



AN INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL

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Response to Tribunal Queries on Population Dilution and Residential Schools

Rian Thum

24 August 2021

(1) On the policy to dilute the Xinjiang population, the Uyghur and indigenous population - what is the final purpose: You stated that the Han settlements are crucial for the security of the region and that this is expressed in documents, that you wished to re-read before giving an answer - submit to the Tribunal later.

Summary of Intent as expressed and demonstrated

The final purpose of dilution, as described in Chinese government documents, is to achieve security and lasting rule of the CCP in Xinjiang under a shared “Chinese” (中华) culture. Under the same security umbrella, officials from Xi Jinping down to the local level call for the melding of ethnic groups in a “melting pot.” Party officials focus on two “problems” that they see as obstacles to the dilution and melding they believe is critical for security and continued rule: 1) indigenous population substantially outnumbering the Han in Xinjiang and 2) indigenous people living in concentrated areas. They seek to address these perceived threats by increasing Han population in the region through migration, increasing Han population in the region through promotion of childbearing, physically removing Uyghurs from areas where they predominate (and from Xinjiang entirely), and preventing Uyghur births.

The expressed intentions summarized above are reflected in actual policy design and implementation. There are other intentions expressed which do not match actual policies, suggesting that their role is primarily rhetorical. Notable among these are official claims that the “melting pot” should blend minorities with Han and Han with minorities, implying that the change in culture and identification is equal. In fact, the policies actually implemented all focus on weakening minority groups’ ethnic identification and bringing their cultural practices into line with the Han. This suggests an unspoken intent to absorb Xinjiang’s indigenous ethnic groups into the Han.

Expressions of intent in state documents

Clear expressions of intent can be found in speeches by leaders, state media, local government planning documents, official research institution publications, and articles by state-supported academics. The connection between population dilution and security is entirely explicit and consistent across documents, as is the call for “melting pot” fusion.

The number of available documents on the topic is high. A large selection of them have been reviewed, summarized, and quoted from extensively in [“End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group’: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang”](#) by Adrian Zenz. Rather than summarize these documents again I will introduce examples that are not included in Zenz’s article, which show how these policy goals are framed by Xi Jinping and then re-presented by lower officials and Party academics. (I recommend also reviewing the quotes in the Zenz article alongside my comments here, because they include statements that are even more forthright, for example, discussion of building an environment in which “ethnic boundaries and barriers are gradually weakened and eliminated.”)

The close relationship between Xi Jinping’s orders and lower-level policy making is particularly clear in state documents related to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, commonly referred to by its

Chinese abbreviation, “Bingtuan.” The Bingtuan is a para-military conglomerate and governing arm of the Chinese state, and it has had an outsize role in population dilution based on migration. This is because the Bingtuan was primarily founded as a soldier-settler organization, which brought over a million Chinese settlers to Xinjiang in its first two decades. In the period of 2014-2017 the Bingtuan was tasked with a change in mission emphasis, moving from a focus on economic development to a focus on security and population “optimization.”

Xi Jinping announced the new strategic goals for the Bingtuan when he visited a Bingtuan facility in 2014 and delivered a speech. The original speech appears not to have been made public, but it is [summarized](#) and quoted from in state [media](#), Bingtuan documents, and Chinese academic papers. Bingtuan policy papers regularly cite this speech as the source of the organization’s guiding mission.

Xi’s speech outlines “[four major roles](#)” for the Bingtuan in ensuing years:

- “Adjusting the social composition”
- “Promoting cultural exchange” [between ethnic groups]
- “Advancing regional coordination”
- “Optimizing population resources”

The “major roles” are presented as means of achieving three central goals for the Bingtuan: “stabilizing the border region” (Xinjiang); acting as “a melting pot of all ethnic groups”; and serving as a “model zone of advanced productivity and advanced culture.”¹ All four of the “major roles” target the cultural and demographic distinctiveness of indigenous groups, especially the Uyghurs, in the Southern part of Xinjiang, where such groups are concentrated. Here I will focus primarily on “optimizing population resources.”

The meaning of the population resource optimization policy is discussed in detail in an article entitled “Research on Giving Full Play to the Bingtuan’s Special Role in Optimizing Population Resources,” written by two scholars at the official Party school of the Bingtuan, which trains government officials.²

In its opening paragraph the article cites Xi Jinping as the source of the “four major roles” and “optimizing population resources” in particular. Population resources are described in terms of four aspects: size, quality, composition, and distribution. The composition category includes, among other aspects, “Han-ethnic composition.” The authors describe this aspect as follows:

Han-ethnic composition mainly refers to the proportion, regional distribution, and residential concentration of the population of different ethnic groups. Affected by factors such as ethnic habits, religious beliefs, and family planning policies, the birth rate of minority populations is far higher than that of the Han ethnic group, resulting in a continuous decline in the proportion of the Han ethnicity in the total population. At the same time, ethnic minorities are characterized by a high degree of concentrated residence. Highly concentrated areas of ethnic minorities are

¹ A [media report](#) quotes Xi directly: “We must give full play to the special role of the Bingtuan in adjusting social composition, promoting cultural exchange, advancing regional coordination, and optimizing population resources, so that the Bingtuan can truly become a stabilizing tool for a stable and secure border region, melting pot of people of all ethnic groups, and a model area of advanced productivity and advanced culture.

² Li Wei-chao and Wang Li-juan, “兵团发挥优化人口资源特殊作用问题研究[A Discussion on Playing the Special Role of the XPCC in Optimizing the Population Resources]”, *西北人口 Northwest Population Journal*. 2020, 1: 116-126.

likely to become targets of extremist ideological infiltration and erosion, and we must attach great importance to them.

The paper goes on to outline the “problems” that the “optimization of population resources” needs to address. Within the composition category the authors list four problems. One of them is that “the population of ethnic minorities is growing faster than that of Han people and their residence pattern is distinctly concentrated.” The authors are concerned not only that growth is disproportionate within the Bingtuan, but also in Xinjiang as a whole, lamenting that “in terms of Xinjiang, the proportion of the Han in the total population also dropped from 41.38% to 32.32% ... while the proportion of ethnic minorities rose to 67.68%” between 1980 and 2017.

To address these “problems,” the authors go on to recommend the following policies, which have all been implemented since the article’s publication:

- Implement preferential policies and special benefits to create increased immigration from internal Chinese provinces to Xinjiang.
- “Improve the quality of ethnic minority populations” through education in the Chinese language.
- “guide ethnic minority populations to migrate” out of Xinjiang to cities in the interior.
- Encourage ethnic minorities to move to out of the Southern part of Xinjiang, where they are concentrated, and into the North.

These policies are offered alongside recommendations for expanding the size of the Bingtuan in an absolute sense and expanding its presence in the Uyghur-dominated South. The Bingtuan population has historically fluctuated between 80% and 90% Han, part of the reason that the Bingtuan is seen as a stabilizing force.

Numerous other, less detailed state publications repeatedly emphasize the Bingtuan’s role as a “melting pot to congeal all ethnicities” and “promoting advanced culture and Chinese (中华) culture.

“Melting pot” absorption is of course not the only consideration that state actors bring to questions of population distribution in Xinjiang, but it does appear to be the overriding concern. For example, planners also express concern about limited resources (especially water) in Xinjiang and worry that the population is already too large in many areas. Nonetheless, the “melting pot” goal overrides this concern where the Han population is outnumbered, and planners are working hard to increase the Han population even where they are aware of strains on resources.

While the above expressions of intent are reflected in policies enacted on the ground, other expressions are not. Several documents describe the “melting pot” and embedding as a two-way street, as is implied in Xi Jinping’s phrase, “cultural exchange,” suggesting that Han Chinese will have to change as much as indigenous ethnic groups. However, there is little or no evidence of programs that encourage Han people to change their daily habits and lifeways to those of indigenous groups. While Uyghur children must learn Mandarin, Chinese children have no requirement to study Uyghur. Uyghurs are required to refurbish their homes with “modern” Chinese-style furniture, but no Han people are required to adopt Uyghur furnishings. Uyghur students must learn Chinese moral and philosophical classics, but Chinese students need not study Uyghur equivalents. In short, while almost every element of Uyghur life is under pressure to become more Chinese, virtually no aspect of Han life is under pressure to become more Uyghur. This suggests that the “melting pot” is intended to absorb the Uyghurs and other

indigenous ethnicities into the Han, assisted by the dilution of the indigenous population and the curbing of their reproduction.

(2) On the intent behind boarding schools - you recommended looking at the 2017 report issued by the Xinjiang Bureau of Education which contains information on the subject. You mentioned getting more Han teachers, teaching Chinese, having it as a language of operation not just as a language of education, involving home visits to coerce Uyghur families to send their children into boarding schools.

Cultural assimilation is clearly an important goal of the boarding schools and its elements are discussed in the Xinjiang Education Department report on 2017 activities (published in 2018). That report was published by the national Education Department as part of a compendium of reports from multiple provinces and regions.

The following passages directly address your query:

“In order to implement the general goals proposed by General Secretary Jinping regarding Xinjiang’s social stability and long-term security, the autonomous region, based on the overall social stability of Xinjiang, has decided to make great efforts to run boarding schools in the compulsory education stage in rural areas, to promote the teaching of the national standard language [Mandarin Chinese], and to create a stable and peaceful learning environment for students, blocking the influence of the family’s religious atmosphere on the children to the greatest extent and reducing the occurrence of ‘teaching science in school, listening to the scriptures at home, with thinking and ideas suffering the shocks of moving back and forth’” (232)

All schools should “create a campus culture of comprehensive use of Mandarin; universally develop activities such as recitation of Chinese classics, reciting excellent poems, listening to Mandarin broadcasts, and singing Mandarin songs; uniformly use Beijing time on campus; and uniformly use Mandarin for communication...” (233-4)

In reporting on the education department’s recent successes, the document boasts that “the recruitment of teachers, especially the number and proportion of Han teachers, is unprecedented in history.” (236)

In further recruiting teachers the report says, “regard political quality and the ability to teach the national standard language as the primary standards.” (238)

“Effectively give full play to the role of the autonomous region’s “*fang hui ju*” [home visitation and monitoring program] working team in villages, implement door-to-door visits, and urge guardians to send school-age children and adolescents to school and complete compulsory education” (237)

(3) Any further issues you wish to raise and/or which arise from (1) and (2) above.

The “melting pot” terminology has a distinctive history in China, originally indicating the assimilation of minorities to Han culture and identity. It was used in the early twentieth century, most notably by Sun Yatsen, who is widely regarded in China today as the father of the modern Chinese nation. His seminal works are still praised and promoted by the PRC government. Sun advocated a “melting pot” approach to ethnic diversity in China and promoted an overarching “Chinese” (*Zhonghua*) race/culture to subsume all peoples within China’s borders. He was explicit in advocating that the other, smaller ethnic groups assimilate to Han culture, something he thought would be the natural outcome of mixing given the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Han. The Communist Party of China subsequently abandoned much of Sun’s ethnic ideology for an approach borrowed from the Soviet Union. The term *Zhonghua* receded in favor of *Zhongguo*, and the “melting pot” approach was replaced by an emphasis on the individual flourishing of distinctive ethnic groups in a “multi-ethnic nation-state”. In the last ten years the central government has turned away from theories and policies supporting ethnic distinctiveness, following the advice of scholars who began to explicitly attack the existing ethnic policies in the 1990s. State pronouncements have now followed those scholars and returned to the terminology of Sun Yatsen, including the frequent use of *Zhonghua*, framed as an overarching state/race based in Han Chinese culture, and the idea of the “melting pot” fusing all people into this overarching ethnic/racial identity.

1 **13 September 2021 (6:43:20 – 7:12:00)**

2 **Rian Thum**

3

4 RIAN THUM – In answer to the first question of the purpose behind the dilution of
5 Uyghur population, particularly in the southern part of Xinjiang, I provided the panel
6 with access to explicit statements that are quite numerous across officialdom and sort
7 of state supported universities and academics that explain why they see the population
8 structure in southern Xinjiang as a problem. Many of those are made available in a
9 paper that has now come out in a peer reviewed journal by Adrian Zenz. I also
10 provided some of my own research and some statements that I found myself. What
11 they all agree on is that changing the population and demographic structure of Xinjiang
12 is important to long term party rule in Xinjiang and stability. In order to achieve that
13 assimilation is required and that the concentration of Uyghurs and the superior
14 numbers of Uyghurs in the south is an obstacle to that assimilation.

15 I focused on my response in particular on the Bingtuan, the Xinjiang Production and
16 Construction Corp, which has probably been the main vehicle for bringing settlers into
17 Xinjiang over the last half-century or more, because there we can see a very clear line
18 of orders from Xi Jinping himself beginning with his speech in 2014, which are then
19 dissected and expounded upon by papers by authors from the Bingtuan Party School.
20 It is a good place to see exactly where this expression of intent comes from. It is
21 explained in some detail. Most notably Xi Jinping's speech calls for adjusting the social
22 composition of the population, promoting cultural exchange, advancing regional
23 coordination, which is pointing to giving the Bingtuan a bigger role in the south, and
24 optimising population resources which is further elaborated at lower levels as

25 addressing the problem of the dominance of the Uyghur population and its
26 concentration.

27 I won't talk too much about the second question which was specifically a question to
28 me about a request for me to provide examples of assimilation as intent that I
29 mentioned exist in the 2018 report by the Xinjiang Education Department. I provided
30 some working translations of those sections including the part where they say the
31 boarding schools are intended to block the influence of the family's religious
32 atmosphere on the children to the greatest extent. That teachers should be recruited
33 primarily based on political quality and ability to teach Chinese and the emphasis on
34 recruiting Han teachers for boarding schools.

35 *COUNSEL – Thank you very much for that very informative summary. I have a few*
36 *questions starting inf act with the point you have just made about assimilation*
37 *meaning, from the perspective of Chinese authorities, being a melting pot or a cultural*
38 *exchange and of course these words (melting pot or cultural exchange) they imply,*
39 *they connote a constructive exchange. However, from your analysis you found that in*
40 *reality what this policy translates to is far from constructive. In your own words you say*
41 *that “whilst almost every element of Uyghur life is under pressure to become more*
42 *Chinese, virtually no aspect of Han life is under pressure to become more Uyghur.” If*
43 *you could firstly expand a little about that. It is not really an exchange therefore, we*
44 *are speaking about, is it?*

45 RT – That's right. I think an excellent example is the demolition of Uyghur homes and
46 the redecorating of Uyghur homes. Which is a policy in many parts of southern Xinjiang
47 now whereby where Uyghurs are compelled to remove the sorts of beds they normally
48 use where people will sleep together or do homework together and things like that –

49 and replace them with so-called 'modern' beds which are used across the rest of
50 China. We see no examples of Han people being forced to install Uyghur-style
51 furniture or Uyghur-style bed. We also see, of course, the compulsory education in
52 Chinese and not just in classes within the schools. There is very clear instructions that
53 Chinese should be the language of communication within the school. There are no
54 schools that do this for Han people to learn Uyghur.

55 *COUNSEL – Thank you for that. You also explained, therefore, that the ultimate*
56 *purpose of this policy is control of the Xinjiang province or area by the central*
57 *government. The means of reaching that ultimate goal is assimilation. So if we have a*
58 *look at this graph you have put on the screen now. We currently see a number of*
59 *yellow dots that are Han areas and the number of blue dots that are Uyghur areas,*
60 *together with some others. How will that map look once this assimilation project is*
61 *accomplished?*

62 RT – That is a very interesting question. It is hard to predict where Chinese ethnic
63 policy will go if they achieve the kind of assimilation they are seeking. Identity is not
64 solely based on cultural content. People maintain ethnic borders between themselves
65 and others, even when they share all or nearly all of there cultural content. So it is
66 conceivable, if the Chinese government achieves its assimilationist goals, which
67 appear to be that all Uyghur speaking Chinese as there strongest language, living in
68 houses that look like Han Chinese houses, not practicing Islam et cetera, it is quite
69 conceivable that they will maintain a Uyghur identity. For the moment, the state seems
70 to be resisting some calls from some academics within China to eliminate the ethnic
71 name from identity cards. Much of the new ethnic policies that have been adopted,
72 comes from a set of academics who propound what is usually called [*inaudible*]... A
73 lot of those want to actually eliminate the ethnic term from identity cards. The central

74 authorities have rejected that. At the moment they seem to be leaving room for
75 persistence of identification. However, I don't there is any reason to assume that they
76 would maintain that stance into the future, in which case you could have all the dots
77 be one colour which would be Chung Hua people. Not the Han nor the Uyghur, but
78 the Chung Hua people.

79 *COUNSEL – Thank you for that. Just to press a bit further. Yes, so indeed, things may*
80 *not always go to plan and sometimes other events may intervene and the resilience*
81 *of the Uyghur people themselves could help maintain the blue dots there. In terms of*
82 *the intention now of the government, the intention is very much for the majority of the*
83 *dots in Xinjiang to be, you are saying neither yellow nor blue but it's a merge? Is that*
84 *a correct?*

85 RT – Yes. I would say that the intention present, or at least when these documents
86 came out, is to have the yellow dots outnumber the purple dots - to have the purple
87 dots spread out. Some of them moved to the interior of China, many of them moved
88 up to the north so the dots don't have this divide that you see. The ideal that they are
89 expressing is that the yellow dots would outnumber the purple and that they would be
90 evenly intermixed. That is an intermediary stage to the fuller goal of assimilation. That
91 is a means to assimilation. They see that concentration as a barrier to assimilation.

92 *COUNSEL – Thank you for that. I have two more questions relating now to your work*
93 *on boarding schools. In your report you refer to compulsory boarding schools, which*
94 *as you say in the report, but you also said again today, they aim to block the influence*
95 *of the family religious atmosphere on the children and to re-educate and re-socialise*
96 *perhaps these children into Han Chinese culture. This is done, for instance, promoting*
97 *culture of comprehensive use of Mandarin. Perhaps if you could, speak a little more*

98 *about this ultimate purpose of these boarding schools. Perhaps if you could reflect on*
99 *whether there could be any other ultimate purposes for them, such as advancing the*
100 *education of the children going to the school. Is that conceivably one of the purposes?*

101 RT – I think that is conceivably one of the purposes. I don't think it is the main purpose
102 because this report comes in a compilation of reports from, I think all of the different
103 provinces and regions in China. There is only one report in that compilation that
104 emphasises the construction of boarding schools and that's Xinjiang. So, none of the
105 other provinces have seen an expansion of boarding schools as crucial to improving
106 educational outcomes and that includes Tibet. So, I don't think it is really plausible to
107 think of that as the main intent. Although even ten years ago there were a lot of Uyghur
108 parents who voluntarily sent their children to Mandarin-speaking schools, because it
109 would give them better employment prospects. For sure there can be some benefit to
110 knowing Chinese, I doubt that any of the parents would think that there is a benefit in
111 essentially having their children raised as Han Chinese. Whilst documents do not
112 speak of the sort of cultural material that is promoted in these schools. We have plenty
113 of evidence from news reports within China and out, of students celebrating Han
114 Chinese holidays, reading Confucius texts and of course, like everyone else and all
115 the children, they will have to study Xi Jinping thought.

116 *COUNSEL – Thank you, ok. As you put it in your report, the main purpose is then*
117 *resocialisation into Han Chinese culture. First and foremost, is this resocialisation*
118 *meant to be temporary or permanent on the children?*

119 RT – In my opinion it is meant to be permanent.

120 *COUNSEL – So, now perhaps I am asking you to look both into future but also into*
121 *the intention behind these boarding schools then – if it is intended to be permanent.*

122 *Could you reflect a little for us on what kind of adults will these children, sent to these*
123 *boarding schools, become? In particular will they see themselves as Uyghurs firstly?*
124 *To what extent for instance, for example Uyghur religion or Uyghur culture be able to*
125 *survive through these children from these boarding schools in the future?*

126 RT – We have some good evidence from the past that can give us an insight into that.
127 There are two groups...Two populations that have experienced something somewhat
128 similar. One is the so-called Xinjiang class of Uyghur students who go to the east coast
129 and study in boarding schools there. The other is Min Kao Han, these are Uyghurs
130 who for decades had been doing their education in the Chinese system and in
131 Mandaring. It literally means “ethnicities testing in the Han way.” Among those, of both
132 of those populations the adults still think of themselves as Uyghurs by and large. This
133 is not a topic of research for me but I can say anecdotally, meeting Min Kao Han, they
134 are better in Chinese than Uyghur language. Many of them can’t write in Uyghur and
135 can only speak it. There is often a lot of anxiety about not being as familiar with the
136 culture they identify with as Uyghurs who went through Uyghur language education. I
137 also think as a historian looking at assimilation projects around the world you find that
138 even when people are put through this intense assimilationist programme, they tend
139 to still identify as not being a member of the majority ethnicity at the least. That is
140 something that is not just a choice, although they often choose to do that – but
141 something that is enforced upon them by the dominant group and I expect that these
142 adults will still suffer no matter how much they are assimilated to Han Chinese ways
143 of life. They will still suffer discrimination for being Uyghur.

144 *COUNSEL – Very quick final question and then I will hand you over to the panel. So*
145 *just to clarify, from historic precedent, they will find it hard to identify with the majority*

146 *group and how easy or difficult will it be for them to identify with the minority group, in*
147 *this case the Uyghurs?*

148 RT – In the case of the Min Kao Han, they often face difficulties in both directions.
149 Uyghurs who are not Min Kao Han will sometimes see them as fully Uyghur or real
150 Uyghurs.

151 COUNSEL – *Thank you. I will now hand you over the panel.*

152 PANEL – *Thank you for joining us again today. So if I thought about or if we thought*
153 *about what goes beyond assimilation and that the objective is not to turn Uyghurs into*
154 *Han. But to create subservient citizens, subservient class and there is arguably*
155 *reasonable evidence in regard to that, removal of many of the rights of citizens is*
156 *endemic. So, if that was the case and you now no longer thought about this map in*
157 *yellow and blue but all the blues become a sort of very pale grey. That gives you very*
158 *different context and imagery around where this might end up, does that resonate at*
159 *all?*

160 RT – Yes, I think you make a good point. Beyond the question of re-engineering or
161 destroying the Uyghur identity, there is a process of creating this kind of underclass
162 which Uyghurs have suffered terrible dissemination before for this latest turn to
163 repression. But obviously as you mentioned many of the ordinary rights, for example
164 to have a trial, when you are detained have disappeared for this group. And grey dots...
165 If we take ethnicity out of the picture then I think that makes some sense. I think
166 probably the intent, at least the vision that appears from these speeches and the
167 analysis of these speeches is that maybe they are all red dots or they are all yellow
168 dots. That they are all one colour.

169 *PANEL – And in your report previously you talked about, as we just discussed, the*
170 *intent being however you want to describe it, population optimisation leading to*
171 *assimilation and so on. That is the intent. You talked about the motive as being that of*
172 *security, but would you think there might be other motives. History provides plenty of*
173 *examples such as land appropriation and resources appropriation. Exactly as one of*
174 *our expert witnesses talked about yesterday the indigenous population in America. It*
175 *could be a slave labour; it could be a whole bunch of things. Does that make any*
176 *sense?*

177 RT – Yes, absolutely. I so far have only been discussing the stated intent to be there.
178 There is plenty of evidence of other motives or incentives. It is hard to disentangle
179 which of them are primary motivating factors and which of them are opportunistic.
180 There has not yet been systematic research that I am aware of on land grabs. But I
181 have seen a whole lot of anecdotal evidence of this all over Xinjiang. People who were
182 taken to internment camps have their land taken. There are demolition of Uyghur
183 villages going in an enormous pace. The old towns of all the cities and small towns of
184 the southern ring road or the southern curving road in the south have all been
185 demolished and people are moved out of farming into... Villages are being moved into
186 so-called 'modern villages.'. Then of course you have the use of Uyghurs to fill in the
187 labour gap China is experiencing. Some analysts would say the sense of Xinjiang as
188 an important corridor for trade if China can get steady trade going through Pakistan.
189 There are lots of economic reasons that go along with this. Economic opportunities for
190 powerful Han people to take the property of Uyghurs.

191 *PANEL – My final question. Could you shed any light on the power structure on the*
192 *Bingtuan? Is it a regional force of some autonomy? Or is it an agent of central*
193 *government? Is it possible to imagine that the execution of its policy in the region could*

194 *have been independently founded or is it more likely that its power source and its*
195 *policy emanates all the way from the top in Beijing?*

196 RT – It is absolutely beholden to Beijing. It must follow orders from Beijing. I am not
197 an expert on its bureaucratic structures, it roughly serves as a provincial entity of its
198 own but bears a similar responsibility to following central orders. I will read for you
199 something I ran across recently. This is a response to Xi Jinping’s 2014 speech on the
200 new direction for the Bingtuan which should focus more on population dilution. “The
201 Bingtuan Party Committee attaches great importance to studying, understanding and
202 implementing the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech. The
203 propaganda department actively organises Bingtuan experts and scholars to study the
204 spirit of the speech to write theoretical articles. The Bingtuan daily attaches great
205 importance to the publication of theoretical on studying and implementing the spirit of
206 General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech”

207 *PANEL – Regarding Han migrants, could you say anything about their composition?*
208 *Are they for instance, mainly young men? Is there any information you can give us on*
209 *that?*

210 RT – The information that I know is not detailed enough to give you much on that.
211 Traditionally it has been mainly men and it was an enormous problem for the Bingtuan
212 in the 1950s and 1960s. There were big efforts to bring women against their will to the
213 Bingtuan. Who is responding to the calls right now, is something I can’t answer...

214 *PANEL – Thank you for giving evidence on both occasions. I am sure your evidence*
215 *will feature in our final decision. Thank you again very much.*

