



AN INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL

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1 **13th September 2021 (8:18:30 – 9:25:23)**

2 **Adrian Zenz**

3

4 ADRIAN ZENZ – I will present on some new findings that discuss the connection
5 between the internment campaign and central government institutions. We know that
6 in 2014, Xi Jinping, in Xinjiang, likened Islamic terrorism to a virus and called for a
7 period “of painful [interventionary] treatment.” However, more direct links between the
8 re-education campaign in 2017 and the central government including Xi himself have
9 so far been elusive. Based on new evidence, I suggest a new approach to
10 understanding the development and implementation of the re-education campaign. Xi
11 Jiang’s previous Party-Secretary Zhang Chunxian experimented with re-education,
12 first administering in villages, and then especially after Xi’s remarks in 2014,
13 implementing dedicated transformation through education facilities. In 2015, we now
14 know, based on new, previously unreported information, the region began to draft the
15 “Regulation on De-extremification,” and it did so based on a specific Central
16 government mandate to develop long-term solution. Likely, it did so to tackle local
17 ethnic dissent. The Xinjiang government was formally in charge of drafting this crucial
18 regulation, all the while continuing to implement and experiment with re-education
19 practice. The new evidence shows that this drafting was done in close concertation
20 with central government institutions. This supports my prior assessment that when
21 Chen Quanguo replaced Zhan Chunxian in mid-2016, he essentially took charge of an
22 ongoing and premeditated process, rather than pioneering or being the primary
23 architect of the re-education campaign as has commonly been presumed. Chen was
24 most likely brought in as a ruthless and efficient implemented of a hatched plan that

25 was all planned and approved by the central government. Immediately after the final
26 approval and publication of the March 2017 Regulation, the plan was executed. By
27 allowing the Xinjiang government to take charge of the experimentation and the
28 drafting of re-education legislation, the central government has been able to claim that
29 the re-education campaign constitutes a local solution to a local problem, of which it
30 probably broadly approves but which it did not directly order. However, based on the
31 new information, the most logical conclusion is that the responsibility and culpability
32 for this campaign rests primarily with the Central government, most notably with the
33 Politburo Standing Committee, to which there are significant institutions linkages.
34 While Chen Quanguo may potentially have substantially contributed with the exec plan
35 of how to implement the re-education drive, his role is best assessed as that of an
36 implementer of central government policy decisions.

37 I will now try to briefly present some key bits of the new information to substantiate my
38 analysis and my new conclusions. The March 2017 Regulation on De-extremification,
39 which is as experts know, a later foundation for the normalisation, standardisation, and
40 legalisation for the re-education campaign through centralised education involving
41 behavioural correction. The camp construction bids and anecdotal accounts from the
42 ground all indicate that Xinjiang's campaign of internment began right around the time
43 that this regulation came into effect. The PRC itself stated that this regulation
44 constitutes a legal basis for the vocational skills education and training centres, (the
45 vocational camps). This regulation was then revised in October 2018 to fully legitimise
46 these educational centres, referring to them bluntly as "re-education institutions." New
47 evidence shows now that the drafting of this regulation involved extensive consultation
48 for three important central government organs: firstly, the Office of the Central
49 Government Coordination Small Group on Xinjiang Work, which other experts have

50 mentioned; the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the
51 National People's Congress, in Beijing; and the State Administration for Religious
52 Affairs. Two of these three can be directly linked to some of the most powerful
53 members of China's top decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee, that
54 only has seven members, and which is more powerful than the Politburo itself.
55 Specifically, they represent the third and fourth rank members who rank directly behind
56 General Secretary Xi and Premier Li Keqiang, who is second. The 2019 revision
57 involves an even more direct link between the Central government and the camps. A
58 document said that "the relevant leaders of the Party Committee of the XUAR [...] and
59 their People's Congress and their legislative affairs commission made a special trip to
60 the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's
61 Congress in Beijing to report on this revision. This standing committee in Beijing
62 express then its full affirmation of the role of the Autonomous Region's local laws" and
63 so on, expressed approval for the amendments to the regulation, and proposed
64 specific amendments to form a draft, which was then reported back to the XUAR for
65 review and approval, which took place in August 2018. This close involvement is of
66 extreme significance: the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, to which the
67 Legislative Affairs Commission reports to is the third-rank member of the Politburo
68 Standing Committee (PBSC). The head of the Central Xinjiang Work Group, Wang
69 Yang, is the fourth-rank member of the PBSC, also the Chairman Chinese People's
70 Political Consultative Conference, the top advisory body, and a central part of Xi
71 Jinping's United Front system. The PBSC and all these people are more powerful than
72 Chen Quanguo himself, who is a regular member of the 25-person Politburo.
73 Practically speaking, the direct and close involvement of the NPC Standing
74 Committee's Legislative Commission and of the Central Xinjiang Work Group in the

75 drafting provides tangible evidence that the framing and conceptualising of Xinjiang’s
76 “De-Extremification through Re-education” campaign, was undertaken with the direct
77 knowledge of leading figures in China’s most powerful policy, legislative, and advisory
78 bodies. I have a graph, that you will be able to see if you read through my report,
79 because I don’t have a PowerPoint. This effectively implicates Xi’s inner circle of power
80 in the atrocities. There is lots of other important details and I have to be quite brief, but
81 on March 21st, 2017, the very day before this regulation came to effect, the General
82 Office of the Standing Committee of the Xinjiang’s People Congress held a press
83 conference, saying that “it was emphasised that the regulation constitutes the
84 implementation of the Central government’s policy decisions and deployments,
85 especially to implement the important instructions and requirements of General
86 Secretary Xi Jinping.” This very important statement clarifies at the highest relevant
87 official level in Xinjiang that the interactive drafting process of the regulation and its
88 revision resulted in an implementing of the policies of the Central Government, which
89 is no surprise because we have already implicated the PBSC, China’s top policy
90 decision-making body.

91 The specific emphasis on the fact that this regulation is “especially” related to
92 implementing Xi’s own “instructions and requirements” is of equal significance. It can
93 be argued that the reference to these important instructions and requirements likely
94 refers to an important speech, and there is other circumstantial evidence buttressing
95 that. A speech made by Xi in March 2017, in two sessions in Beijing, which took place
96 just weeks before the onset of the internment campaign, with Xinjiang’s top leaders
97 including Chen Quanguo in attendance. In a 2019 China Daily article, it says about
98 this event that “on March 10, 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping participated in the
99 deliberations of the Xinjiang Delegation of the Nation’s two sessions. He emphasised

100 that it is necessary to tightly embrace the general goal of social stability and long-term
101 stability. In the past two years, the XUAR Party Committee and Government have
102 resolutely implemented the important instructions of General-Secretary Xi Jinping.
103 Focused on the overall goal, they had to be dauntless, fought tough battles and
104 created a new horizon in Xinjiang's work." Similar statements were later made by
105 Xinjiang's Governor, Shohrat Zakir, who also said that in the last two years, these
106 instructions were implemented, and "earth-changing" changes have taken place.
107 Above, we have seen that at the Xinjiang press conference, when they introduced the
108 regulation in 2017, it was argued that this regulation constituted an implementation of
109 the important instructions and requirements of Xi. This February 2019 article repeated
110 some of this wording literally, referring back to the speech of Xi Jinping at the two
111 sessions. Noteworthy is also the timing, February 2019 is the time when Xinjiang
112 started to open up the camps to reporters and visitors from around the world, meaning
113 it has been a success, "we can show this off now."

114 Along with other evidence presented in my report, it is possible and even likely that Xi
115 himself endorsed the re-education campaign just weeks prior to its inception. In any
116 case, in this state-media report and a speech given by Xinjiang Governor Shorhat
117 Zakir, he aligned himself very closely to the unconditional implementation of Xinjiang
118 work in the context of the imminent launch of this re-education campaign. In
119 September 2020, Xi then said at the Work Forum, "the facts have abundantly
120 demonstrated that our national minority work has been a success," meaning his stamp
121 of approval on what has happened. In sum, we know that institutions, headed by
122 figures in China's top decision-making bodies, were directly involved in the drafting of
123 the documents legalising, standardising and normalising the re-education campaign.
124 It is in my view likely that in the weeks prior to the start of this campaign, Xi himself, in

125 front of Xinjiang's top leadership in attendance, demanded their unconditional
126 implementation. My article then also shows more details about the stern warnings and
127 exhortations given by Xinjiang's officials in March and April 2017 that this new
128 regulation must be implemented unconditionally.

129 *COUNSEL – You have noted that the March 2017 regulations were drafted with*
130 *extensive consultation with various regional and national State Party as well as*
131 *Government organs, and you talk about both the horizontal and vertical relationships*
132 *there. Ultimately you find that the extra-legal Xinjiang re-education facilities are*
133 *sanctioned by the National People Congress as well as Beijing. My question is: what*
134 *significance does this have beyond solely possible State consent for arbitrary*
135 *detention of Uyghurs?*

136 AZ – We surmised and speculated that Beijing must have known of Xinjiang's plans
137 and must have at least tacitly approved them. Sometimes regions have considerable
138 leeway and freedoms to implement policy as long as they are broadly within the will of
139 Beijing. We also knew that Chen Quanguo is a highly capable and creative innovator
140 of policy, and therefore he has been largely named the architect of the interments, and
141 I believe that while Chen Quanguo absolutely was a very energetic figurehead and
142 implementer of the interments and may well have been creative in some of the details
143 of the implementation, we now know that the legal and legislative framework
144 underpinning all that was really co-developed in quite close consultation with the
145 central government. For me, that implies a whole different level of involvement and
146 ultimately culpability of the central government, including its top decision-making body,
147 in the internment campaign, which in many ways forms the heart of these atrocities,
148 and kicked off the whole crackdown, and a number of initiatives are linked to it. In

149 terms of the clarifying the role of the central government and likely of Xi Jinping himself,
150 I think this is a significant new contribution.

151 *COUNSEL – Would it be correct to say that your findings suggest Central State*
152 *permission or agreement for other alleged crimes or other human rights violations?*

153 AZ – I would say yes, because we see the role, for instance, of the Central Government
154 Xinjiang Work Group, which is closely involved in policy and links all the way to the
155 PBSC. It is very likely, or virtually certain that other aspects of the atrocity outside of
156 the internments themselves, would have been know and approved of by this body and
157 its chairman, who is the fourth rank member in the PBSC. Also, I think we need to take
158 into account that many of the atrocities are in some way linked to the re-education
159 internment campaign, and some of the steps taken that cause atrocity fall within the
160 scope of the de-extremification regulation.

161 *COUNSEL – Can you clarify for us what precisely is the link between the 2017*
162 *regulation and its revision in 2018, and the alleged commission of crime in Xinjiang?*

163 AZ – The 2017 regulation on de-extremification mandates that re-education, or literally
164 “transformation through education,” must be done well, involving centralised
165 education, behaviour correction, psychological counselling, and vocational skills
166 training. It does not yet mention dedicated facilities. That was added in the revision of
167 2018 after the central government admitted to the existence of these facilities. In the
168 revision, it was bluntly stated that vocational skills, education and training centres are
169 “re-education institutions that perform re-education.” This is the contextual link. The
170 primary purpose of the re-education internment camps is to perform de-extremification
171 in terms of policy, and this is exactly what the regulation and its revision sanction. Then

172 there is a temporal link, which indicates that right upon the approval and publication of
173 the original regulation, that is really when the sweeping internments began.

174 *COUNSEL – You would not link the 2017 to alleged measures to intended to restrict*
175 *births, or the transfer of children from one group to another, is that correct?*

176 AZ – No, the specific link is to the internment campaign. If I recall well, the timing of
177 the construction of boarding schools is a bit similar, there are different policies. There
178 was an important policy document issued by Chen Quanguo in early 2017 about the
179 implementation, and some documents in 2016. In some ways the construction of the
180 boarding schools constituted a dramatic acceleration of what was planned already in
181 a previous five-year plan, but it was implemented much faster under Chen Quanguo,
182 with much greater urgency. With the birth prevention, we see in the wake of the update
183 of the Family Planning law that Xinjiang issued in the summer (I believe July) of 2017,
184 we see that after that, a number of documents and practices were issued and I
185 specially took note of an important regulation that apparently could come out first thing
186 in 2018, and a lot of the crackdown and language surrounding birth prevention then
187 took place starting from early 2018. So, the link here is not as direct.

188 *COUNSEL – Two more questions on this report: You have identified various state*
189 *media and official state pronouncements on the camps following the promulgation of*
190 *the 2017 regulation, in particular the reference to “important instructions and*
191 *requirements of General-Secretary Xi Jinping.” Can you help us understand what a*
192 *direct reference to Xi, an ambiguous instruction from him, adds, if anything, to the*
193 *implementation of the 2017 regulation?*

194 AZ – In my opinion, it is very important, having this new insight which we have
195 discussed now, to examine these further statements, many of which came out in late

2018 after the revision was published, during the peak of the internment campaign, where, facing the Xinjiang population, government officials made blatant links with the “vocational centres,” that constitute the implementation of the will of the central government, the Party central committee, and with Xi Jinping at the core. I think they were quite clearly communicating that all of these stringent measures that were having a major effect on life there were not just a “local” invention or innovation but were a direct implementation of the will of the central government with Xi at the core. I think it is in this context that this admittedly vague reference, or the important instructions of General Secretary Xi, need to be taken as a justification which I think is very significant because the local Xinjiang government links it and attributes it to implementing the will of the central government firstly; and secondly, looking at the wording of the important implementations, a link can be made not only to Xi’s various statements in 2014 and possibly subsequently, but to his unpublished speech at the two sessions in Beijing immediately preceding the internment in earlier March 2017. This is a very significant timing, with the top leadership of Xinjiang in attendance.

COUNSEL – To what extent what Xi’s instructions merely for discipline of party cadres, and to what extent, if at all, were they directed at Uyghurs and crimes against Uyghurs?

AZ – We only have a limited information about the contents of this speech, which is not published. However, there are some things said in there that I think are very significant. Firstly, he is quoted as saying “we must insist on maintaining stability, and so identify problems early, when they are minor, grasp them quickly and well, seek long-term strategies and act to consolidate the foundation.” This really speaks into the purpose of the de-extremification regulation, which was going to be published soon after. Maintaining stability at that time was all about de-extremification. That was

221 already the focus at the time, in early 2017 and late 2016. Of course, this urging of the
222 implementation, the “grasping.” Some of that language is identical to the exhortations
223 issued in March and April by the Xinjiang authorities in relation to this regulation,
224 meaning “this is a new measure, and you must implement it unconditionally and as is.”
225 In my view, that significant circumstantial evidence that refers to the prime measure at
226 hand at the time, namely the re-education internment campaign.

227 *PANEL – You have obviously researched and published extensively on a wide range*
228 *of the allegations that we have been looking at as a Tribunal. Your work has been very*
229 *influential, it has been widely quoted by other experts at this Tribunal. So, I need to*
230 *ask you some questions about your independence. Could you tell us about the source*
231 *of your funding?*

232 AZ – My research is funded by the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation.

233 *PANEL – What is the source of its funding?*

234 AZ – The source of its funding are private donations.

235 *PANEL – We are familiar with your methodology, but could you just tell us how you*
236 *ensure yourself, in the gathering of evidence and its analysis, that you approach that*
237 *with an objective mind?*

238 AZ – I try to triangulate information from different sources, but also at different levels.
239 For instance, if we have evidence from government documents, in my opinion it is
240 important to look at wider policy and context, including historical context or the
241 etymology of words being used. For example, if we look at “labour transfer” we must
242 ask ourselves “what is labour transfer?” and “what is the history of labour transfer in
243 the region?”; “what is the wider policy of labour transfer?” And we need to look at how
244 has the implementation of labour transfer evolved in the region over time. How has it

245 become more or less coercive? Can we identify key-moments of change or influence
246 and how they led to political development? Then, link that to much more specific
247 regional implementation, for example that is also extensively seen in birth prevention.
248 Also, I always look for local statements, local examples (propaganda accounts). The
249 Chinese sources and their quotations are double-checked internally. I have instituted
250 here a more rigorous process between myself and my research assistant and
251 sometimes others. I also often try to prepare an early draft and make it available to
252 another expert for feedback. By publishing through think-tanks like the Jamestown,
253 there is at least a basic editorial review process in place. It is however in principle my
254 ambition to also subject the work to a more rigorous and much slower academic peer-
255 review, which I have been able to do on three occasions in regard to my research in
256 Xinjiang, including most recently, but I have more in process. This is my goal, but
257 unfortunately this process of academic peer-review really has not been suited to try to
258 uncover evidence for [*unintelligible*].

259 *PANEL – Turning to the new paper, your own sequencing of events would put the re-*
260 *education campaign in the middle term of events, with before that an extensive*
261 *preparing of the ground (building the security system in the region), do you think that*
262 *we would actually need to find earlier sources for the implication of central*
263 *government, so back to 2014 for example?*

264 AZ – It is always good to have earlier and more context. In my 2018 paper I gave a lot
265 of context for the local development in Xinjiang of the re-education campaign, under
266 Zhang Chunxian, which my latest paper skips over. It was in tandem with the
267 increasing securitisation of the region. We of course have some initial evidence from
268 the New York Times Xinjiang Papers, and also statements by Xi Jinping at the April
269 2014, at the Second Xinjiang Work Forum. It would be relevant to try to identify further

270 information of how that developed. There is one slightly more specific document that I
271 have not yet included in my report, that talks about the beginning of the drafting of the
272 de-extremification legislation of 16 April 2015 I believe. This is very new research that
273 I conducted very recently, so more bits and pieces, like the visits to Xinjiang conducted
274 by these high-level people (the third and fourth ranking members of the PBSC) in their
275 capacity as head of the Xinjiang Central Government Work Group could be examined
276 further. Given that we broadly know the context and understand it, I think the current
277 assessment and the evidence found in the report I submitted to you probably contains
278 the most significant evidence, we might be able to better contextualise it but I don't
279 think we will find anything that would significantly alter the conclusions.

280 *PANEL – You describe what seems to be a systematic, industrialised, and I believe*
281 *you also said a militaristic approach in all those different stages and programs. Could*
282 *you describe to us what do you think the features of a systematic, industrialised*
283 *approach to the control of the people of the region?*

284 AZ – We see that Xinjiang, as have other regions, have experimented with these
285 approaches and introduced things successively and then decided to upscale them
286 very quickly. A lot of this dramatic militaristic, large-scale upscaling we see with the
287 beginning of Chen Quanguo. I believe that is the primary reason he was brought in,
288 that is his primary skill. He has this incredibly intense driven nature, ruling cadres with
289 an iron fist which is of course key to the implementation of this. So, I think in many
290 ways, the key to the draconian and dramatic implementation of this campaign with its
291 various aspects (birth prevention, police, camps, boarding schools, etc.) goes back to
292 this incredible managerial figure of Chen Quanguo and his iron-fisted approach to
293 controlling and governing the cadres. I think that is the core: having the freedom of
294 reign, the ability to just do whatever needs to be done with very little restraint and

295 restriction; and then having the technology of China, that has advanced so much; the
296 economic resource (dramatic increase in budget between 2016 and 2017); the ability
297 to spend that money, having recruited all these auxiliary police, having put all these
298 systems in place and rolling things out step by step, etc. A lot of the language of this
299 rolling out, including for instance in a boarding school campaign, or labour training,
300 has this militaristic language. Of course, some of that has already been given by Xi
301 Jinping himself. He also has that aura of this almost military “drivenness,” of these
302 militaristic campaign-style implementation, the unconditional implementation of things
303 including targeted poverty alleviation with military-style commands, etc. I think
304 ultimately the political and government structure and the top-leadership is very much
305 what sets the tone and brings all these resources to bear in this way.

306 *PANEL – What you describe is that all levels of government are involved and that,*
307 *presumably, would not be possible at the regional level without the approval of the*
308 *central authorities?*

309 AZ – Without the approval and the active involvement. We have often wondered about
310 the ability of Chen Quanguo, and I think that is why he has been credited as the
311 architect, to just do this. But I think we now understand just how much of the central
312 government involvement at the highest level of the PBSC, the NPC itself and so on,
313 made this possible. And it makes sense, it had to be involved. Of course, if we look at
314 this financially and economically, I think 70% or 80% of Xinjiang’s budget is subsidised
315 by the central government and this cost increases, directly financed by Beijing.

316 *PANEL – Let us assume that there is a legitimate need to counter terrorism, extremism*
317 *and separatism. What, in this system that develops over time very rapidly, would be*
318 *the indicators of measures being taken that are indisputably excessive to the threat?*

319 AZ – Nearly everything that has been stated, especially by witnesses and survivors of
320 the atrocity, namely excessive police force; psychological and physical abuse;
321 internment of not just limited numbers of perpetrators of actual acts of resistance or
322 violence, but indiscriminately of huge swathes of the population including women, etc;
323 excessive measures of birth prevention and sterilisation; excessive measures of
324 shifting people around, of scooping people up into forced or coerced labour in the
325 name of poverty alleviation or for actual poverty alleviation but coercively; the violence;
326 the family separation; the cultural destruction; the closing and destruction of mosques
327 and other religious facilities; and so on. I would say that well over 90 or 95% of the
328 measures in consequence of this internment campaign are manifestly excessive, and
329 not designed to restrain or bring to justice those who have perpetrated violence
330 punished by the law, by killing authorities or bystanders or population, but has been
331 targeted against people against which the state has no evidence of criminal activity.

332 *PANEL – When an academic researches a subject for which there are known to be*
333 *documents but they are not available to her or him, a risk is taken if the interpretation*
334 *is extravagant, or [at the limits] of possibilities. Would you agree with that?*

335 AZ – Yes, absolutely.

336 *PANEL – You researched material that was available, made interpretations allowing*
337 *for the possibility that documents would emerge to show you right or wrong.*

338 AZ – Yes.

339 *PANEL – Documents have emerged. Have they shown you to be right, wrong,*
340 *extravagant or cautious?*

341 AZ – I believe that the evidence that has emerged after my various publications has
342 by and large shown that the situation is as bad or worse than I portrayed it to be.

343 Oftentimes things turned out a lot worse than we imagined them to be, although
344 oftentimes that particular evidence was by witnesses and not by documents. I would
345 say a lot of the documentary evidence that would have emerged after my publications
346 would either not significantly added to or altered conclusions, or would have added
347 more detail, or maybe would have changed relatively minor or mid-level assessments
348 with new information, because we knew better.

349 *PANEL – Your latest report is to be published tomorrow and will therefore be for the*
350 *first time exposed to the review of those who may criticise you. Is that based on newly*
351 *found documents or just newly-researched documents?*

352 AZ – It is, I would say, about 90% or more based on documents that I had previously
353 not seen or were not previously in my possession.

354 *PANEL – Are you able to tell us from where those documents have come?*

355 AZ – Yes, they have come from government websites at all different levels, from state-
356 media reports and just a small number from private media reports, mostly government
357 or state-media.

358 *PANEL – We hear of caches of leaked documents, some apparently disclosed and*
359 *some apparently only ever disclosed in part. Are there any of those caches of leaked*
360 *documents that you have not seen in full?*

361 AZ – Yes, the New York Times' Xinjiang Papers were never made public and we only
362 know whatever the New York Times publish about them.

363 *PANEL – You may know by the way, that the Tribunal has asked the New York Times*
364 *for access to those papers and had been denied. Would those papers be of value to*
365 *your work, do you think?*

366 AZ – Typically, new documentary evidence is always valuable and especially if it is
367 extensive, it is likely that either something has escaped somebody's attention,
368 whoever published on it at the New York Times; or to researchers like myself and
369 others who have other pieces of information, often semi-connected pieces of
370 information in our minds and we see something, just like with what I am publishing
371 tomorrow, of some significance, which may have escaped one person, but not escape
372 another. Therefore, I think it is crucial that many minds look at any evidence available,
373 and that many minds critically and constructively review whatever I publish.

374 *PANEL – But for the time being and on the papers that are available, you would trace*
375 *responsibility for the acts that have been described in negative terms by you and*
376 *witnesses and others to the very top, there being no other way of them being*
377 *authorised, is that correct?*

378 AZ – Not only no other way, which we have surmised correctly, but I believe we now
379 have quite direct documentary evidence of such a link itself.

380 *PANEL – So, from your papers it would appear as you posited, that the policies*
381 *emanated from the very top. Do you have any sense of how much of the*
382 *implementation strategy, and specifically the commissioning of some of the alleged*
383 *crimes that we have heard, would have emanated from the senior officials, possibly*
384 *the PBSC itself, or in your view, might those have been delegated to Chen Quanguo,*
385 *or subsidiary, junior or even regional entities?*

386 AZ – The re-education camps, certainly their transformation through education camps,
387 were *de facto* pioneered by Chen Quanguo's predecessor, Zhang Chunxian, as is
388 outlined in my 2018 research paper, which was also peer-reviewed. The upscaling
389 and standardisation and mass implementation of these camps, including this

390 vocational variant of it was obviously implemented by Chen Quanguo. Now, if we want
391 to say, “to what extent did he himself come up with that idea?” or “to what extent did
392 he just take his cues from his predecessor?” or “to what extent did the details of the
393 implementation mandated by the central government and Beijing?”, we are left up to
394 speculation. However, I will say this: if, for the legal basis, meaning the legislation of
395 the de-extremification regulation, there was close involvement in the drafting and the
396 consultation with central government institutions. There is no reason to assume that
397 there was no close consultation for the design or the details of the camp system, with
398 relevant central government authorities, especially the central government’s Xinjiang
399 Work Group.

400 *PANEL – More specifically, we have heard a significant amount of evidence of torture,*
401 *of humiliation, of rape and sexual violence, and general mistreatment and abuse. Do*
402 *you think those acts would have been constructed at local level? Or would it tacitly, in*
403 *your mind, have had to emanate from the central government?*

404 AZ – The outline that re-education must be done well and involve centralised
405 education and behavioural correction is clearly in the regulation, which is, as we now
406 know, was drafted in consultation with the central government. Now, if the central
407 government co-develops a legislation that talks about re-education involving
408 “behavioural correction,” I think many people who think logically, including myself,
409 could make various conclusions from this. At the very least, they would conclude that
410 the use of significant coercion would have been understood to be part of that process.
411 Any further thought is speculative. So, in my opinion the use of significant coercion, at
412 the very least heavy-handed psychological coercion and at the minimum physical
413 restraint would have been completely understood to be part of this process that the
414 central government not only acknowledged but was involved in the drafting. So, I think

415 this was part of the plan, and the central government was involved in the planning of
416 the plan. If you are talking about more extreme forms of torture, or even rape, I think
417 we are probably starting to veer in territory where it becomes quite speculative at what
418 level this was either planned, authorised or happened. But if we are talking about
419 severe psychological coercion including physical restraint of various forms, veering
420 maybe into corporal punishment, then I think it is very clear that the central government
421 must have approved that.

422 *PANEL – I was wondering whether, in the information that you found, there is any*
423 *information about the subsequent involvement of central government in the follow-up,*
424 *in receiving information about the implementation of the regulation, once it had been,*
425 *as you said, co-authored with involvement from the Politburo.*

426 AZ – I would say that, ideally, that is subject to further research. As you can tell this is
427 an ongoing research project. New evidence has emerged, and my report has focused
428 on what it has focused on. Your question would best be answered with a good amount
429 of further research, but I think it is quite evident what we see from the statements about
430 the successful implementation and the reporting back. It is very clear from Shohrat
431 Zakir, the Governor's own words and the state-media report from the first-half of 2019
432 that the re-education campaign was successful and constituted a successful
433 implementation of the important instructions of Xi Jinping and the will of the central
434 government. We can always say "of course, there was reporting back," that is a very
435 generic statement. Of course, for Shohrat Zakir to have made such a statement must
436 have been with the approval of the central government. He himself could not have said
437 "we have done it successfully" without the approval of Beijing. We can make all kinds
438 of inference about it. The details of the actual reporting of implementation progress will
439 be an important and pertinent further research project.

440 *PANEL – Your submission to us in June purported to be new research bringing*
441 *together hitherto unknown information, which was a breakthrough in our*
442 *understanding. Is that correct?*

443 AZ – Yes.

444 *PANEL – And again, on this occasion you tell us that your research is also, with*
445 *remarkable good timing, providing great insights helpful to the Tribunal. Am I right?*

446 AZ – Yes.

447 *PANEL – That is a fairly good score for any academic, is that correct?*

448 AZ – Very timely indeed.

449 *PANEL – For the avoidance of doubt, this question is specifically in the context of the*
450 *Preamble of Article 2 of the Convention, in regard to intent. Would it be unreasonable*
451 *to assume a degree or full intent in regard to the appointment of Chen Quanguo as*
452 *the instrument of implementation of the Central standing committee’s intentions and*
453 *policies, and arguably the President’s, given his track record in Tibet?*

454 AZ – The appointment of Chen Quanguo, at that time, given his background and given
455 what happened after he was appointed, clearly reflects the central government’s will
456 and intention to dramatically upscale and intensify previous policy, with the effects we
457 have observed. As such, this appointment of him, in my opinion, certainly plays a
458 significant role in asserting the intent, the plan and the strategy of the central
459 government. I think that is relevant to the question of intent of the Convention you
460 stated.

461 *PANEL – Coming back to the questions about the good score of your two reports, in*
462 *attending the Tribunal twice, were you under pressing requests from the Tribunal to*
463 *help? Or were you making pressing requests to the Tribunal to contribute?*

464 AZ – With my first publication, earlier this year, the findings on population optimisation
465 emerged having directly looked for it as part of my research on labour transfer, and
466 the Nankai Report and the population transfers and optimisation that came with that,
467 including the plan to relocate 300,000. From that, it was evident to me that I had a new
468 publication, and I felt a pressing or timely need and decided that it was an urgent topic,
469 particularly relating to the genocide determination. At the time the question of genocide
470 determination was also wide in the media and in public discussion, so I decided to
471 publish on it quite quickly. I had no request from the Tribunal, and I did offer it to the
472 Tribunal. We did also manage to publish a draft of it in time. But I had no request from
473 the Tribunal. This time, I had a request from the Tribunal to respond to a couple of
474 questions. Then, in the last weeks, to be honest not really premeditated, I kind of had
475 it in my mind to revisit the question of the link to the central government, not being
476 aware of the schedule of the Tribunal. I did not, for example, know that several other
477 experts were specifically questioned on this very link, including Jessica Batke, David
478 Tobin, etc. By coincidence, I did come across this evidence but then again I decided
479 to publish quickly, and I also felt it was very pertinent to this tribunal, and one could
480 say I did speed up publication to be able to present it today. That is fair to say.

481 *PANEL – A last point, emerging from evidence heard this afternoon: it is never easy*
482 *to know, in cases of state-induced mass violence, what the mental state of the persons*
483 *at the bottom of the chain of command may be when she or he acts in accordance*
484 *with a state policy. She or he may claim to be acting under orders, or she or he may*
485 *be acting out of a personal desire to rape for example. We heard distressing evidence*

486 *this afternoon, of a woman who described how the guards threw through the hole in*
487 *the cell door the Quran and required her to put it in the bucket where people defecated,*
488 *and for her, therefore, to have to defecate on the Quran. Might that indicate, simply in*
489 *respect to that individual guard, that whatever policy underlying the approach to*
490 *religion may have been, it had been effective right at this bottom level?*

491 AZ – It is the first time I hear about this, since I did not listen to that particular testimony.
492 Given that in Xinjiang, Qurans were confiscated and their possession deemed illegal,
493 and that the Quran has become a securitised object subject to sanctioning, my first
494 instinct of expert response to this would be that it is quite unlikely, in my opinion, that
495 a prison guard just happened to have a Quran and happened to bring it into a
496 securitised facility as part of his work, which is a highly controlled environment as we
497 know from the China Cables and others, and then happened to perform a particular
498 action. Rather, instinctively I would think that this must have been ordered by
499 somebody and be part of some sort of strategy at least at a slightly more mid- to senior
500 level – although it would be very speculative to try to say how high up this would go,
501 as part of one of the many psychological strategies that are being implemented against
502 these detainees. The extent to which that connects to a higher-level policy, I find
503 impossible to say.

504 *COUNSEL – To the extent that it may argued that what has been implemented is at*
505 *variance with the important instructions of President Xi, or the will of the central*
506 *government, then one must assume that those responsible for implementation would*
507 *have faced some sort of disciplinary punishment or demotion. Are you aware of any*
508 *such proceedings having taken place? Anyone punished, disciplined, or demoted for*
509 *carrying out these atrocities?*

510 AZ – Yes, there was one very high, very noted example published by the New York
511 Times, based on the Xinjiang Papers in 2019, of, I believe, a County Party-Secretary
512 of Yarkant Shache County, who is said to have been punished and demoted and I
513 think even subject of trial, as a result of releasing some detainees, for economic
514 reasons I believe. This is an important example. It may possibly be the only example
515 of such a case of an official punished for not fully implementing. However, some of the
516 statements found in my report, which I did not quote in my presentation, provide
517 important additional, and previously unpublished evidence of some of the threatening,
518 stern and warning language surrounding the introduction and propagation of the March
519 2017 regulation, which will directly confirm this and make us think this would not have
520 been an isolated case. It also makes me think, more speculatively, admittedly, that the
521 words of Xi Jinping in early March at the two Sessions, confirmed the exhorting nature
522 in terms of the implementation of the campaign.