The Tribunal

Tribunal Participants will number not less than seven members who will act as roughly the equivalent of a jury and membership will be of citizens with no specialist interest in the matters to be decided.

The Secretariat to the Tribunal will administer the Tribunal’s work and provide advice to Tribunal Participants.

A large body of witness and expert evidence has already been provided to the Tribunal and further evidence from various sources will be sought including from the PRC itself.

At least two ‘in person’ hearings will be held in London, in addition to virtual hearings, all of which will be open to the Public. Witnesses and connected parties including family members who are considered to be vulnerable will be afforded anonymity.

Up to three senior lawyers expert in the field of international criminal law will provide Opinions for, and be available to give evidence to, the Tribunal.

Timing of the final judgment will depend on the volume of evidence that becomes available but is forecast, albeit not guaranteed, to be delivered by the end of 2021.


If it were realistically possible to bring the PRC to any formal international court – in particular to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – there would be no need for the establishment of a people’s tribunal.

There is no such possibility not least because China/the PRC, although a signatory to and ratifier of the Genocide Convention, has entered a reservation against ICJ jurisdiction. There is no known route to any other court that can deal with the issues before the tribunal.

The Uyghur Tribunal, which has no powers of sanction or enforcement, will confine itself to reviewing evidence in order to reach an impartial and considered judgment on whether international crimes are proved to have been committed by the PRC.

It will be for States, international institutions, commercial companies, art, medical and educational establishments and individuals to determine how to apply the Tribunal’s Judgment, whatever it may be, in their dealings with the PRC. This could include, but is not limited to, trade and other sanctions including against individuals, proscribing the sale of technologies, surveillance and medical equipment and the declaration of ineligibility for visas.

All the evidence considered by the Tribunal will form a permanent record, which may, depending on the judgment delivered, serve as a deterrent to impunity.

No present or future members of the Tribunal or the Secretariat are activists in any Uyghur cause.