是南疆劳动力就业创造条件。另一个是鼓励到内地就业。(p. 41)</p> <p>把教育搞上去，是实现新疆经济发展、社会进步和长治久安的治本之策，也是扩大就业、改善民生的基础。要扎实办好义务教育等各级各类教育。这里我特别讲一下双语教育和职业教育。不会国家通用语言文字，日常生活都会遇到不便，出来就业创业就更难了。现在国际上兴起中文热，我国公民更应当熟练掌握。帮助新疆各族群众特别是年轻人学好用好国家通用语言文字，就可以为他们打开一片新天地，带来更多的发展机遇，这也是为子孙后代负责。要坚定不移地依法推进双语教育，确保到2020年少数民族学生基本掌握和使用国家通用语言文字。(p. 42)</p> <p>还要积极支持新疆发展民族特色手工业。新疆实施发展纺织服装产业带动就业规划，中央在政策上给予大力支持，创造良好的投资环境，调动企业主体的积极性，主要面向疆内、境外市场，鼓励内地企业向新疆有序转移、集中布局、集聚发展。这有利于污染集中处理、资源循环利用。还要积极支持新疆发展民族特色手工业。(p. 44)</p> <p>特色优势资源是新疆的一大本钱，我们的发展要用好这一本钱，把资源优势切实转化为经济优势，更好地造福各族人民。(p. 45)</p> <p>区从资源开发中更多受益，国家实施了石油、天然气等资源税从价计征改革，今后将进一步完善相关税收制度。这次，中央要求中石油、中石化在新疆新设置企业实行属地注册，并推进现有在疆分支机构与新疆当地企业合资合作，这将使新疆获得更多实惠。资源开发要严格执行准入标准，规范开发秩序，合理控制开发强度，不走一些地方“有水快流”的老路，防止资源损失和浪费。在资源转化利用上，要逐步提高在新疆当地加工、深加工的比例。(p. 46)</p>
Yu Zhengsheng's speech (May 29, 2014)		
<p>CPC News, May 30, 2014 Archived URL: https://archive.is/cizRe</p>	<p>俞正声在总结讲话中指出，习近平总书记的重要讲话着眼党和国家事业发展全局，统筹国内国际两个大局，科学分析新疆形势，深刻阐述新疆工作一系列重大理论和实践问题，对做好新形势下新疆工作，特别是维护新疆社会稳定和实现长治久安工作作出全面部署，具有很强的政治性、全局性、战略性。中央制定的《关于进一步维护新疆社会稳定和实现长治久安的意见》，进一步明确了新疆工作的指导思想、基本原则、目标任务、主攻方向 and 政策措施。这些都是指导新形势下新疆工作的纲领性文件。他强调，要深刻理解社会稳定和长治久安这个新疆工作的着眼点和着力点，真正把思想和行动统一到中央重大决策部署上来。他要求，各地各部门要结合各自实际，抓紧制定具体实施方案，狠抓落实。新疆要充分发挥主体</p>	<p>这次会议高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，着眼党和国家事业发展全局，统筹国内国际两个大局，承前启后，继往开来，与时俱进，确定社会稳定和长治久安是新疆各项工作的着眼点和着力点。(p. 63)</p> <p>会上，习近平总书记发表重要讲话，李克强总理对新疆经济社会发展作出部署，中央将下发《关于进一步维护新疆社会稳定和实现长治久安的意见》，这些充分体现了我们党在新形势下的治疆方略，为进一步做好新疆工作指明了方向。(p. 62)</p> <p>抓好落实，首先要全面准确地把握会议精神，真正把思想和行动统一到中央重大决策部署上来。第一，深刻理解中央对新疆形势的重大判断。(pg. 64)</p> <p>比如，在新疆，对发展劳动密集型产业的要求尤为迫切，虽然这些产业对经济增长和税收的贡献不一定比其他产业多，但对就业尤为重要，对促进各民族交往交流交融尤为重要，是改善民生、凝聚人心之举。新疆工作的着眼点和着力点的根本</p>

	<p>作用，紧密联系实际抓好学习宣传，抓紧制定具体落实方案，严格执行政策、讲究工作方法，切实改进工作作风，聚精会神推进社会稳定和长治久安。中央各部门要讲政治顾大局，分解任务，加强协调，把好事办好，把实事办好，为推进新疆社会稳定和长治久安发挥支撑作用。各地特别是援疆省市要牢固树立全国一盘棋思想，完善援疆工作规划，着力促进各民族交往交流交融，为推进新疆社会稳定和长治久安发挥驱动作用。对中央决策部署的贯彻落实情况，要进行专门督查，确保中央关于新疆工作的大政方针落到实处。</p>	<p>在于争取人心，赢得各族群众的拥护和支持，进一步加强民族团结，促进宗教和谐。(65-66)</p> <p>三、中央各部门要讲政治顾大局，为推进新疆社会稳定和长治久安发挥支撑作用中央各部门对新疆都给予大力支持，一些政策措施含金量高，有些比开始预想的还要好、还要实，每一条都有落实的空间。(pg. 71)</p> <p>四、各地特别是援疆省市要牢固树立全国一盘棋思想，为推进新疆社会稳定和长治久安发挥驱动作用做好新疆工作是全党全国的大事，是各地共同的政治责任。(pg. 75)</p> <p>一把手要亲自抓，分管同志具体抓，常抓不懈，一抓到底，确保中央关于新疆工作的大政方针落到实处。中央新疆工作协调小组及其办公室要会同有关方面，健全督查制度、信息反馈制度、重大责任追究制度等，对中央决策部署的贯彻落实情况进行专门督查。(pg. 76)</p>
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Table 2. Identical sections are marked in bold font.

4. Document Contents and Comparison to Public Sources

Comrade Xi Jinping's speech (May 28, 2014)

The context of Xi's speech at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum in Beijing is well documented in state media reports, and several passages from his speech are quoted verbatim (see section 3 above).

Xi's speech is focused on the issues and the tasks at hand. He opens with the dramatic statement that stability in Xinjiang is the foundation for the stability of the entire nation and its long-term goals. Xi notes how successive historic waves of rebellions against Chinese rule have brought "disasters to the people of all ethnic groups." In contrast, he makes a statement that has since been repeated numerous times, including later by Chen Quanguo: "Practice has proven that our party's strategy of governing Xinjiang is correct, and must be persistent[ly continued] for a long time" (p.2).¹¹

Xi then declares a shift in emphasis from the trickle-down effects of broad economic development to a more targeted focus on counterterrorism and stability maintenance. He notes how the former Yugoslavia was "originally a country with good economic and living standards, but it finally fell apart" (p.7).¹² Xi argues that:

This shows that economic development does not naturally bring about long-term peace and stability, and issues pertaining to development cannot be used to substitute issues pertaining to stability. (p.7)¹³

As in his April 2014 speech (document no.1, p.4), Xi again argues that the origins of Xinjiang's "terrorism" problem are external, and that violence is flourishing because of conducive domestic conditions:

¹¹ 实践证明，我们党的治疆方略是正确的，必须长期坚[持]。Since page 3 of the document is missing, the text ends with "坚". Future repetitions of this statement confirm that this statement would typically end with "坚持".

¹² 原来是经济水平和生活水平都不错的国家，最后也分崩离析了

¹³ 这说明，经济发展并不能自然而然带来长治久安，不能用发展问题代替稳定问题。

As I said before, there are ‘seeds’ outside the [national] borders, the ‘soil’ within the borders, and a ‘market’ online – these are the main causes behind the highly active occurrence of violent terrorist activities in Xinjiang. (p.7)¹⁴

This important phrase that is frequently found in official documents has never been publicly attributed to Xi. In its first public mention in August 2014, it is attributed to Xinjiang’s governor Shohrat Zakir.¹⁵

Xi declares that Xinjiang’s stability maintenance work is “at a historical stage” (p.7). He argues that “[w]e must have strong faith in our victory, make a determined effort, and even have to pay a special price sometimes” (p.7).¹⁶

In the face of rampant violent terrorist activities and frenzied violent terrorists, we must focus our current fight on a severe crackdown on violent terrorist activities. We must not hesitate or waver in the use of the weapons of the people’s democratic dictatorship and focus our energy on executing a crushing blow that buys us time and initiative for solving the deep-seated issues regarding Xinjiang’s long-term peace and stability. (p.8)¹⁷

Especially the latter statement about “executing a crushing blow that buys us time and initiative” constitutes an apt description of Beijing’s strategy in Xinjiang since Xi’s speech, and especially since early 2017, when the region initiated an unprecedented campaign of mass internment (along with a range of other severe measures).

Parts of this statement were quoted verbatim by Xinjiang’s then Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian on June 19, 2014 (Table 3). They were never publicly attributed to Xi himself.

Xi Jinping, May 28, 2014	Zhang Chunxian, June 19, 2014 ¹⁸
<p>In the face of rampant violent terrorist activities, in the face of frenzied violent terrorist, we must focus our current fight on a severe crackdown on violent terrorist activities. We must not hesitate or waver in the use of the weapons of the people’s democratic dictatorship and focus our energy on executing a crushing blow that buys us time and initiative for solving the deep-seated issues regarding Xinjiang’s long-term peace and stability.</p> <p>面对十分猖獗的暴力恐怖活动，面对丧心病狂的暴力恐怖分子，必须把严厉打击暴力恐怖活动作为当前斗争的重点，毫不迟疑、毫不动摇运用人民民主专政的武器，集中力量进行毁灭性打击，为从根本上解决影响新疆长治久安的深层次问题赢得时间和主动。</p>	<p>In the face of rampant violent terrorist activities, in the face of frenzied violent terrorists, we must not hesitate nor waver in the use of the weapons of the people’s democratic dictatorship and focus our energy on executing a crushing blow. We must have the courage and determination to fight and win, so as to apply extremely strong measures, exceed conventional methods, with a heavy hand, a strong fist, be ruthless, precise, and prestigious, to resolutely destroy violent terrorist activities before they are premeditated, and before they are acted upon. We must be resolutely effective in containing the frequency of violent terrorist activities in Xinjiang, in order to serve on account of all ethnic groups of Xinjiang, peace and tranquility.</p> <p>面对十分猖獗的暴力恐怖活动，面对丧心病狂的暴力恐怖分子，必须毫不迟疑、毫不动摇地运用人民民主专政的武器，集中力量进行毁灭性打击。要勇于决战</p>

¹⁴ 我说过，境外有“种子”、境内有“土壤”、网上有“市场”，是导致新疆暴力恐怖活动呈活跃态势的主要原因。

¹⁵ “人大代表声讨严重暴恐犯罪行为：把嚣张气焰打下去。”新疆日报·新疆日报，August 25, 2014.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20211103084754/http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0805/c70731-25405676.html>.

¹⁶ 我们要坚定必胜信心，作出特别努力，有时还要付出特殊代价。

¹⁷ 面对十分猖獗的暴力恐怖活动，面对丧心病狂的暴力恐怖分子，必须把严厉打击暴力恐怖活动作为当前斗争的重点，毫不迟疑、毫不动摇运用人民民主专政的武器，集中力量进行毁灭性打击，为从根本上解决影响新疆长治久安的深层次问题赢得时间和主动。

¹⁸ 朱峰，ed. “新疆日报：依法治疆 对暴力恐怖斩草除根。”新疆日报，August 14, 2014.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20211117174456/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2014/08-14/6492725.shtml>.

	<p>决胜，以超强硬措施、超常规手段，出重手、下重拳，打狠、打准、打出声威，坚决把暴力恐怖活动摧毁在预谋阶段和行动之前，坚决有效遏制暴力恐怖活动在新疆多发频发势头，为新疆各族人民打出太平、打出安宁。</p>
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Table 3. Identical sections are marked in bold font.

Xi repeats his statement from his April 30, 2014, speech that “Xinjiang is in a period of painful interventional treatment” (干预治疗阵痛期), but now prefaces it with a “We propose” (我们提出), turning it into a more formalized proposition (p.6). The *New York Times* translated 干预治疗阵痛期 as a “period of painful interventional treatment.” However, the parallelism of the structuring of the “three periods” suggests that the adjectives (in this case 阵痛 or “painful”) relate to “period” rather than “intervention.” The term “treatment” (治疗) connotes a medical context and can alternatively be translated as “therapy” (as in: a “painful period of interventional therapy”).

The statement that Xinjiang was in a “painful period of interventional treatment,” was not coined by Xi, but by Xinjiang’s party secretary Zhang Chunxian. On March 7, 2014, days after the Kunming train station stabbing, Zhang used this statement to argue that stability maintenance was Xinjiang’s primary task.¹⁹ After Xi’s two speeches, the statement became very common among Xinjiang’s leadership, including during the time of Chen Quanguo.

Subsequent sections of Xi’s speech focus on concrete measures, including the need for preventative policing, the expansion of big data analysis, and the general need for major improvements in intelligence gathering. Xi speaks of these measures as providing a form of “preemptive control of the enemy” (先发制敌; p.10). He bluntly notes that Xinjiang’s “intelligence work is overall weak” and that current counterterrorism efforts are akin to “fighting against the enemy with a black eye” (p.10).²⁰ Xi notes that the region must “compare and correlate massive amounts of data” (p.10)²¹, but also that technology cannot replace human resources – given that Bin Laden was found by informants.

Subsequent developments show how Xi’s words foreshadowed Xinjiang’s policing strategy. On the one hand, in 2014, Xinjiang began to install a massive surveillance system and to invest in big data-driven policing. On the other hand, between 2014 and 2016, the region recruited more police and security-related staff than in the preceding decade.²²

In what might come as a surprise to some (although not to this author), Xi defends China’s ethnic policy framework. Rather than largely dismantling ethnic distinctions and categorizations, or even the system of regional autonomy, as had been suggested by proponents of a so-called Second Generation of Ethnic Policies (第二代民族政策)²³, Xi argues that it would be a “political mistake” (政治错误) to try to deemphasize ethnic distinctions, given that they only tend to dissolve as the “result of a long process of social development” (社会发展长过程的结果; p.12). Instead, China must “must

¹⁹ “张春贤谈昆明暴恐案哽咽:曾自己在房里静静思考.” 中国新闻网, March 7, 2014.

http://web.archive.org/web/20200131130155/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2014qglianghui/2014-03/07/content_17331846.htm.

²⁰ 我们的情报工作总体还是薄弱 and 对敌斗争，两眼一抹黑。

²¹ 对海量数据进行比对和关联

²² See Zenz, Adrian, and James Leibold. “Securitizing Xinjiang: Police Recruitment, Informal Policing and Ethnic Minority Co-Optation.” *The China Quarterly* 242 (2020): 324–48. doi:10.1017/S0305741019000778.

AND, Zenz, Adrian. “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang.” The Jamestown Foundation, September 21, 2017. <https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/>. AND Zenz, Adrian. “Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State.” The Jamestown Foundation, March 15, 2017. <https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/>.

²³ See Zenz, “Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State.” <https://jamestown.org/program/toward-a-second-generation-of-ethnic-policies/>.

unswervingly adhere to the party's ethnic policies and the system of ethnic regional autonomy” (p.13), which he argues are superior to those of western countries.²⁴

Even so, Xi is alarmed by what he describes as a soaring negative ethnic consciousness between Han and ethnic groups after the Urumqi riots in 2009, which he says even extends to young people (p.15). He condemns ethnic discrimination, and argues that growing phenomena such as that of ethnic groups living in separate communities (分族而居) must be countered with policies that promote “a social structure and community environment where all ethnic groups are mutually embedded in each other” (p.15).²⁵ The practical solution to this is as follows:

[S]ystematically expand the scale of [relocating] Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities to the Mainland to receive education, employment, and residence, and promote better understanding and enhance [mutual] feelings among different ethnic groups through producing, living, working, and studying together. (p.15)²⁶

By elevating of the phrase “ethnic interaction, exchanges and blending” (民族交往交流交融), which features twice in his speech, Xi marks a clear turn towards a much more assimilationist ethnic policy.²⁷ This concept had previously been promoted by Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe in a widely-noted 2011 speech which spelled out their concept of a Second Generation of Ethnic Policies.²⁸ Its first use appears to have been by Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao at the Fifth Tibetan Work Conference in January 2010.²⁹

Xi also advocates that ethnic groups should be put into enterprise work. He argues that large numbers of unemployed persons will “provoke trouble” (无事生非; p.20). Employment in enterprises is in contrast “conducive to ethnic interaction, exchanges and blending” (有利于民族交往交流交融) and therefore helps ethnic groups to “resist religious extremist thinking” (抵制宗教极端思想; *ibid.*). Such employment also makes them “unobtrusively study Chinese culture” (潜移默化学习中华文化; *ibid.*). Similar sentiments are reflected in a since-deleted 2017 report by the Huafu Fashion Corporation in Aksu Prefecture.³⁰ This company actively absorbs so-called rural surplus laborers from ethnic regions, using state-mandated forms of militarized vocational training and intensified political indoctrination. The since-deleted report argues that “a large number of rural surplus laborers are idle at home, which increases the burden on their families and brings hidden dangers to public security.” Similar sentiments are reiterated in the subsequent speeches by Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng.

When speaking of ethnic unity, Xi seemingly coined the phrase that Xinjiang’s ethnic groups must “hug each other tightly like pomegranate seeds” (p.14).³¹ Xi attributes this expression to a Uyghur cadre, who is said to have coined the term days after the Kunming train station knife attack. This fact

²⁴ 我们要坚定不移坚持党的民族政策、坚持民族区域自治制度

²⁵ 推动建立各民族相互嵌入式的社会结构和社区环境

²⁶ 有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模，促进各族群众在共同生产生活和工作学习中加深了解、增进感情。

²⁷ Compare Leibold, James. “Xinjiang Work Forum Marks New Policy of 'Ethnic Mingling'.” The Jamestown Foundation, November 18, 2016. <https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiang-work-forum-marks-new-policy-of-ethnic-mingling/>.

²⁸ “第二代民族政策：促进民族交融一体和繁荣一体[①].” 中国研究服务中心, October 2011.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20201126024427/http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=8299>.

²⁹ “中共中央国务院召开第五次西藏工作座谈会。” 中华人民共和国驻纽约总领事馆, January 23, 2010.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20211118160656/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgny/chn/zt/y1709/t653361.htm>.

³⁰ http://www.e-huafu.com/mobile/zxzx/info_348.aspx?itemid=15553 (since deleted), archived URL: “阿克苏华孚举行‘今冬明春’产业工人就业培训开班仪式.” December 5, 2017. <https://archive.md/pRkKc>.

³¹ 像石榴籽那样紧紧抱在一起

is confirmed by government records, who state that the cadre posted such a statement on WeChat.³²

Subsequently, Xi encouraged more intimate relations between the Han and the ethnic groups. His statements may have been the basis for subsequent policies of pairing Han and ethnic groups through the highly intrusive “Becoming Family” (结对认亲) campaign that is being used by the authorities to promote ethnic assimilation and to spy on families of ethnic minorities.³³ To quote:

Cadres and people of all ethnic groups must move to interact with each other on multiple levels, in multiple ways, and in multiple forms. This is an important task that must be done under the current situation. ... Party and government agencies, enterprises and institutions, civic organizations, and democratic parties must take the initiative to do something harmonious and with sentiment. Uyghur and Han cadres and workers must engage in activities together and find a weekend once a month to do an activity together. Cadres of all ethnic groups can take the initiative to drop by, to visit, to take their family members and children and go on walks together, chat, have a meal, all of these are viable options. (p.15-16)³⁴

Descriptions of Xinjiang’s ‘Becoming Family’ campaign closely reflect the types of joint activities, visits, shared meals and supposed family-style “warmth” that Xi envisions in this section.³⁵

Another set of highly pertinent statements relate to what Xi terms as Xinjiang’s “heart sickness” (心病; p.23). Xi argued that this “sickness” could only be cured with “heart medicine” (心药) that would “support the correct, remove the evil” (扶正祛邪; p.23). In March 2015, Li Zishun (李子顺), then-Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the XUAR Party Committee (自治区党委政法委副书记), stated that Xi had said this in his speech at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum, and quoted the entire passage nearly verbatim (Table 4). Similarly, a 2017 work report on re-education in a Uyghur region quoted part of Xi Jinping’s expression literally when stating that re-education must “support the correct, remove the evil.”³⁶

Xi Jinping, May 28, 2014	Xinjiang Government, March 26, 2015 ³⁷
Heart disease requires heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this "heart medicine" is a correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the core value system of socialism and the core values of socialism. It is necessary to use this medicine to support the correct, remove evil, strengthen the body, and strengthen the heart. We must adopt effective measures to strengthen the recognition	Heart disease requires heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this "heart medicine" is a correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the core value system of socialism and the core values of socialism. It is necessary to use this medicine to support the correct, remove evil, strengthen the body, and strengthen the heart. We are required to adopt effective measures to strengthen the

³² “人民日报评论员文章：筑牢民族团结的生命线。” 中国政府网, June 2, 2014.

http://web.archive.org/web/20140829194913/http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-06/02/content_2692119.htm.

³³ 杨明方, 李亚楠, and 阿尔达克. “新疆百万干部职工与各族群众结对认亲.” 人民网, November 7, 2018.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20181107042727/http://gongyi.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1107/c151132-30386143.html>. AND “China's Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here's What They Think They're Doing.” ChinaFile, November 9, 2018. <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang>.

³⁴ 各族干部群众要多层次、多方式、多形式走动互动起来，这是当前形势下必须要做的一项重要工作。... 党政机关、企事业单位、人民团体、民主党派等都要主动做一些融洽感情的事情。维汉干部职工一起活动活动，一个月找一个周末在一起搞个活动。各族干部可以带头串串门，带着家人、孩子等一起走走，聊聊天、吃个饭都可以。

³⁵ See for example 杨明方, 李亚楠, and 阿尔达克. “新疆百万干部职工与各族群众结对认亲.”

<http://web.archive.org/web/20181107042727/http://gongyi.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1107/c151132-30386143.html>.

³⁶ “新源县司法局 2017 年工作计划.” 新源县人民政府网, May 26, 2017.

http://web.archive.org/web/20190630195027/http://www.xinyuan.gov.cn/info/egovinfo/1001/common/inf_content/xy02_2-02_A/2017-0526003.htm.

³⁷ “打好‘五把钥匙’组合拳.” 新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府办公厅, May 26, 2015. <https://archive.md/IMtCN>.

<p>that people of all ethnic groups identify with the great motherland, the Chinese nation, the Chinese culture, and the road to socialism with Chinese characteristics.</p> <p>心病还需心药医。对新疆来说，这副“心药”就是正确的祖国观、民族观，就是中华文化，就是社会主义核心价值体系和社会主义核心价值观，要用这味药扶正祛邪、健体强心。要采取有效措施，增强各族群众对伟大祖国的认同、对中华民族的认同、对中华文化的认同、对中国特色社会主义道路的认同。(p.23-24)</p>	<p>recognition that people of all ethnic groups identify with the great motherland, the Chinese nation, the Chinese culture, and the road to socialism with Chinese characteristics.</p> <p>心病还需心药医。对新疆来说，这副“心药”就是正确的祖国观、民族观，就是中华文化，就是社会主义核心价值体系和社会主义核心价值观，要用这味药扶正祛邪、健体强心。要求我们：采取有效措施，增强各族群众对伟大祖国的认同、对中华民族的认同、对中华文化的认同、对中国特色社会主义道路的认同。</p>
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Table 4. Identical sections are marked in bold font.

On the same page, Xi had expanded on previous medical analogies for characterizing religious extremism as a pathogen, stating that Xinjiang’s cadres and masses must be equipped with great “immunity” (免疫能力; p.23). This statement is quoted word-for-word in a June 6, 2014, summary of the “spirit” of his May 2014 speech published by CPC (CCP) News (Table 5). At the very time when Xi demanded that people’s “immunity” against extremist ideology must be increased, Uyghur regions were actively carrying out early forms of re-education and reported that these re-education efforts were “increasing the immunity...of ‘susceptible’ groups of people”.³⁸ Subsequently, several instances can be identified where re-education (“transformation through education”, 教育转化) is directly associated with “enhanced immunity.”³⁹

<p>Xi Jinping, May 28, 2014</p> <p>开展反分裂斗争，既要重视“外科手术”式的随时清理，更要注重干部群众“免疫能力”的持续增强。(p.23)</p>	<p>CPC News, June 6, 2014⁴⁰</p> <p>开展反分裂斗争，既要重视“外科手术”式的随时清理，更要注重干部群众“免疫能力”的持续增强。</p>
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Table 5. Identical sections are marked in bold font.

For the Xinjiang context, Xi appears to have been the first to employ the “immunity” analogy. However, the potentially first use of this concept in the context of ethnic and national unity was interestingly by Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe in a 2011 speech, where the two promoted their concept of a Second Generation of Ethnic Policies.⁴¹ To quote:

We must ... not artificially strengthen or solidify the cultural differences of the people ... Strengthen the identity of the Chinese nation among people of all ethnic groups, and continuously strengthen their immunity against national separatism.⁴²

In his April 30, 2014, speech, Xi argued that those ensnared by extremist religious thoughts had become “dehumanized” (丧失人性) and “kill people without blinking an eye” (杀人不眨眼; document no.1, p.9). In his May 28 speech, he stated that those who “watched [extremist] videos or propaganda materials” were “turning from an ordinary person into a devil who kills without blinking

³⁸ 潘从武, and 刘琰. “新疆司法厅实施‘土壤改良计划’, 主攻‘去宗教极端化.’” The Paper. 法制日报, May 20, 2016.

http://web.archive.org/web/20211014204208/http://m.thepaper.cn/renmin_prom.jsp?contid=1471896&from=renmin.

³⁹ For example, “法治新疆建设铿锵发力亮点频现.” 法制日报 . 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室, February 18, 2016.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20211119011016/http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/8/2/Document/1468839/1468839.htm>.

⁴⁰ “打好‘五把钥匙’组合拳.” 新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府办公厅, May 26, 2015. <https://archive.md/IMtCN>.

⁴¹ “第二代民族政策：促进民族交融一体和繁荣一体[①].” 中国研究服务中心, December 2011.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20201126024427/http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=8299>.

⁴² Full statement: 我们一定要顺应文化交往交流交融的客观需要，既充分尊重和保持文化的多样性，又不人为强化、固化公民的文化差异属性，要更加重视促进各民族文化的交往交流交融，加强对一切族群文化与中华民族文化一体化、共通共融的宣传，反对任何形式的地方族群（民族）主义和大族群（民族）主义，不断强化各族干部群众的中华民族意识、国家意识和公民意识，不断增强各族公民对中华民族的身份认同，不断增强抵御民族分裂主义的免疫力。

an eye” (p.25).⁴³ Strikingly, almost the exact same wording was used by a former re-education detainee at a February 10, 2021, propaganda press conference in Beijing. There, a former detainee in a Vocational Skills Education and Training Center (VSETC, 职业技能教育培训中心; there abbreviated as 教培中心), makes the following statement:

[I now] see clearly the evilness of those religious extremists, who want to turn us into *devils who kill without blinking an eye* [杀人不眨眼的魔鬼]. They want us to serve as cannon fodder, violate the law and commit crimes. ... I deeply regret my prior stupid behaviors which almost ruined my life. If I had not been saved by the education and training center, then I would have fallen deeper into the abyss of evil and *become a devil who kills without blinking an eye* [成为杀人不眨眼的魔鬼].⁴⁴ (emphasis added)

The original New York Times report mentioned Xi’s statement from April 30, 2014 (document no.1), that “[t]he psychological impact of extremist religious thought on people must never be underestimated.” In document no.2, Xi likewise makes some very blunt remarks on the subject. To quote:

Religious extremism is a powerful psychedelic drug. Under its toxic influence, some people become obsessed with “martyrdom.” When committing violent and terrorist crimes, these people often lose their lives through their stubborn resistance – out of fear that they may not die. Some persons – even whole families – become reckless criminals. (p.24)⁴⁵

Without eradicating the violent and terrorist ideology of religious extremism, violent terrorist activities will continue to replicate and multiply like cancer cells. (p.25)⁴⁶

Parts of both statements, namely that religious extremism is like a “psychedelic drug” and that acts of terror will “multiply like cancer cells” if extremist thought is not eradicated, are quoted verbatim (and attributed to Xi) in a widely-cited March 31, 2017, government document that likens re-education to free medical treatment for “sick thinking.”⁴⁷ Some of Xi’s statements are also found in a state media summary of the essence of his speech (Table 6).

Xi Jinping, May 28, 2014	People’s Daily (summary of the spirit of Xi’s speech), June 4, 2014 ⁴⁸	Kashgar “Zero Distance” (state propaganda department), March 31, 2017 ⁴⁹
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⁴³ 就是看了一些视频或宣传品，便从一个普通人变成了杀人不眨眼的魔鬼

⁴⁴ 认清了那些宗教极端分子的丑恶嘴脸，他们就是想把我们变成杀人不眨眼的魔鬼，让我们当炮灰，干违法犯罪的的事情。... 我非常后悔当初的愚蠢行为，差点断送了自己的生命。如果没有教育培训中心的挽救，那么我一定会掉入罪恶的深渊，成为杀人不眨眼的魔鬼。Source: “新疆维吾尔自治区在京第四场涉疆问题新闻发布会实录。” 中华人民共和国驻美利坚合众国大使馆. 新疆自治区在京新闻发布会, July 23, 2021.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20211117214219/http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/zt/mlxj/xifabuhui/disichang/>.

⁴⁵ 宗教极端思想是一种强力迷幻药，在其毒害下，有的人痴迷“殉教”，实施暴力恐怖犯罪时往往顽抗送命，唯恐不死，有的甚至一家子全成了亡命徒。

⁴⁶ 不根除宗教极端思想这一暴力恐怖的意识形态，暴力恐怖活动就会像癌细胞一样不断复制繁衍。

⁴⁷ “宣讲稿：到教育转化班学习是对思想上患病群众的一次免费住院治疗。” March 31, 2017.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20211117160618/https://read01.com/zh-sg/n3L6Do.html>.

⁴⁸ 耿聪, and 文松辉, eds. “人民日报评论员：精心做好宗教工作。” 人民日报, June 4, 2014.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20140623162504/http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0604/c1003-25099303.html>.

⁴⁹ “宣讲稿：到教育转化班学习是对思想上患病群众的一次免费住院治疗。” March 31, 2014.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20211117160618/https://read01.com/zh-sg/n3L6Do.html>.

<p>老百姓说，魔鬼出现时，往往装扮成天使。宗教极端思想是一种强力迷幻药，在其毒害下，有的人痴迷“殉教”，实施暴力恐怖犯罪时往往顽抗送命，唯恐不死，有的甚至一家子全成了亡命徒。...这些人一心想着“圣战”升天堂，最终走上罪恶的邪路！千万不要低估了宗教极端思想的毒害性，一旦信了它就像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智、精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来。...一些暴力恐怖分子未必懂得什么“泛伊斯兰主义”、“泛突厥主义”，就是看了一些视频或宣传品，便从一个普通人变成了杀人不眨眼的魔鬼。...不根除宗教极端思想这一暴力恐怖的意识形态，暴力恐怖活动就会像癌细胞一样不断复制繁衍。 (p.24-25)</p>	<p>宗教极端思想是一种强力迷幻药，一旦中毒，就会从一个普通人变成杀人不眨眼的魔鬼，痴迷“殉教”，一心想着“圣战”升天堂，实施暴恐犯罪时顽抗送命，唯恐不死。</p>	<p>习近平总书记说：魔鬼出现时，往往装扮成天使；宗教极端思想是一种迷幻药，在其毒害下，有人当亡命徒；一旦信了宗教极端思想，就像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智，精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来，有的就变成杀人不眨眼的魔鬼；宗教极端思想不根除，暴力恐怖活动就会向癌细胞一样不断复制繁衍。</p>
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Table 6: Passages in bold font are identical across all three texts. Passages in blue font are identical between the texts in the first two columns (from the left-hand).

Importantly, the Kashgar document from March 2017 notes that people have been sent for re-education despite the fact that they have not committed acts of violence, but simply because they “have been infected”:

Although some people, after being affected by the infiltration of religious extremism and violent terrorist thoughts, have yet to carry out violent terrorist activities themselves, they have already been infected with the “virus” of religious extremism and violent terrorist thoughts and could act at any moment, endangering themselves and those around them. They must be sent to transformation through education classes to receive “hospitalized treatment” to eliminate the harm of the “virus” and restore their mental health.⁵⁰

This shows how Xi’s statements in 2014 undergirded a development that culminated in the preventative eradication of this alleged pathogen (“virus”, “drug”, “poison”) in re-education centers, even where illegal acts or acts of violence had not yet been committed. A later and widely cited academic paper on “transformation through education” by Qiu Yuanyuan from the Xinjiang Party School in 2017 likewise links re-education (“transformation through education”) with the removal of poisonous thinking.⁵¹

Another section of Xi’s speech makes highly pertinent remarks regarding internment and what would later lead to the mass internment campaign. To quote:

Regarding those who violate the law, those who should be seized should be seized, and those who should be sentenced should be sentenced, there must be no one above the law. The national level must expedite the process of [enacting] counterterrorism legislation, and Xinjiang should also draft relevant local regulations to promote the normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance work. (p.9)⁵²

⁵⁰ 部分群众被宗教极端、暴力恐怖思想渗透影响后，虽然还没有实施暴力恐怖活动，但已经感染了宗教极端和暴力恐怖思想的“病毒”，随时都可能发做，危及自己和他人的生命，必须在第一时间送到教育转化班接受“住院治疗”，消除“病毒”危害，恢复思想健康。Source: “宣讲稿 | 到教育转化班学习是对思想上患病群众的一次免费住院治疗,” March 31, 2017. <https://archive.md/La6PQ>.

⁵¹ 邱媛媛.“紧紧围绕总目标做好‘去极端化’教育转化工作.”中文期刊服务平台, 2017.

<http://www.nmglib.com:8901/article/detail.aspx?id=672372336>. OR

<http://yuxiqbs.cqvip.com/Qikan/Article/Detail?id=672372336>. 紧紧围绕总目标做好“去极端化”教育转化工作.

⁵² 对违法犯罪的，该抓的抓，该判的判，决不能有法外之人。国家层面要加快反恐立法进程，新疆也要制定相关地方性法规，推动反恐维稳工作实现常态化。

Xi himself authorized the Xinjiang government to draft a local legal regulation to address the issues of religious extremism and violent resistance. The resulting “De-Extremification Regulation” (新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例) came into effect in April 2017 and is intimately linked with the re-education campaign.⁵³ It laid the foundation for the “normalization, standardization, and legalization” (常态化、规范化、法治化) of Xinjiang’s re-education (lit. “transformation through education”; 教育转化) through “centralized education” involving “behavioral correction” (XUAR Government, March 30, 2017; Legal Daily, April 11, 2017). Re-education camp construction bids and anecdotal accounts from the ground indicated that Xinjiang’s campaign of mass internment began right around when the Regulation came into effect.⁵⁴ The regulation’s October 2018 revision constituted the first official acknowledgement that so-called Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers (VSETCs) perform “re-education” (literally “transformation through education”, 教育转化), and represents their legal basis according to the state.⁵⁵ VSETCs are a state euphemism for what are in effect high-security re-education internment camps.

In his speech, Xi explicitly calls for a systematic expansion of Xinjiang’s boarding school system. Using fairly direct language, Xi demands that students should “learn in school, live in school, and grow up in school” (p.21).⁵⁶ In a May 2016 China Daily article on the “Spirit of Xi’s important speech” (referring to his May 28, 2014, speech), this exact same phrase is repeated.⁵⁷ It is then again found in a XUAR government document from Kashgar Prefecture from 2018 on strengthening compulsory education and preventing dropouts.⁵⁸

Regarding Islam, Xi’s words reflect a similarly bifurcated view as with his reflections on ethnicity and ethnic unity. He argues that Xinjiang must “fully implemented the party’s policies on religion” (全面贯彻执行党的宗教政策; p.17). He notes that some people’s beliefs that the “development of Islam should be curbed” or that Islam should be “eliminated” are “one-sided and even wrong” (ibid.). Xi cites one of the fathers of Marxism, Friedrich Engels, when saying that religions will gradually become extinct over time as the conditions for their existence decrease through improved ideological awareness of the population. This, however, requires a long historical process, given that major world religions have existed for thousands of years, and even continue to exist despite great progress in science and technology.

Rather than supporting the existence of religions per se, Xi’s words appear to reflect a sober realism vis-a-vis religions’ historical resilience. Xi goes on to call for strong measures to vigorously push back against Islam’s influence in Uyghur society. To quote:

⁵³ Zenz, Adrian. “Evidence of the Chinese Central Government's Knowledge of and Involvement in Xinjiang's Re-Education Internment Campaign.” The Jamestown Foundation, September 24, 2021. <https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-of-the-chinese-central-governments-knowledge-of-and-involvement-in-xinjiangs-re-education-internment-campaign/>.

⁵⁴ Zenz, Adrian. “‘Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude’: China’s political re-education campaign in Xinjiang.” Central Asian Survey, 38:1, 2019. First published September 5, 2018, 102-128. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997>.

⁵⁵ “新疆维吾尔自治区第十三届人民代表大会常务委员会公告（第7号） Announcement of the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (No.7).” 新疆维吾尔自治区人大常委会, October 9, 2018. <https://web.archive.org/web/20181010124647/http://www.xjpcsc.gov.cn/1009/t4028e49c665347630166588b8cf40001001.html>. Note that Western experts on Chinese domestic law dispute that the Regulation can in fact achieve this function – See for example: Clarke, Donald. “No, New Xinjiang Legislation Does Not Legalize Detention Centers.” Lawfare, October 11, 2018. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/no-new-xinjiang-legislation-does-not-legalize-detention-centers>.

⁵⁶ 让适龄的孩子们学习在学校、生活在学校、成长在学校

⁵⁷ 程尔凡. “习近平对做好新疆发展民生工作重要讲话精神.” 中国日报网, May 31, 2016.

http://web.archive.org/web/20191109111129/http://china.chinadaily.com.cn/2016-05/31/content_25560157.htm.

⁵⁸ 刘潇翰. “新疆维吾尔自治区喀什地区关于进一步加强义务教育阶段控辍保学工作的实施方案.” 中华人民共和国教育部政府门户网站, July 26, 2018. http://web.archive.org/web/20211119165414/http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/xw_zt/moe_357/jyzt_2016nztzl/ztl_xyn/cs/ztl_xy_dfiz/201808/t20180816_345444.html.

It is necessary to vigorously disseminate modern cultural concepts and behaviors, produce large numbers of modern cultural products that transmit modern culture in their values, convey the real life of ethnic minorities in their contents, and appeal to the public through their styles and techniques, so as to guide the masses towards secularization and modernization in their spiritual and emotional interests (p.28)⁵⁹

Xi's speech makes references to details such shops are not selling cigarettes and alcohol due to the work of religious zealots (p.27).⁶⁰ In April 2017, the Associated Press reported that Xinjiang's authorities punished a local official for declining to smoke in front of Muslim elders, treating his refusal as a lack of commitment to the fight against religious extremism.⁶¹ Xi goes on to argue that:

A secularized atmosphere has to be vigorously cultivated and promoted, and continuously maintained. Xinjiang has long been known as the land of songs and dances, where multiple cultures coexist.⁶²

Xi's references to a vigorous promotion of a secularized atmosphere and to singing and dancing (instead of religiosity) is an apt summary of the drastic and coercive sociocultural transformations witnessed in the region since 2017.

Comrade Li Keqiang's speech (May 28, 2014)

As noted by related state media summaries, Li Keqiang's speech focused largely on the themes of development, improved livelihoods and employment. Here, Li bases his statements on Xi's argument that while development by itself is insufficient to guarantee social stability, it is nevertheless an important aspect to work towards and ensure such stability. Compared to Xi's speech, media accounts of Li's statements are exceedingly brief. In the author's view, the publication of his full speech (below) is therefore all the more pertinent.

Both Xi's and Li's speeches open with a focus on both "long-term peace and stability" (长治久安) and "leapfrog-style development" (跨越式发展), the latter especially constitutes a term that played an important role at the First Central Xinjiang Work Forum in 2010. Li repeats Xi's argument that "development [by itself] will not naturally bring stability" (发展不会自然而然带来稳定; p.39). He then quickly focuses on what he perceives to be Xinjiang's key livelihood predicament: a lack of sufficient employment opportunities (p.39).

Li notes that Xinjiang has "about 3 million urban and rural laborers in Xinjiang who need to find employment, which is equivalent to about one-sixth of the labor force in the region" (p.39).⁶³ He adds that the problem of surplus labor in southern Xinjiang is "particularly prominent" (尤为突出; *ibid.*). This is not merely an economic problem. Li argues that:

⁵⁹ 要大力传播现代文化理念和行为方式，制作一大批价值观念上透射现代文化理念、内容上反映少数民族现实生活、形式和技巧上吸引人的文化作品，引导群众在精神和情趣上向世俗化、现代化靠近。

⁶⁰ 宗教极端势力恐吓群众和宗教界人士，不许唱歌、跳舞，不让看电视、看电影，煽动排斥现代服饰和民族服饰，小卖部不让卖烟酒

⁶¹ Shih, Gerry. "China Punishes Official for Not Daring to Smoke near Muslims." AP NEWS. Associated Press, April 11, 2017. <https://apnews.com/2eb11288c58b40209b709c2e4abec723>.

⁶² 世俗化氛围要大力培养和提倡，继续保持这种氛围。新疆历来就是多元文化荟萃、多种文化并存，素有歌舞之乡的美称。

⁶³ 现在新疆大约有 300 万城乡劳动力需要解决就业，相当于全区劳动力的约六分之一

[P]eople without land, employment or a fixed income have nothing to do and wander around all day; not only will this breed dissatisfaction, but they will also be easily exploited by evildoers. (p.39)⁶⁴

However, at the same time, many enterprises in Xinjiang struggle to recruit workers. Li suggests a reason for this suggesting that to a large extent this is because people have yet to adapt to [this kind of] employment concept and skills. :

There is an old saying in Xinjiang, "I would rather eat bread at home than eat mutton soup outside." On the one hand, this shows people's strong feelings for their hometown, while on the other, it indicates that their awareness regarding [the need for] leaving their hometown to work or start a business is weak. Changing this situation requires patience and time, as well as improving the management [and] training methods for new employees. (p.40)⁶⁵

Li argues that Xinjiang must therefore "transform [people's] way of thinking about employment" (转变就业观念) and "vigorously develop labor-intensive industries that absorb more employment" (大力发展吸纳就业多的劳动密集型产业; p.40). He argues that the task of employment promotion in southern Xinjiang is "urgent" and cannot wait (p.53).

Starting soon after the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum, but especially from late 2016, Xinjiang developed a much more coercive system of labor transfers for rural surplus laborers especially in southern Xinjiang, with a focus on placing them into labor-intensive industries, especially garment and textile factories.⁶⁶

In the remainder of his speech, Li demands, among numerous other things, an intensified planting of cotton, the promotion of textile and apparel industries, the use of sustainable development strategies to protect Xinjiang's fragile ecological environment, and a major expansion of Chinese (Mandarin) language education.

Noteworthy here is perhaps Li's strong focus on the scarcity of water, which in 2014 already exceeded the "control target" set by the government for 2030 (p.48). Li refers to water resources as the "biggest bottleneck in Xinjiang's development, the shortcoming of shortcomings" (p.47).⁶⁷ The author had previously argued that due to the severely limited ecological carrying capacity of southern Xinjiang's natural resources, the state cannot simply add large numbers of Han to the region's existing ethnic minority populations, as it is planning to do (compare also document no.7).⁶⁸ Consequently, the systematic embedding of Xinjiang's ethnic populations (as demanded by Xi) requires the state to reduce the latter's growth – and perhaps total size – through a combination of cross-regional labor transfers and sustained birth prevention.

⁶⁴ 无地、无业、无固定收入人员没事做，整天游逛，不仅会滋生不满情绪，还容易被坏人利用

⁶⁵ 新疆有句老话，“宁肯在家里吃苞谷糁，也不到外地喝羊肉汤”。这一方面表明，群众的恋乡之情很浓，另一方面表明大家外出就业创业的意识不强。改变这种状况需要耐心和时间，也需要改进对新就业人员的管理培训方式。

⁶⁶ See Zenz, Adrian. "Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang's Cross-Regional Labor Transfer Program." The Jamestown Foundation, March 4, 2021. <https://jamestown.org/product/coercive-labor-and-forced-displacement-in-xinjiangs-cross-regional-labor-transfer-program/>. And: Byler, Darren. *In the Camps CHINA'S HIGH-TECH PENAL COLONY*. Penguin Random House. Columbia Global Reports. Random House Audio, n.d. <https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/696114/in-the-camps-by-darren-byler/>.

⁶⁷ 水资源是新疆发展最大的瓶颈，是短板中的短板

⁶⁸ Zenz, Adrian. "End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group': An Analysis of Beijing's Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang." *Central Asian Survey* 40, no. 3 (August 24, 2021): 291–312.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483>. (Open access version: Zenz, Adrian. "End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group: An Analysis of Beijing's Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang." Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3862512>.)

Comrade Yu Zhengsheng's concluding speech (May 29, 2014)

In 2014, Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声) was head of the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组) and chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC; 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会). His former role is most pertinent to his speech, which focuses squarely on a thorough, unified and intensified implementation of the "party's strategy for governing Xinjiang" (党治疆方略).

Yu emphasizes that in the current "painful period of interventionary treatment" (干预治疗阵痛期), the achievements of Xinjiang Work goals are paramount, not only for the region, but for the entire nation. Like Xi, he notes that the achievement of stability maintenance is a matter of "national security" (国家安全). To quote:

We must thoroughly comprehend that doing a proper job in Xinjiang is not only a matter of concern for the region, but also a major issue for the whole party and the entire country. If the Xinjiang situation is not handled properly, it will influence the overall situation regarding reform, development and stability throughout the country, as well as the realization of the "Two Centennial Goals. (p.64)⁶⁹

China's "Two Centennial Goals" are 1) to "build a moderately prosperous society" by 2021, the centenary of the CCP, and 2) to "build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious" by 2049, centenary of the People's Republic of China.⁷⁰ Together, they arguably constitute Beijing's and Xi's most important political goals in the coming decades.

Yu mentions an important guiding document issued by the central government to clarify the specific tasks, objectives and policy measures that derive from the speeches held during the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum, titled "Opinions on further safeguarding social stability and realizing long-term peace and stability in Xinjiang" (《关于进一步维护新疆社会稳定和实现长治久安的意见》; p.62). This document is mentioned in numerous related state media reports.⁷¹

Yu then notes that the Work Forum has "put forward a series of new ideas, new measures, and new requirements for Xinjiang Work" (这次会议提出了新疆工作一系列新思想、新举措、新要求; p.64). He argues that:

The Central Government's major policy direction regarding Xinjiang Work has been decided. The key is to seize the opportunity to implement [these policies]. Implementation is the pivotal link in doing all the work well. Carrying out the spirit of the meeting [Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum] is an important test of the work ability and work style of the leading cadres at all levels. We cannot falter at the expense of the party, we cannot bargain for discounts, and we have to be firm in our party spirit as a guarantee that we

⁶⁹ 要深刻认识做好新疆工作，不仅是新疆的事情，而且是全党全国的大事，如果新疆的问题处理不好，将会影响全国改革发展稳定大局，影响“两个一百年”奋斗目标的实现。

⁷⁰ "CPC Q&A: What Are China's Two Centennial Goals and Why Do They Matter?" Xinhua News, October 17, 2017. http://web.archive.org/web/20180223145958/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/17/c_136686770.htm.

⁷¹ 马俊卿, ed. "习近平在第二次中央新疆工作座谈会上发表重要讲话." 新华网, May 29, 2014. http://web.archive.org/web/20180608025413/http://www.xinhuanet.com/photo/2014-05/29/c_126564529.htm.

are determined to put the central [government's] decisions and deployments into practice. (p.63)⁷²

Consequently, each government department and work unit must use the central government's directives to determine their respective tasks and implement them.

Yu's special attention turns to Xinjiang's economic and employment situation, given its urgency and immediate relevance for stability maintenance. He argues that:

Given that southern Xinjiang has poor natural conditions, a weak economic foundation, poor employment conditions, a monolithic population structure, many people with [economic] difficulties, a distorted religious atmosphere, a complicated surrounding environment, and a situation involving severe struggles, how can we solve the problems of Southern Xinjiang, maintain social stability and realize long-term peace and stability without implementing special policies? (p.67)⁷³

This statement is of great interest, given that it links different aspects together, such as poor employment, a monolithic population structure, and a "distorted religious atmosphere." This particular assessment provides the context for his statements regarding the urgency of promoting employment through the development of labor-intensive industries such as garment and textile. Here, Yu makes it clear that economic development "must absolutely be subservient to [the goals of] social and long-term peace and stability" (一定要服从服务于社会稳定和长治久安; p.65). To quote:

For example, in Xinjiang, the requirements for the development of labor-intensive industries are particularly urgent. Although these industries may not contribute more to economic growth and taxation than other industries, they are particularly important for employment and for promoting exchanges and the integration of various ethnic groups. (p.65)⁷⁴

This statement, together with related points made by Li Keqiang, clarifies the priorities and motivations behind Xinjiang's recent employment policies, in line with what academics, including this author, have been surmising: the region has been urgently placing hundreds of thousands, if not millions of ethnic minorities into state-arranged (or mandated) jobs in labor-intensive industries, based on an increasingly coercive mechanism to transfer southern Xinjiang's rural surplus laborers into factory work.

Yu further clarifies the nature of this plan:

For example, a series of supporting policies and requirements have been put forward for the development of the textile and garment industry, which is to drive at least one million people into employment. This matter is of vital importance to Xinjiang's social stability and long-term stability. To develop

⁷² 中央关于新疆工作的大政方针已定，关键在于狠抓落实。落实是做好一切工作的关键环节，抓好会议精神的贯彻落实，是对各级领导干部工作能力、工作作风的重要检验，不能阳奉阴违瞎折腾，不能讨价还价打折扣，要以坚强的党性作保证，坚决把中央决策部署落到实处。

⁷³ 南疆自然条件不好，经济基础薄弱，就业条件差，人口结构单一，群众困难比较多，宗教氛围扭曲，周边环境复杂，斗争形势严峻，不给特殊政策怎么解决南疆问题，怎么维护社会稳定和实现长治久安？

⁷⁴ 比如，在新疆，对发展劳动密集型产业的要求尤为迫切，虽然这些产业对经济增长和税收的贡献不一定比其他产业多，但对就业尤为重要，对促进各民族交往交流交融尤为重要...

the textile and garment industry, we must rely on the environment, make enterprises willing to transfer their production [to Xinjiang]... (p.72)⁷⁵

The policy goal of placing at least 1 million workers into jobs in textile and garment industries by 2023, with 650,000 of them coming from the southern Uyghur majority regions, was publicly announced on July 18, 2014, and then formalized in February 2018.⁷⁶ Since 2016, substantial numbers of ethnic group members, mostly Uyghurs, have been placed into related jobs, including persons recently released from internment camps.⁷⁷ Often, this involves the so-called Pairing Assistance (对口援疆) program through which provinces and cities in eastern China are paired with ethnic minority prefectures in Xinjiang. These pairing connections then act as channels through which factories are constructed in Xinjiang for local employment, and ethnic surplus laborers are transferred to eastern Chinese companies.

To strengthen the coordination and planning of projects funded by the Pairing Assistance [program]....For example, focusing on employment, education, talent recruitment, etc., we should put into consideration the number of labor-intensive enterprises to be brought in[to Xinjiang], the number of Xinjiang workers to be employed in the Mainland, the number of bilingual teachers and vocational education teachers to be supported and trained, the extent to which bilingual education and vocational education should be popularized, the number of talents to be introduced and the number of talents to be trained, etc. These factors should be included in the project planning of [the] Pairing Assistance [program], enforcing responsibility and conducting strict assessments. (p.76)⁷⁸

This is consistent with demands made in Xi's speech that more ethnic citizens from Xinjiang should be sent to eastern China for "education, employment and residence" (教育、就业、居住; p.15)

Yu further notes that enterprises that are directly managed by the central government (中央企业 or short 央企) are not just in Xinjiang in order to produce, but also to function as "propaganda teams" (宣传队) who are to "promote national unity and propagate party policies," and to "carry out in-depth education on ethnic and religious policies" (p.74).⁷⁹ By 2017, this mandate had apparently also reached large private corporations, some of which not only received state-directed labor transfers, but actively promoted state policies, including through in-company Han-Uyghur inter-ethnic mass

⁷⁵ 比如，对发展纺织服装产业提出了一系列的扶持政策和要求，是要带动至少一百万人就业，这件事对新疆社会稳定和长治久安至关重要。把纺织服装产业搞上去，要靠环境，要让企业愿意把产业转移过来...

⁷⁶ See: 林巧婷, ed. "新疆设立 200 亿元专项资金支持纺织服装产业发展." 中央政府门户网站. 新华社, July 18, 2014. http://web.archive.org/web/20211103123350/http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-07/18/content_2720088.htm. AND "《新疆纺织服装产业发展规划(2018-2023 年)》印发实施." 新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府, March 2, 2018. <http://web.archive.org/web/20180825053820/http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/03/02/148047.html>.

See also this author's report on this target: Zenz, Adrian. "Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang." *The Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 12 (December 2019). <https://www.ipolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang/>. Section 1.1.

⁷⁷ Ordonez, Victor. "China's Persecuted Muslims Find Haven in the US." ABC News. ABC News Network, August 5, 2021. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/chinas-persecuted-muslims-find-haven-us/story?id=77789396>. AND

Byler, Darren. "How Companies Profit from Forced Labor in Xinjiang." *Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia*, October 11, 2019. <https://livingotherwise.com/2019/10/11/how-companies-profit-from-forced-labor-in-xinjiang/>.

⁷⁸ 加强援疆资金项目统筹规划...。比如，围绕就业、教育、人才等工作，要把引进多少劳动密集型企业，在内地解决多少新疆籍劳动力就业，支援和培训多少双语教师和职业教育教师，把双语教育和职业教育普及率提高到什么程度，引进多少人才，培训多少人才等，纳入援疆工作规划，落实责任，严格考核。

⁷⁹ 促进民族团结、宣传党的政策等方面发挥着重要作用 and 深入开展民族、宗教政策教育。

weddings and through company staff forming village-based work teams that conduct door-to-door visits in Uyghur villages.⁸⁰

5. Transcript of the Original Document

The transcript of document no.2 can be accessed here:

<https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Transcript-Document-02.pdf>

⁸⁰ “70 对新人集体婚礼 向新中国成立 70 周年献礼! .” 特变电工, August 8, 2019.

http://web.archive.org/web/20210525091043/https://www.tbea.com/cs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1467896785084&d=Touch&pagename=TBEA_CN%2FPage%2FTemplate%2FNewsCenter%2FNewsInfo&assetid=1450324307662.